Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein
Zeid Ra'ad al-Hussein é presidente do Instituto Internacional da Paz e membro do The Elders. Foi Alto Comissário da ONU para os Direitos Humanos de 2014 a 2018 e, antes disso, atuou como Embaixador da Jordânia nos Estados Unidos e nas Nações Unidas.
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| Palestinos retornando ao norte da Faixa de Gaza, outubro de 2025 Dawoud Abu Alkas / Reuters |
Construir uma paz duradoura, justa e abrangente no Oriente Médio deve ser como construir uma ponte. De um lado, os arquitetos da paz devem construir a partir de onde estão hoje: negociar um acordo de cessar-fogo, mantê-lo e direcioná-lo para uma solução duradoura. Do outro lado, outros devem definir os contornos desse acordo permanente e, em seguida, fazer a engenharia reversa para conectá-lo aos esforços atuais.
Se seguirem esse plano, aqueles que trabalham em uma visão de paz de longo prazo poderão fazê-lo sem serem afetados por quaisquer convulsões políticas ou ódios crescentes que surjam no curto prazo. A libertação de todos os reféns israelenses sobreviventes pelo Hamas, a retirada de Israel de Gaza e o fim de sua terrível campanha no território (que uma comissão de inquérito das Nações Unidas e muitos outros especialistas descreveram como genocídio) oferecem um alívio desesperadamente necessário. Devemos também dar crédito ao presidente dos EUA, Donald Trump, e seu governo por ajudarem a garantir a trégua incipiente. Mas este cessar-fogo será apenas uma pausa, uma interrupção em uma longa e sombria história, se não for eventualmente conectado a um futuro acordo político que acomode as aspirações legítimas de israelenses e palestinos: dois Estados. Tal acordo pode parecer distante, mas sua busca não é insensata. Determinar em detalhes como seriam dois Estados vivendo lado a lado em paz e harmonia não precisa depender do humor público predominante hoje. Os planejadores podem elaborar os detalhes agora que inspirarão ampla aceitação no futuro.
Infelizmente, quando se trata de paz no Oriente Médio, a tendência tem sido, há muito tempo, trabalhar para superar desafios presentes e efêmeros, sem uma compreensão clara do destino final. Essa foi a abordagem adotada com os acordos de Oslo na década de 1990 e o Roteiro para a Paz no Oriente Médio de 2003. Hoje, muitos observadores estão novamente obcecados pelas condições imediatas: como aproveitar a iniciativa de paz de 20 pontos de Trump e expandir a primeira fase do cessar-fogo para estabilizar Gaza de forma mais ampla.
Embora pôr fim ao sofrimento em Gaza, juntamente com a garantia da libertação de reféns e prisioneiros, seja um objetivo urgente e necessário, ele continua sendo apenas mais uma forma de cessar-fogo — não uma paz duradoura. A estrutura de Trump, pelo menos em sua forma atual, aborda a possibilidade de um Estado palestino, sem maiores detalhes. Os palestinos e os Estados árabes, desesperados para ver o fim da miséria em Gaza, aceitaram o plano. Mas é difícil imaginar que possam sustentar seu apoio ao plano a longo prazo sem um compromisso claro dos EUA com a criação de dois Estados. Afinal, essa foi a posição que expressaram ao apoiar a recente Declaração de Nova York, liderada pela França e pela Arábia Saudita, que ofereceu um roteiro para uma solução de dois Estados e foi endossada pela Assembleia Geral da ONU em setembro.
É verdade que o primeiro-ministro israelense Benjamin Netanyahu e seus aliados permanecem totalmente opostos à criação de um Estado palestino — e, de fato, têm procurado excluir a possibilidade de sua fundação. Mas essa posição não é imutável; as atitudes públicas e as pressões políticas mudam e se transformam, e os líderes israelenses podem pensar de forma diferente no futuro. Enquanto isso, israelenses e palestinos que desejam construir uma solução de dois Estados devem prosseguir. Felizmente, grupos da sociedade civil israelense e palestina têm feito esforços meritórios nos últimos anos para traçar um quadro mais detalhado da paz.
