ZONGYUAN ZOE LIU
ZONGYUAN ZOE LIU é Pesquisadora Sênior Maurice R. Greenberg para Estudos da China no Council on Foreign Relations e Pesquisadora Sênior no Instituto de Política Global da Escola de Assuntos Internacionais e Públicos da Universidade de Columbia. Ela é autora de Sovereign Funds: How the Communist Party of China Finances Its Global Ambitions.
Foreign Affairs
Nonetheless, Beijing does not seek to export an alternative set of Chinese values or send its ideology abroad, as the Soviet Union once did. Instead, its aims are almost exclusively strategic: to reshape global norms around sovereignty and development in ways that advance its own interests. By defining itself largely in negative terms—it is not Western, not liberal, not subordinate—Beijing has succeeded in cultivating solidarity among some states but has struggled to inspire genuine allegiance.
China’s global influence is further constrained by weak cultural affinities with other countries. Unlike Western powers, whose alliances are reinforced by shared heritage, language, and values, China lacks comparable cultural or societal linkages. Largely transactional, its partnerships are not grounded in moral obligation or historical kinship. China’s relations with its neighbors and closest cultural kin, Vietnam and Taiwan, remain among its most adversarial. And although the Chinese diaspora is vast and economically dynamic—a great many of the world’s major cities have a Chinatown—the party sees Chinese people living abroad as potential sources of ideological risk and has been known to monitor and intimidate them. In both cases, Beijing’s approach has inhibited the formation of organic, trust-based ties between China and other societies, leaving it with a persistent deficit of soft power.
China’s defensive pragmatism has also made it reluctant to play a constructive role in conflict resolution. Although it claims to be a neutral power, for example, Beijing has maintained solidarity with Moscow in its war in Ukraine under the banner of opposing Western “hegemony.” The pro-Russian stance has fed growing concerns in Europe, whose leaders and policymakers increasingly view China as both an economic competitor and a security threat. Such tensions help explain why China often commands respect but not affection. It is seen as formidable but not completely trustworthy; its leadership powerful but not quite legitimate. Without moral leadership to complement its material strength, China’s global role remains that of a power to be managed—and, perhaps, feared—but not one to be followed.
China’s expanding control of overseas ports and critical infrastructure has added to these suspicions. Chinese state-affiliated entities now hold stakes in more than 100 overseas port projects around the world, over 70 percent of which have potential military as well as civilian capabilities. Although evidence of militarization remains limited, Western defense strategists warn that these dual-use facilities could evolve into a global network for the Chinese navy. Once again, negative perceptions have been fueled by Beijing’s lack of transparency as well as its unhelpful tendency to blur boundaries between state and commercial actors. Although the fears may be overstated, they remain plausible enough to call into question China’s overseas investments on national security grounds. In this sense, Beijing’s credibility deficit is cumulative and largely self-inflicted.
Of course, rising powers have invited suspicion about their motives throughout history. In the 1980s, Japan faced accusations of “aid imperialism,” and its growing trade surplus, high-profile purchases of American assets, and strong technological and manufacturing prowess fueled fears that it threatened American dominance, prompting protectionist measures. Yet the speed and scale of China’s rise have brought it a credibility problem far greater than that of its predecessors. Beijing’s opacity, fragmented policymaking, and continual fusion of state, commercial, and strategic motives have thus created a self-reinforcing cycle. The more China asserts leadership, the more its actions invite skepticism—leaving it strong in capacity and financial power yet uncertain in character and weak in credibility.
Foreign Affairs
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| No porto de Qingdao, China, outubro de 2025 China Daily / Reuters |
Durante grande parte do ano passado, a resposta da China às tensões comerciais surpreendeu continuamente os defensores de políticas comerciais mais agressivas em Washington. Em dezembro de 2024, quando o governo Biden impôs novas restrições à exportação de chips avançados, Pequim respondeu imediatamente proibindo a exportação de diversos elementos metálicos para os Estados Unidos. Em abril de 2025, após o governo Trump ameaçar impor tarifas elevadas à China, Pequim se entrincheirou, impondo rígidos controles de exportação sobre sete minerais de terras raras vitais para a defesa e a fabricação de energia limpa. Em maio, a China parou de comprar soja dos EUA, o maior produto de exportação dos EUA para a China em valor. Em outubro, após os Estados Unidos estenderem as restrições de exportação existentes às empresas chinesas a todas as suas subsidiárias com participação majoritária, a China adicionou mais cinco terras raras e uma ampla gama de tecnologias avançadas de processamento aos seus próprios controles de exportação. Essas medidas cada vez mais ousadas não apenas representavam uma grande ameaça às cadeias de suprimentos dos EUA e globais, mas também teriam consequências internas significativas. A mensagem era inequívoca: a China está preparada para absorver prejuízos para exercer pressão real sobre os Estados Unidos.