Existem atualmente três variações principais de uma solução plausível de dois Estados. Uma delas é a proposta bastante convencional apresentada pelo ex-primeiro-ministro israelense Ehud Olmert e pelo ex-ministro das Relações Exteriores palestino Nasser al-Kidwa, que retoma o ponto em que os negociadores pararam há quase duas décadas. Os outros dois defendem a criação de entidades confederadas compostas por dois Estados interligados de diferentes maneiras: a "Confederação da Terra Santa", proposta pelo ex-ministro israelense Yossi Beilin e pela advogada palestina Hiba Husseini, e "Uma Terra para Todos: Dois Estados, Uma Pátria", elaborada ao longo de anos de consultas colaborativas entre uma ampla variedade de líderes da sociedade civil israelense e palestina e agora liderada pelas ativistas May Pundak e Rula Hardal. Esses planos para uma confederação buscam maneiras inovadoras de superar os obstáculos que tornaram tão difícil alcançar uma paz duradoura no passado. Esse pensamento criativo e de longo prazo é crucial. À medida que os palestinos buscam reconstruir suas vidas em Gaza e os últimos reféns israelenses retornam para casa, é essencial começar a construir o outro lado da ponte, dando total peso às propostas pragmáticas apresentadas por israelenses e palestinos para uma solução de dois Estados confiável e duradoura.
FALSE STARTS
Understanding these initiatives requires first looking at the past three decades of efforts toward a two-state solution. Through a series of bilateral discussions beginning with the Oslo process, in 1993, Israelis and Palestinians settled on a gradual approach to peacemaking that would culminate in an agreement on five principal “final status issues”: borders, Jewish settlements, Jerusalem, the right of Palestinian refugees to return, and security. These were issues thought to be so difficult that they were better left until the very end, when a sufficient store of trust would have accumulated between the two sides.
The approach could have worked had there been a mechanism in place that forced the two parties to stick to agreed timelines no matter the circumstances—and had those circumstances not proved so volatile. Attacks by both Israeli right-wing extremists and Hamas battered the process almost from the beginning. In 1994, an Israeli American extremist carried out a mass shooting of Palestinians at the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron. The following year, an Israeli extremist assassinated Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Months later, Israeli forces killed Yahya Ayyash, the commander of Hamas, and the group responded by launching a series of devastating bus bombings. All these attacks took their toll on the peace process, and the timelines soon fell by the wayside. The process took another downturn in 1996, following Netanyahu’s election as prime minister—he had campaigned against Oslo. Neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians had any clearer sense of how the process would resolve the important final status issues. And all the while, the construction of Jewish settlements continued apace in the West Bank and Gaza.
The Oslo process briefly regained momentum in 1999, after Ehud Barak became Israel’s prime minister. Barak tried to rescue Oslo by moving straight to final status talks. This attempt also failed. Soon after the Camp David talks ended, in 2000, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat was simply unwilling to accept all of Barak’s peace proposal—although some have attributed this decision less to Arafat’s intransigence than to a rushed negotiation and poor personal chemistry between the two men.
Um cessar-fogo não é uma paz duradoura.
Significantly, however, at the end of the Camp David talks, U.S. President Bill Clinton outlined his suggested parameters for peace, including the idea of territorial swaps. His argument was simple: if the border separating Israel from the Palestinian territories could be agreed on precisely, the thorny issue of settlements would also be resolved. Under his proposal, the states would be demarcated by the Green Line (the borders before the Six Day War in 1967, in which Israel gained control of the West Bank and Gaza), but with some adjustments. The Palestinians would cede four to six percent of the West Bank to Israel with no territorial compensation, and a further one to three percent of all their territory in exchange for land Israel would hand over from elsewhere. By modifying the border this way, Israel would retain control over 80 percent of the settler population. The settlers living on land that remained in the Palestinian territories would be relocated back to Israel.
The proposal of land swaps became the principal key used in attempts to unlock other issues. Over the next few years, land swaps found their way into further plans to reach a final status agreement, such as The People’s Voice initiative in July 2002 and, significantly, the Geneva accord of December 2003. The latter document, drafted by civil society representatives from both sides, offered a model Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement and outline of a two-state solution. The accord did not, however, offer much detail on how the land swaps would work.