Se a abordagem foi ousada, no entanto, não foi imprudente. Ao optar por uma retaliação calibrada, Pequim preservou espaço para negociações e manteve as vias de saída em aberto. Após o encontro entre o presidente dos EUA, Donald Trump, e o líder chinês, Xi Jinping, na Coreia do Sul, no final de outubro, a China concordou em adiar muitas das restrições. Contudo, a calibração não deve ser confundida com fraqueza. Paralelamente às medidas anunciadas, a China desenvolveu um poderoso arsenal de barreiras não tarifárias e instrumentos legais que pode utilizar quando necessário. Abandonando a contenção estratégica que anteriormente caracterizava sua abordagem aos Estados Unidos, a China demonstrou estar pronta para usar seu domínio sobre a cadeia de suprimentos como arma.
Essa postura firme foi reforçada por considerações políticas internas. Os líderes e negociadores chineses estão determinados a não reviver a reação negativa do público que se seguiu ao acordo comercial de Fase Um de 2020 entre Pequim e o governo Trump, que, para muitos comentaristas chineses, pareceu tão desproporcional contra a China quanto os tratados que as potências coloniais ocidentais negociaram com a dinastia Qing. Para Xi Jinping, que prometeu acabar com o “século de humilhação” da China, outro acordo que pareça favorecer os Estados Unidos é politicamente insustentável, e sua disposição de confrontar Washington tornou-se um meio de consolidar sua posição como o líder supremo do país, impulsionando uma “revitalização nacional”.
No entanto, a abordagem de Pequim não pode ser reduzida a táticas retaliatórias ou nacionalismo. Os líderes chineses passaram anos se preparando para o retorno de Trump e veem a guerra comercial como parte de uma disputa muito maior que provavelmente durará décadas. No curto prazo, a prioridade de Pequim é garantir as concessões em tecnologia avançada necessárias para acelerar o desenvolvimento de semicondutores na China e reduzir a dependência de importações. A médio prazo, o objetivo é aprofundar a capacidade tecnológica, diversificar os mercados de exportação e capturar uma parcela maior das exportações de valor agregado nas cadeias de suprimentos globais, a fim de reduzir a influência dos EUA. A longo prazo, pretende construir uma arquitetura comercial e financeira global alternativa, suficientemente robusta para destituir os Estados Unidos de seu poder de impor sanções unilaterais. Acima de tudo, a China deseja o reconhecimento de que seus interesses fundamentais transcendem até mesmo a ameaça da interferência ocidental — que possui plena liberdade de ação dentro de sua esfera de influência, incluindo Taiwan e sua periferia regional, e que pode se engajar economicamente com o mundo em termos não menos favoráveis do que aqueles concedidos aos Estados Unidos ou a outras grandes potências.
Em essência, a China está tentando uma façanha geopolítica sem precedentes. A China busca alcançar um lugar de igualdade com os Estados Unidos sem desencadear a “armadilha de Tucídides” — a tendência de hegemonias emergentes e estabelecidas entrarem em conflito. Ao contrário das potências revisionistas anteriores, a China pretende consolidar sua ascensão por meio do acúmulo constante de poder e influência econômica, e não por meio de conquistas militares. Para ter sucesso, ela não deve apenas se igualar aos Estados Unidos, mas superá-los em algumas áreas, a ponto de qualquer recusa dos EUA em reconhecer seu status de superpotência parecer absurda para o resto do mundo.