Despite these efforts to advance a final peace agreement, diplomacy was overtaken by escalating violence, deepening mistrust, and diverging priorities among Israeli, Palestinian, and regional actors. By 2003, relations between Israelis and Palestinians had reached a new low. The second intifada, ignited by the provocative visit of the Israeli politician (and future prime minister) Ariel Sharon to the Holy Esplanade in Jerusalem in September 2000, still burned. Two important peace initiatives then failed to secure Israel’s backing: the Arab Peace Initiative in March 2002, spearheaded by Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, and the Roadmap for Peace presented by the Quartet on the Middle East (consisting of Russia, the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations) in late April 2003. These initiatives had helped define how a future two-state peace would be accepted within the region; all the Arab states would recognize Israel once the latter ended its occupation of the Palestinian territories. They also demonstrated the international community’s desire to press the two sides into an agreement. Yet Israel remained unconvinced about the Arab Peace Initiative and responded to the road map with 14 points of its own. Sharon’s government argued that nothing could be done until the intifada stopped, even though many countries believed an end to the intifada and a negotiated settlement based on two states could be pursued in parallel.
The possibility of land swaps was not picked up again until 2006, after the intifada had subsided and both camps had new leaders: Olmert, who became prime minister of Israel in 2006, and Mahmoud Abbas, who was elected president of the Palestinian Authority in 2005. Yet they struggled to agree on the precise percentage of land that would be exchanged. After two years of negotiations, both sides were stuck somewhere between four and six percent. Those exchanges were the last time serious face-to-face negotiations on final status issues took place.
O PASSADO COMO PRÓLOGO
Quase duas décadas depois, Olmert, agora cidadão israelense, está novamente por trás de uma iniciativa de dois Estados, juntamente com Kidwa, um conceituado ex-ministro das Relações Exteriores da Autoridade Palestina. A proposta Olmert-Kidwa retoma exatamente onde as negociações Olmert-Abbas terminaram em 2008, mas acrescenta uma linguagem nova e criativa sobre Gaza e Jerusalém. Olmert e Kidwa sugeriram agora um valor de 4,4% para a troca territorial, que incluiria a criação de um corredor entre Gaza e a Cisjordânia.
Única entre as visões para uma solução de dois Estados, embora agora se assemelhe a aspectos do plano de 20 pontos de Trump, esta iniciativa também se concentra na criação de uma estrutura de governança tecnocrática para Gaza. Olmert e Kidwa referem-se a essa estrutura como o Conselho de Comissários e, ao contrário do órgão semelhante no plano de Trump, ela estaria vinculada ao Conselho de Ministros da Autoridade Palestina.
As eleições gerais seriam realizadas dentro de dois a três anos após a criação do conselho. Uma "presença temporária de segurança árabe" seria enviada a Gaza para trabalhar com uma força de segurança palestina, responsável perante o Conselho de Comissários. Essa força árabe preencheria a lacuna de segurança e impediria ataques contra Israel. Além disso, uma conferência de doadores seria convocada para arrecadar fundos para a reconstrução de Gaza.
Jerusalém seria dividida em duas capitais ao longo da Linha Verde, com os bairros judeus construídos no lado palestino da cidade após junho de 1967 incluídos na troca de terras. A Cidade Velha seria administrada por uma tutela de cinco Estados, incluindo Israel e um Estado palestino, e regida por regras estabelecidas pelo Conselho de Segurança da ONU. O plano também reconhece o papel especial do rei da Jordânia na custódia dos locais sagrados islâmicos em Jerusalém. Nenhum Estado teria soberania exclusiva sobre a área dentro e ao redor de Jerusalém, conhecida como Bacia Sagrada, e todos os fiéis teriam acesso aos locais sagrados da área sem limitações. Este Estado palestino seria desmilitarizado, exceto para fins de segurança interna.
O plano Olmert-Kidwa não oferece recomendações definitivas para todas as questões de status final. As questões de colonos, assentamentos, refugiados e medidas de segurança adicionais, incluindo o possível posicionamento de tropas internacionais ao longo do Rio Jordão, seriam deixadas para negociações futuras.