À medida que essa luta prolongada se desenrola, comparações convencionais lado a lado de dados econômicos ou capacidade militar provavelmente não fornecerão uma indicação clara de qual lado está na frente, qual está ficando para trás e por quê. Quando o sucesso em um domínio ocorre à custa de outro, o efeito final sobre o poder ou a influência nacional pode ser ambíguo. Como a história demonstrou, a influência global de um país também depende de qualidades menos tangíveis, como os valores que projeta, sua reputação e sua capacidade de atrair aliados e parceiros. Para chegar a uma avaliação geral mais clara da busca da China pelo poder, é útil recorrer a uma disciplina que prospera na incerteza e nas compensações. No financiamento de crédito, bancos e instituições financeiras avaliam a solvência de uma empresa aplicando uma série de critérios amplos comumente chamados de "os quatro Cs": capacidade, capital, caráter e garantia. Traduzido para a geopolítica, esse arcabouço oferece uma maneira estruturada de avaliar a ascensão contínua da China e suas implicações para os Estados Unidos.
À medida que Washington se afasta do multilateralismo e se torna mais consumido pela polarização interna, Pequim continuará a explorar oportunidades para promover seus próprios objetivos geopolíticos. Em teoria, está bem posicionada para isso: pode mobilizar recursos em uma escala imensa, domina as cadeias de suprimento de energia verde, comanda o maior exército permanente do mundo e suas empresas de inteligência artificial demonstraram capacidade de acompanhar suas contrapartes americanas. Mas os Estados Unidos mantêm outras formas de influência e poder global que serão difíceis para a China igualar. Como sugere uma análise detalhada dos quatro Cs, a disputa entre Washington e Pequim não será determinada apenas por qual país possui os melhores modelos de IA ou o maior número de navios. Dinâmicas difíceis de quantificar provavelmente também influenciarão o cenário. ser tão importante quanto as vantagens empíricas brutas e o poderio militar. Para se preparar para essa longa luta, portanto, os Estados Unidos precisarão entender melhor o que a China busca e como isso se compara ao poder americano em diferentes domínios, e onde as próprias políticas de Washington estão falhando.
NATION OF MILLIONS
China’s global power is founded on its immense population and resources, or what might be called its capacity. As long ago as the thirteenth century, Marco Polo marveled at the extent of China’s cities, wealth, and territory in The Travels of Marco Polo, whose original Italian title was Il Milione, or The Million. Today, that vastness has enabled China to mobilize resources for growth at a scale and speed that eclipse most competitors. In 1978, China was among the poorest countries, with a per capita GDP of about $157, less than one-60th that of the United States and less than one-tenth of Brazil’s. Now, it is the second-largest economy and exports more goods and services than any other nation on earth.
This unprecedented ascent has been built on the backs of China’s easily exploited migrant laborers, a subset of its workforce that grew from roughly 30 million in 1989 to nearly 300 million in 2024. These low-paid workers have fueled the country’s explosive growth, manning factories, operating ports, building infrastructure, and making China the industrial powerhouse of the world. Today, the Chinese Communist Party is betting that the country’s huge army of engineers and scientists can do the same for technology and innovation. Already, China has nearly caught up to the United States in spending on research and development. Chinese researchers now publish more papers in elite scientific journals and file more patent applications than their American counterparts. Behind these figures lies a deep well of human talent: China produces roughly 3.6 million STEM graduates annually, over four times the U.S. total.
Yet this enormous capacity also poses one of China’s biggest challenges. It has left the economy lopsided and reliant on foreign markets to absorb excess output, leading to growing friction with many Western governments. And China’s industrial and supply chain dominance has pushed many countries to reduce their dependence on the country, eroding Beijing’s principal source of leverage. China’s extraordinary industrial power thus presents a paradox: the country can produce almost anything cheaply and at enormous scale, yet the more it uses this strength, the faster the world turns against it.
Beijing’s almost singular focus on building its industrial base has also stunted the development of a balanced domestic market. Chronically weak household demand has prevented the Chinese economy from becoming a self-propelling engine. For household consumption to account for the same share of GDP in China as it does in the United States, the average Chinese family would have to consume 70 percent more—a tall order. In fact, China’s consumer spending growth has slipped to its lowest levels in over a decade, with retail sales growth in 2024 around 3.5 percent, well below the double-digit gains of earlier years. Consumer prices fell year-on-year in several months of 2025, signaling deflationary pressure in parts of the economy. Falling prices reduce corporate profits, further increasing the true economic cost of maintaining bloated industrial capacity.
China’s massive industrial capacity has made it especially dependent on the United States. In addition to being the leading destination for Chinese exports, the United States has served as a vital source of best practices that Chinese policymakers and companies have repeatedly drawn on to craft their own approach to industrial, financial, technological, and military development. Even in sectors in which Chinese companies have long outpaced American competitors, such as electric vehicles and batteries, the United States remains an indispensable source of talent, research networks, and demand. These realities contribute to the conundrum that Xi faces in negotiating with the second Trump administration: if China is to eventually stand on its own against the United States, it must first pull its rival closer so it can lean on American expertise in sales and product design.
History has shown that capacity alone does not make a superpower. In the early twentieth century, Germany boasted a world-beating industrial base and top engineering talent but ultimately failed to establish enduring regional hegemony. Starting in the 1960s, Japan enjoyed decades of dominance in automobile manufacturing and electronics but failed to translate this advantage into geopolitical power before the rest of the world caught up. Even when capacity helped create a superpower, that status could be short-lived if other attributes were weak. The Soviet Union developed a vast industrial and scientific sector and achieved spectacular technical feats, such as the first space flight and the world’s largest nuclear arsenal. Yet political and bureaucratic sclerosis, combined with an unbalanced statist economy, ultimately led to its demise. Today, China has the industrial capacity of a superpower, but it will need to match that strength in other domains to consummate that status in geopolitics.
Se a abordagem foi ousada, no entanto, não foi imprudente. Ao optar por uma retaliação calibrada, Pequim preservou espaço para negociações e manteve as vias de saída em aberto. Após o encontro entre o presidente dos EUA, Donald Trump, e o líder chinês, Xi Jinping, na Coreia do Sul, no final de outubro, a China concordou em adiar muitas das restrições. Contudo, a calibração não deve ser confundida com fraqueza. Paralelamente às medidas anunciadas, a China desenvolveu um poderoso arsenal de barreiras não tarifárias e instrumentos legais que pode utilizar quando necessário. Abandonando a contenção estratégica que anteriormente caracterizava sua abordagem aos Estados Unidos, a China demonstrou estar pronta para usar seu domínio sobre a cadeia de suprimentos como arma.
Essa postura firme foi reforçada por considerações políticas internas. Os líderes e negociadores chineses estão determinados a não reviver a reação negativa do público que se seguiu ao acordo comercial de Fase Um de 2020 entre Pequim e o governo Trump, que, para muitos comentaristas chineses, pareceu tão desproporcional contra a China quanto os tratados que as potências coloniais ocidentais negociaram com a dinastia Qing. Para Xi Jinping, que prometeu acabar com o “século de humilhação” da China, outro acordo que pareça favorecer os Estados Unidos é politicamente insustentável, e sua disposição de confrontar Washington tornou-se um meio de consolidar sua posição como o líder supremo do país, impulsionando uma “revitalização nacional”.
No entanto, a abordagem de Pequim não pode ser reduzida a táticas retaliatórias ou nacionalismo. Os líderes chineses passaram anos se preparando para o retorno de Trump e veem a guerra comercial como parte de uma disputa muito maior que provavelmente durará décadas. No curto prazo, a prioridade de Pequim é garantir as concessões em tecnologia avançada necessárias para acelerar o desenvolvimento de semicondutores na China e reduzir a dependência de importações. A médio prazo, o objetivo é aprofundar a capacidade tecnológica, diversificar os mercados de exportação e capturar uma parcela maior das exportações de valor agregado nas cadeias de suprimentos globais, a fim de reduzir a influência dos EUA. A longo prazo, pretende construir uma arquitetura comercial e financeira global alternativa, suficientemente robusta para destituir os Estados Unidos de seu poder de impor sanções unilaterais. Acima de tudo, a China deseja o reconhecimento de que seus interesses fundamentais transcendem até mesmo a ameaça da interferência ocidental — que possui plena liberdade de ação dentro de sua esfera de influência, incluindo Taiwan e sua periferia regional, e que pode se engajar economicamente com o mundo em termos não menos favoráveis do que aqueles concedidos aos Estados Unidos ou a outras grandes potências.