A CONFEDERATION IN THE HOLY LAND
The approach could have worked had there been a mechanism in place that forced the two parties to stick to agreed timelines no matter the circumstances—and had those circumstances not proved so volatile. Attacks by both Israeli right-wing extremists and Hamas battered the process almost from the beginning. In 1994, an Israeli American extremist carried out a mass shooting of Palestinians at the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron. The following year, an Israeli extremist assassinated Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Months later, Israeli forces killed Yahya Ayyash, the commander of Hamas, and the group responded by launching a series of devastating bus bombings. All these attacks took their toll on the peace process, and the timelines soon fell by the wayside. The process took another downturn in 1996, following Netanyahu’s election as prime minister—he had campaigned against Oslo. Neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians had any clearer sense of how the process would resolve the important final status issues. And all the while, the construction of Jewish settlements continued apace in the West Bank and Gaza.
The Oslo process briefly regained momentum in 1999, after Ehud Barak became Israel’s prime minister. Barak tried to rescue Oslo by moving straight to final status talks. This attempt also failed. Soon after the Camp David talks ended, in 2000, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat was simply unwilling to accept all of Barak’s peace proposal—although some have attributed this decision less to Arafat’s intransigence than to a rushed negotiation and poor personal chemistry between the two men.
Um cessar-fogo não é uma paz duradoura.
Significantly, however, at the end of the Camp David talks, U.S. President Bill Clinton outlined his suggested parameters for peace, including the idea of territorial swaps. His argument was simple: if the border separating Israel from the Palestinian territories could be agreed on precisely, the thorny issue of settlements would also be resolved. Under his proposal, the states would be demarcated by the Green Line (the borders before the Six Day War in 1967, in which Israel gained control of the West Bank and Gaza), but with some adjustments. The Palestinians would cede four to six percent of the West Bank to Israel with no territorial compensation, and a further one to three percent of all their territory in exchange for land Israel would hand over from elsewhere. By modifying the border this way, Israel would retain control over 80 percent of the settler population. The settlers living on land that remained in the Palestinian territories would be relocated back to Israel.
The proposal of land swaps became the principal key used in attempts to unlock other issues. Over the next few years, land swaps found their way into further plans to reach a final status agreement, such as The People’s Voice initiative in July 2002 and, significantly, the Geneva accord of December 2003. The latter document, drafted by civil society representatives from both sides, offered a model Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement and outline of a two-state solution. The accord did not, however, offer much detail on how the land swaps would work.
Despite these efforts to advance a final peace agreement, diplomacy was overtaken by escalating violence, deepening mistrust, and diverging priorities among Israeli, Palestinian, and regional actors. By 2003, relations between Israelis and Palestinians had reached a new low. The second intifada, ignited by the provocative visit of the Israeli politician (and future prime minister) Ariel Sharon to the Holy Esplanade in Jerusalem in September 2000, still burned. Two important peace initiatives then failed to secure Israel’s backing: the Arab Peace Initiative in March 2002, spearheaded by Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, and the Roadmap for Peace presented by the Quartet on the Middle East (consisting of Russia, the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations) in late April 2003. These initiatives had helped define how a future two-state peace would be accepted within the region; all the Arab states would recognize Israel once the latter ended its occupation of the Palestinian territories. They also demonstrated the international community’s desire to press the two sides into an agreement. Yet Israel remained unconvinced about the Arab Peace Initiative and responded to the road map with 14 points of its own. Sharon’s government argued that nothing could be done until the intifada stopped, even though many countries believed an end to the intifada and a negotiated settlement based on two states could be pursued in parallel.
The possibility of land swaps was not picked up again until 2006, after the intifada had subsided and both camps had new leaders: Olmert, who became prime minister of Israel in 2006, and Mahmoud Abbas, who was elected president of the Palestinian Authority in 2005. Yet they struggled to agree on the precise percentage of land that would be exchanged. After two years of negotiations, both sides were stuck somewhere between four and six percent. Those exchanges were the last time serious face-to-face negotiations on final status issues took place.