Em essência, a China está tentando uma façanha geopolítica sem precedentes. A China busca alcançar um lugar de igualdade com os Estados Unidos sem desencadear a “armadilha de Tucídides” — a tendência de hegemonias emergentes e estabelecidas entrarem em conflito. Ao contrário das potências revisionistas anteriores, a China pretende consolidar sua ascensão por meio do acúmulo constante de poder e influência econômica, e não por meio de conquistas militares. Para ter sucesso, ela não deve apenas se igualar aos Estados Unidos, mas superá-los em algumas áreas, a ponto de qualquer recusa dos EUA em reconhecer seu status de superpotência parecer absurda para o resto do mundo.
À medida que essa luta prolongada se desenrola, comparações convencionais lado a lado de dados econômicos ou capacidade militar provavelmente não fornecerão uma indicação clara de qual lado está na frente, qual está ficando para trás e por quê. Quando o sucesso em um domínio ocorre à custa de outro, o efeito final sobre o poder ou a influência nacional pode ser ambíguo. Como a história demonstrou, a influência global de um país também depende de qualidades menos tangíveis, como os valores que projeta, sua reputação e sua capacidade de atrair aliados e parceiros. Para chegar a uma avaliação geral mais clara da busca da China pelo poder, é útil recorrer a uma disciplina que prospera na incerteza e nas compensações. No financiamento de crédito, bancos e instituições financeiras avaliam a solvência de uma empresa aplicando uma série de critérios amplos comumente chamados de "os quatro Cs": capacidade, capital, caráter e garantia. Traduzido para a geopolítica, esse arcabouço oferece uma maneira estruturada de avaliar a ascensão contínua da China e suas implicações para os Estados Unidos.
À medida que Washington se afasta do multilateralismo e se torna mais consumido pela polarização interna, Pequim continuará a explorar oportunidades para promover seus próprios objetivos geopolíticos. Em teoria, está bem posicionada para isso: pode mobilizar recursos em uma escala imensa, domina as cadeias de suprimento de energia verde, comanda o maior exército permanente do mundo e suas empresas de inteligência artificial demonstraram capacidade de acompanhar suas contrapartes americanas. Mas os Estados Unidos mantêm outras formas de influência e poder global que serão difíceis para a China igualar. Como sugere uma análise detalhada dos quatro Cs, a disputa entre Washington e Pequim não será determinada apenas por qual país possui os melhores modelos de IA ou o maior número de navios. Dinâmicas difíceis de quantificar provavelmente também influenciarão o cenário. ser tão importante quanto as vantagens empíricas brutas e o poderio militar. Para se preparar para essa longa luta, portanto, os Estados Unidos precisarão entender melhor o que a China busca e como isso se compara ao poder americano em diferentes domínios, e onde as próprias políticas de Washington estão falhando.
NATION OF MILLIONS
China’s global power is founded on its immense population and resources, or what might be called its capacity. As long ago as the thirteenth century, Marco Polo marveled at the extent of China’s cities, wealth, and territory in The Travels of Marco Polo, whose original Italian title was Il Milione, or The Million. Today, that vastness has enabled China to mobilize resources for growth at a scale and speed that eclipse most competitors. In 1978, China was among the poorest countries, with a per capita GDP of about $157, less than one-60th that of the United States and less than one-tenth of Brazil’s. Now, it is the second-largest economy and exports more goods and services than any other nation on earth.
This unprecedented ascent has been built on the backs of China’s easily exploited migrant laborers, a subset of its workforce that grew from roughly 30 million in 1989 to nearly 300 million in 2024. These low-paid workers have fueled the country’s explosive growth, manning factories, operating ports, building infrastructure, and making China the industrial powerhouse of the world. Today, the Chinese Communist Party is betting that the country’s huge army of engineers and scientists can do the same for technology and innovation. Already, China has nearly caught up to the United States in spending on research and development. Chinese researchers now publish more papers in elite scientific journals and file more patent applications than their American counterparts. Behind these figures lies a deep well of human talent: China produces roughly 3.6 million STEM graduates annually, over four times the U.S. total.
Yet this enormous capacity also poses one of China’s biggest challenges. It has left the economy lopsided and reliant on foreign markets to absorb excess output, leading to growing friction with many Western governments. And China’s industrial and supply chain dominance has pushed many countries to reduce their dependence on the country, eroding Beijing’s principal source of leverage. China’s extraordinary industrial power thus presents a paradox: the country can produce almost anything cheaply and at enormous scale, yet the more it uses this strength, the faster the world turns against it.
Beijing’s almost singular focus on building its industrial base has also stunted the development of a balanced domestic market. Chronically weak household demand has prevented the Chinese economy from becoming a self-propelling engine. For household consumption to account for the same share of GDP in China as it does in the United States, the average Chinese family would have to consume 70 percent more—a tall order. In fact, China’s consumer spending growth has slipped to its lowest levels in over a decade, with retail sales growth in 2024 around 3.5 percent, well below the double-digit gains of earlier years. Consumer prices fell year-on-year in several months of 2025, signaling deflationary pressure in parts of the economy. Falling prices reduce corporate profits, further increasing the true economic cost of maintaining bloated industrial capacity.
China’s massive industrial capacity has made it especially dependent on the United States. In addition to being the leading destination for Chinese exports, the United States has served as a vital source of best practices that Chinese policymakers and companies have repeatedly drawn on to craft their own approach to industrial, financial, technological, and military development. Even in sectors in which Chinese companies have long outpaced American competitors, such as electric vehicles and batteries, the United States remains an indispensable source of talent, research networks, and demand. These realities contribute to the conundrum that Xi faces in negotiating with the second Trump administration: if China is to eventually stand on its own against the United States, it must first pull its rival closer so it can lean on American expertise in sales and product design.
History has shown that capacity alone does not make a superpower. In the early twentieth century, Germany boasted a world-beating industrial base and top engineering talent but ultimately failed to establish enduring regional hegemony. Starting in the 1960s, Japan enjoyed decades of dominance in automobile manufacturing and electronics but failed to translate this advantage into geopolitical power before the rest of the world caught up. Even when capacity helped create a superpower, that status could be short-lived if other attributes were weak. The Soviet Union developed a vast industrial and scientific sector and achieved spectacular technical feats, such as the first space flight and the world’s largest nuclear arsenal. Yet political and bureaucratic sclerosis, combined with an unbalanced statist economy, ultimately led to its demise. Today, China has the industrial capacity of a superpower, but it will need to match that strength in other domains to consummate that status in geopolitics.
RICH BUT NOT QUITE GLORIOUS
Along with capacity, aspiring superpowers need to have immense capital—the ability to deploy vast sums of money to influence behavior and shape outcomes abroad. China now holds over $3.3 trillion in official foreign exchange reserves, more than any other country. The Communist Party’s near-complete hold over China’s financial system also allows it to invest state funds with a speed and scale that would be unthinkable almost anywhere else.
Moreover, China has transformed its massive foreign exchange hoard into an active instrument of financial statecraft through its sovereign leveraged funds. These vehicles finance the party’s industrial policies, back Chinese firms’ strategic acquisitions overseas, and partner with foreign institutions to reduce political resistance to Chinese capital. At the 2024 summit of the Forum on China‑Africa Cooperation, for example, Xi pledged more than $50 billion in renminbi-denominated loans to African countries, much of it underwritten by the China Development Bank and other state-backed institutions. These loans are as much about securing political support for China’s expanding corporate footprint as they are about promoting the international use of the renminbi.
Yet China’s capital and financial power is more constrained than its headline figures suggest. Consider the overall status of the renminbi in the global financial system. On paper, the preeminence of the U.S. dollar looks vulnerable, with the dollar accounting for just 56 percent of global reserve allocations, a 30-year low. Yet despite China’s position as the world’s leading trading nation, much of the dollar’s lost share has shifted not to the renminbi or other currencies but to gold and other nonsovereign assets. Since 2008, central banks have increased their gold holdings by 25 percent to the highest level since 1970. By contrast, the dollar still dwarfs the euro, which accounts for roughly 20 percent of reserve allocations, and the renminbi, which holds just two percent. Thus far, the diversification away from the dollar appears to be less an endorsement of an alternative currency than a reflection of waning confidence in the U.S.-led financial order.