O PASSADO COMO PRÓLOGO
Quase duas décadas depois, Olmert, agora cidadão israelense, está novamente por trás de uma iniciativa de dois Estados, juntamente com Kidwa, um conceituado ex-ministro das Relações Exteriores da Autoridade Palestina. A proposta Olmert-Kidwa retoma exatamente onde as negociações Olmert-Abbas terminaram em 2008, mas acrescenta uma linguagem nova e criativa sobre Gaza e Jerusalém. Olmert e Kidwa sugeriram agora um valor de 4,4% para a troca territorial, que incluiria a criação de um corredor entre Gaza e a Cisjordânia.
Única entre as visões para uma solução de dois Estados, embora agora se assemelhe a aspectos do plano de 20 pontos de Trump, esta iniciativa também se concentra na criação de uma estrutura de governança tecnocrática para Gaza. Olmert e Kidwa referem-se a essa estrutura como o Conselho de Comissários e, ao contrário do órgão semelhante no plano de Trump, ela estaria vinculada ao Conselho de Ministros da Autoridade Palestina.
As eleições gerais seriam realizadas dentro de dois a três anos após a criação do conselho. Uma "presença temporária de segurança árabe" seria enviada a Gaza para trabalhar com uma força de segurança palestina, responsável perante o Conselho de Comissários. Essa força árabe preencheria a lacuna de segurança e impediria ataques contra Israel. Além disso, uma conferência de doadores seria convocada para arrecadar fundos para a reconstrução de Gaza.
Jerusalém seria dividida em duas capitais ao longo da Linha Verde, com os bairros judeus construídos no lado palestino da cidade após junho de 1967 incluídos na troca de terras. A Cidade Velha seria administrada por uma tutela de cinco Estados, incluindo Israel e um Estado palestino, e regida por regras estabelecidas pelo Conselho de Segurança da ONU. O plano também reconhece o papel especial do rei da Jordânia na custódia dos locais sagrados islâmicos em Jerusalém. Nenhum Estado teria soberania exclusiva sobre a área dentro e ao redor de Jerusalém, conhecida como Bacia Sagrada, e todos os fiéis teriam acesso aos locais sagrados da área sem limitações. Este Estado palestino seria desmilitarizado, exceto para fins de segurança interna.
O plano Olmert-Kidwa não oferece recomendações definitivas para todas as questões de status final. As questões de colonos, assentamentos, refugiados e medidas de segurança adicionais, incluindo o possível posicionamento de tropas internacionais ao longo do Rio Jordão, seriam deixadas para negociações futuras.
A CONFEDERATION IN THE HOLY LAND
A second, arguably more creative effort has been promoted by the former Israeli minister and politician Yossi Beilin—one of the original architects of the Oslo process and an experienced negotiator who was also involved with the 2000 Camp David summit, the 2001 Taba talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and the 2003 Geneva accord. Since 2021, he and the Palestinian lawyer Hiba Husseini have been advocating for an arrangement dubbed the Holy Land Confederation, or the HLC. The HLC would be a confederation of two states based on a territorial swap limited to around 2.5 percent of the overall territory. Unlike the Olmert-Kidwa proposal, this one focuses on the structure of the two states and ventures some solutions to tricky final status issues. Its principal departure from the more familiar formulation of the Olmert-Kidwa proposal is the still novel idea of permanent residency for Israeli settlers and Palestinian refugees: Israelis whose settlements are not included in the land swap could remain in their homes as permanent residents of a future Palestine, and an equal number of Palestinian refugees could seek permanent resident status in Israel. The proposal examines in some detail the possible types of legal jurisdiction that would apply to these permanent residents.
Through introducing the notion of permanent residency, Beilin and Husseini are attempting to sort out borders and the question of settlements more or less in one go, much as the proposed land swaps of the Clinton era tried to do. They are trying to resolve the question of where Palestinian refugees can go by allowing for more than the token number of returnees proposed under Oslo. At the same time, permanent residency would obviate the need for a large forcible transfer of settlers back to Israel—and all the attendant chaos that would come with such upheaval. But both sides would have to negotiate a precise timetable that would first allow a Palestinian state to become fully functional and then for the confederation to come into being.
Like the initiative from Olmert and Kidwa, the HLC proposal supports dividing Jerusalem into two capitals. But rather than a five-state trusteeship to supervise the Holy Basin, Beilin and Husseini favor a joint Israeli-Palestinian committee, which would also be charged with municipal planning. Although they advocate for Jerusalem, in its entirety, to eventually become a fully open city, they argue that the Old City should be made open as soon as the confederation is created. They also propose a number of confederal institutions, including a human rights commission. On security, the proposal advocates for both sides to refrain from military cooperation with states or nonstate entities hostile to the other side, without defining what that would mean in the context of a comprehensive peace agreement.
One potential vulnerability is the HLC’s “exit clause,” which permits either state to leave the confederation. That possibility may encourage forces within both camps to push against the arrangement, much as those unhappy with the Oslo accords helped scupper the peace process. Some politicians will be opposed to the confederation from the start. Others will take advantage of inevitable teething issues to win popular support by attacking the HLC. If there is an exit clause, they will likely seek to invoke it, drawing on support from outside powers. The framers of the HLC should excise this exit clause or at least set a lengthy period—say, 50 years—before any withdrawal from the confederation is permitted.
A LAND FOR ALL
Through introducing the notion of permanent residency, Beilin and Husseini are attempting to sort out borders and the question of settlements more or less in one go, much as the proposed land swaps of the Clinton era tried to do. They are trying to resolve the question of where Palestinian refugees can go by allowing for more than the token number of returnees proposed under Oslo. At the same time, permanent residency would obviate the need for a large forcible transfer of settlers back to Israel—and all the attendant chaos that would come with such upheaval. But both sides would have to negotiate a precise timetable that would first allow a Palestinian state to become fully functional and then for the confederation to come into being.
Like the initiative from Olmert and Kidwa, the HLC proposal supports dividing Jerusalem into two capitals. But rather than a five-state trusteeship to supervise the Holy Basin, Beilin and Husseini favor a joint Israeli-Palestinian committee, which would also be charged with municipal planning. Although they advocate for Jerusalem, in its entirety, to eventually become a fully open city, they argue that the Old City should be made open as soon as the confederation is created. They also propose a number of confederal institutions, including a human rights commission. On security, the proposal advocates for both sides to refrain from military cooperation with states or nonstate entities hostile to the other side, without defining what that would mean in the context of a comprehensive peace agreement.
One potential vulnerability is the HLC’s “exit clause,” which permits either state to leave the confederation. That possibility may encourage forces within both camps to push against the arrangement, much as those unhappy with the Oslo accords helped scupper the peace process. Some politicians will be opposed to the confederation from the start. Others will take advantage of inevitable teething issues to win popular support by attacking the HLC. If there is an exit clause, they will likely seek to invoke it, drawing on support from outside powers. The framers of the HLC should excise this exit clause or at least set a lengthy period—say, 50 years—before any withdrawal from the confederation is permitted.
A LAND FOR ALL
The third proposal—A Land for All (ALFA)—was conceived in 2012 and is being led by the Israeli and Palestinian grassroots activists May Pundak and Rula Hardal. It takes the idea of the HLC even further. It, too, would fix the border between Israel and Palestine along the Green Line but, critically, with no variation. Instead of trying to sketch a series of land swaps, it centers entirely on permanent residency. Under the ALFA proposal, there would be no limitations on the numbers of Israelis or Palestinians who could seek permanent residency in the other state. But it does recognize the need for a phased approach to avoid inundating Israel with returning Palestinian refugees or the new state of Palestine with large numbers of Israelis wanting to relocate beyond the former settlements. The key to ALFA is its emphasis on freedom of movement for both peoples and the right of both peoples to settle in either state, not as citizens but as residents who can vote in local elections. The logic behind this is simple: Israelis and Palestinians both feel a deep emotional connection to all the land, from the river to the sea, and that principle must be baked into any durable and just peace.
On Jerusalem, ALFA has much in common with the other initiatives. Jerusalem would be the capital of both states, with freedom of movement throughout and shared management of the Old City, likely with international involvement. Rather than have the city divided by fences or walls, ALFA proposes to keep Jerusalem “whole, open, and shared.” Although Jerusalem would serve as two capitals, Israel and the Palestinian state would also delegate powers to a special body that governs the entire city—either as a single joint local government or as two municipalities under the confederal umbrella.