Along with capacity, aspiring superpowers need to have immense capital—the ability to deploy vast sums of money to influence behavior and shape outcomes abroad. China now holds over $3.3 trillion in official foreign exchange reserves, more than any other country. The Communist Party’s near-complete hold over China’s financial system also allows it to invest state funds with a speed and scale that would be unthinkable almost anywhere else.
Moreover, China has transformed its massive foreign exchange hoard into an active instrument of financial statecraft through its sovereign leveraged funds. These vehicles finance the party’s industrial policies, back Chinese firms’ strategic acquisitions overseas, and partner with foreign institutions to reduce political resistance to Chinese capital. At the 2024 summit of the Forum on China‑Africa Cooperation, for example, Xi pledged more than $50 billion in renminbi-denominated loans to African countries, much of it underwritten by the China Development Bank and other state-backed institutions. These loans are as much about securing political support for China’s expanding corporate footprint as they are about promoting the international use of the renminbi.
Yet China’s capital and financial power is more constrained than its headline figures suggest. Consider the overall status of the renminbi in the global financial system. On paper, the preeminence of the U.S. dollar looks vulnerable, with the dollar accounting for just 56 percent of global reserve allocations, a 30-year low. Yet despite China’s position as the world’s leading trading nation, much of the dollar’s lost share has shifted not to the renminbi or other currencies but to gold and other nonsovereign assets. Since 2008, central banks have increased their gold holdings by 25 percent to the highest level since 1970. By contrast, the dollar still dwarfs the euro, which accounts for roughly 20 percent of reserve allocations, and the renminbi, which holds just two percent. Thus far, the diversification away from the dollar appears to be less an endorsement of an alternative currency than a reflection of waning confidence in the U.S.-led financial order.
A China está tentando uma façanha geopolítica sem precedentes.
Still, China has been building financial infrastructure to reduce global dependence on the dollar, if not to replace it outright. In 2024, China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System grew by 47 percent, compared with just 12 percent growth for SWIFT, the Western-dominated interbank system responsible for moving most of the world’s dollars between countries. For now, CIPS handles only a fraction of the global transactions that SWIFT does, but the system has the capacity to be scaled up rapidly. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, for example, Western governments expelled Russian banks from SWIFT. To bypass Western sanctions, Russian entities began to adopt CIPS, and today, nearly all of Chinese-Russian trade—99 percent—is conducted in renminbi and rubles.
To truly challenge the dollar, however, China would have to make the renminbi fully convertible and dismantle the capital controls that underpin its system of financial repression. It would also need to allow foreigners to hold renminbi-denominated assets on a far greater scale. Some progress has been made: since 2020, foreign holdings of renminbi-denominated bonds have risen 83 percent, to $597 billion. But that figure would need to increase more than 20-fold to match foreign holdings of U.S. corporate and government debt securities. Until China allows far greater foreign access to its debt, there will simply not be enough renminbi-denominated assets for investors to replace their dollars even if they wanted to.
Meanwhile, China’s growth model is reaching its limits. The very mechanisms that once fueled the country’s rise—a state-dominated financial system, suppressed consumption, and export-dependent growth—are now constraining its future. For decades, the government used capital controls, artificially low deposit rates, and an undervalued currency to funnel household savings into industrial sectors. In effect, Chinese households subsidized the country’s rise through foregone returns while the rest of the world splurged on discounted Chinese goods. That model is no longer sustainable: foreign exchange reserves have barely grown since 2017, and the social costs of financial repression are mounting.
To truly challenge the dollar, however, China would have to make the renminbi fully convertible and dismantle the capital controls that underpin its system of financial repression. It would also need to allow foreigners to hold renminbi-denominated assets on a far greater scale. Some progress has been made: since 2020, foreign holdings of renminbi-denominated bonds have risen 83 percent, to $597 billion. But that figure would need to increase more than 20-fold to match foreign holdings of U.S. corporate and government debt securities. Until China allows far greater foreign access to its debt, there will simply not be enough renminbi-denominated assets for investors to replace their dollars even if they wanted to.