On security, again ALFA is similar to the other proposals, recognizing that each state needs to police its own sovereign territory. Unlike the other plans, it calls for reciprocal and agreed terms for the partial demilitarization of both states. It expressly opposes the unilateral deployment of foreign forces without the consent of both parties and supports a joint Israeli-Palestinian border force.
Uma solução confederada poderia superar obstáculos passados à paz.
The biggest threats to this plan, as with the other proposals and past peace efforts, would likely come from within, from those opposed to any form of accommodation. To prevent internal spoilers from derailing a two-state solution, architects of the agreement should craft robust dispute resolution mechanisms, a strong economic development strategy, supported by well-designed laws on both sides, and sensible decisions on education, language, and all civil rights matters. The final line of defense would have to be a regional security arrangement with credible guarantees for lasting stability; none of these proposals offer a vision for such an arrangement.
Compared with the HLC proposal, ALFA offers fewer details on confederal institutions. It does, however, provide a detailed plan on human rights. It emphasizes the importance of both sides embracing the principle of shared, universal human rights. Unlike the HLC’s proposal for a human rights commission, ALFA stresses the need for an appellate body, a supreme court of human rights, to hear cases filed after decisions are handed down in the courts of either country. As a former UN human rights chief, I fully support this approach.
Ultimately, ALFA is the most imaginative of these proposals in that it breaks from existing approaches and paradigms. There is a practical dimension to its idealistic ambition: it could accommodate Israeli settlements, which have hampered every attempt at Middle East peace to date. But all three proposals have merit. They offer real solutions to permanently ending years of extreme violence and oppression.
ALCANÇANDO O OUTRO LADO
Sem o trabalho desses visionários, seria difícil definir um futuro para o Oriente Médio. Embora Netanyahu possa ter acolhido o plano de Trump e aceitado uma referência a um potencial Estado palestino, não está totalmente claro o que ele realmente deseja para seu país e para a região. Além de administrar o que é claramente um status quo insustentável, ele parece não ter outro plano além do de sua coalizão de extrema direita, que busca um "Grande Israel" que implicaria a aniquilação dos palestinos em Gaza e na Cisjordânia. Esse caminho não é apenas terrível e inviável, mas também rejeitado pela maioria dos israelenses. Para alcançar a paz em Gaza além de cessar-fogo de curto prazo, deve haver um destino para o fim permanente deste conflito.
Um conflito tão arraigado e violento como o do Oriente Médio naturalmente gera ceticismo e cinismo. No entanto, existem razões reais para um otimismo cauteloso. Atores regionais e internacionais buscam assiduamente caminhos para reduzir a violência e lançar as bases para uma paz duradoura: o Catar, em coordenação com o Egito e os Estados Unidos, ajudou a conduzir as partes em direção a um cessar-fogo em Gaza; o Egito continua a liderar os esforços árabes em colaboração com os Estados vizinhos, particularmente a Jordânia; e a Arábia Saudita, juntamente com a França e a Noruega, mobilizou apoio diplomático e financeiro global para uma solução viável de dois Estados. Cada vez mais, países ao redor do mundo estão reconhecendo a condição de Estado palestino, sinalizando crescente preocupação e engajamento internacional.
É aqui que as propostas criativas e pragmáticas desenvolvidas por israelenses e palestinos — o plano Olmert-Kidwa, a Confederação da Terra Santa e a ALFA — se tornam indispensáveis. Elas oferecem caminhos realistas para uma solução duradoura de dois Estados, abordando uma série de questões complexas. Essas visões não são exercícios abstratos; elas representam o único caminho pragmático para encerrar o conflito e garantir a estabilidade regional. Certamente, manter o impulso em medidas de curto prazo — seja reduzindo as hostilidades, facilitando o apoio humanitário ou coordenando a pressão diplomática regional — é essencial. Mas essas ações só terão sucesso se estiverem explicitamente vinculadas à construção do outro lado da ponte, uma solução de longo prazo para uma paz justa e duradoura entre israelenses e palestinos. Simplesmente não há outro caminho.
On Jerusalem, ALFA has much in common with the other initiatives. Jerusalem would be the capital of both states, with freedom of movement throughout and shared management of the Old City, likely with international involvement. Rather than have the city divided by fences or walls, ALFA proposes to keep Jerusalem “whole, open, and shared.” Although Jerusalem would serve as two capitals, Israel and the Palestinian state would also delegate powers to a special body that governs the entire city—either as a single joint local government or as two municipalities under the confederal umbrella.
On security, again ALFA is similar to the other proposals, recognizing that each state needs to police its own sovereign territory. Unlike the other plans, it calls for reciprocal and agreed terms for the partial demilitarization of both states. It expressly opposes the unilateral deployment of foreign forces without the consent of both parties and supports a joint Israeli-Palestinian border force.
Uma solução confederada poderia superar obstáculos passados à paz.
The biggest threats to this plan, as with the other proposals and past peace efforts, would likely come from within, from those opposed to any form of accommodation. To prevent internal spoilers from derailing a two-state solution, architects of the agreement should craft robust dispute resolution mechanisms, a strong economic development strategy, supported by well-designed laws on both sides, and sensible decisions on education, language, and all civil rights matters. The final line of defense would have to be a regional security arrangement with credible guarantees for lasting stability; none of these proposals offer a vision for such an arrangement.
Compared with the HLC proposal, ALFA offers fewer details on confederal institutions. It does, however, provide a detailed plan on human rights. It emphasizes the importance of both sides embracing the principle of shared, universal human rights. Unlike the HLC’s proposal for a human rights commission, ALFA stresses the need for an appellate body, a supreme court of human rights, to hear cases filed after decisions are handed down in the courts of either country. As a former UN human rights chief, I fully support this approach.
Ultimately, ALFA is the most imaginative of these proposals in that it breaks from existing approaches and paradigms. There is a practical dimension to its idealistic ambition: it could accommodate Israeli settlements, which have hampered every attempt at Middle East peace to date. But all three proposals have merit. They offer real solutions to permanently ending years of extreme violence and oppression.
ALCANÇANDO O OUTRO LADO
Sem o trabalho desses visionários, seria difícil definir um futuro para o Oriente Médio. Embora Netanyahu possa ter acolhido o plano de Trump e aceitado uma referência a um potencial Estado palestino, não está totalmente claro o que ele realmente deseja para seu país e para a região. Além de administrar o que é claramente um status quo insustentável, ele parece não ter outro plano além do de sua coalizão de extrema direita, que busca um "Grande Israel" que implicaria a aniquilação dos palestinos em Gaza e na Cisjordânia. Esse caminho não é apenas terrível e inviável, mas também rejeitado pela maioria dos israelenses. Para alcançar a paz em Gaza além de cessar-fogo de curto prazo, deve haver um destino para o fim permanente deste conflito.
Um conflito tão arraigado e violento como o do Oriente Médio naturalmente gera ceticismo e cinismo. No entanto, existem razões reais para um otimismo cauteloso. Atores regionais e internacionais buscam assiduamente caminhos para reduzir a violência e lançar as bases para uma paz duradoura: o Catar, em coordenação com o Egito e os Estados Unidos, ajudou a conduzir as partes em direção a um cessar-fogo em Gaza; o Egito continua a liderar os esforços árabes em colaboração com os Estados vizinhos, particularmente a Jordânia; e a Arábia Saudita, juntamente com a França e a Noruega, mobilizou apoio diplomático e financeiro global para uma solução viável de dois Estados. Cada vez mais, países ao redor do mundo estão reconhecendo a condição de Estado palestino, sinalizando crescente preocupação e engajamento internacional.
É aqui que as propostas criativas e pragmáticas desenvolvidas por israelenses e palestinos — o plano Olmert-Kidwa, a Confederação da Terra Santa e a ALFA — se tornam indispensáveis. Elas oferecem caminhos realistas para uma solução duradoura de dois Estados, abordando uma série de questões complexas. Essas visões não são exercícios abstratos; elas representam o único caminho pragmático para encerrar o conflito e garantir a estabilidade regional. Certamente, manter o impulso em medidas de curto prazo — seja reduzindo as hostilidades, facilitando o apoio humanitário ou coordenando a pressão diplomática regional — é essencial. Mas essas ações só terão sucesso se estiverem explicitamente vinculadas à construção do outro lado da ponte, uma solução de longo prazo para uma paz justa e duradoura entre israelenses e palestinos. Simplesmente não há outro caminho.
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