Meanwhile, China’s growth model is reaching its limits. The very mechanisms that once fueled the country’s rise—a state-dominated financial system, suppressed consumption, and export-dependent growth—are now constraining its future. For decades, the government used capital controls, artificially low deposit rates, and an undervalued currency to funnel household savings into industrial sectors. In effect, Chinese households subsidized the country’s rise through foregone returns while the rest of the world splurged on discounted Chinese goods. That model is no longer sustainable: foreign exchange reserves have barely grown since 2017, and the social costs of financial repression are mounting.
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| Em um mercado de eletrônicos em Shenzhen, China, outubro de 2025. Tingshu Wang / Reuters |
China’s aging population now lacks the savings to support itself. Younger workers must shoulder the burden of caring for two sets of elderly parents amid rising living costs and eroding household consumption, driving a collapse in domestic demand. The country’s family formation rate—the proportion of adults who establish a new household unit within a given period—is among the lowest in the world, and its population began shrinking in 2023, far earlier than Chinese planners had projected. Eventually, China will have to scale back overseas investments to fund social welfare.
Xi’s government is betting that new technology can offset these financial pressures—that China can innovate its way out of demographic decline and export its way out of industrial overcapacity. The assumption is that by achieving and maintaining global dominance in advanced industries, Beijing will generate enough prosperity to mitigate structural weaknesses at home. Yet this will require a precarious balancing act: sustaining growth, maintaining social stability, and managing demographic decline all at once. Failure in any one of these tasks could upend China’s bid for global economic leadership.
As Beijing is learning, although capital can be deployed more flexibly than capacity, it is also exhaustible and is rarely decisive on its own. Abundant financial resources do not guarantee lasting power. In the sixteenth century, imperial Spain was awash with silver imported from the New World, but the empire’s structural fragilities had already sealed its decline. China’s accumulation of capital has come with its own liabilities: built on domestic repression and export dependence, it also remains constrained by the renminbi’s relatively small profile in the international system, which limits China’s financial leverage abroad. Ultimately, the country’s rise to superpower status will hinge not just on industrial capacity and capital but also on its leaders’ ability to convert national assets into enduring global influence.
Xi’s government is betting that new technology can offset these financial pressures—that China can innovate its way out of demographic decline and export its way out of industrial overcapacity. The assumption is that by achieving and maintaining global dominance in advanced industries, Beijing will generate enough prosperity to mitigate structural weaknesses at home. Yet this will require a precarious balancing act: sustaining growth, maintaining social stability, and managing demographic decline all at once. Failure in any one of these tasks could upend China’s bid for global economic leadership.
As Beijing is learning, although capital can be deployed more flexibly than capacity, it is also exhaustible and is rarely decisive on its own. Abundant financial resources do not guarantee lasting power. In the sixteenth century, imperial Spain was awash with silver imported from the New World, but the empire’s structural fragilities had already sealed its decline. China’s accumulation of capital has come with its own liabilities: built on domestic repression and export dependence, it also remains constrained by the renminbi’s relatively small profile in the international system, which limits China’s financial leverage abroad. Ultimately, the country’s rise to superpower status will hinge not just on industrial capacity and capital but also on its leaders’ ability to convert national assets into enduring global influence.
SOLIDARITY WITHOUT ALLEGIANCE
In credit analysis, a company’s character—its established way of conducting business and cultivating goodwill—relates to how it uses its capacity and capital. Analogously, China’s character, or the way it asserts itself on the world stage, can be understood by examining how it uses its vast industrial base and financial resources. Guided by its own creed, Beijing tends to wield economic power according to its own precepts rather than global norms or external expectations. Beijing’s approach is inseparable from the Communist Party’s pursuit of domestic legitimacy, which hinges on its promises to deliver ever-greater economic prosperity and end China’s century of humiliation at the hands of Western powers. In addition to justifying the party’s authority at home, this narrative of historical grievance provides the foundation for an assertive foreign policy, galvanizing Beijing’s recurring appeals to sovereignty and noninterference and its claims of affinity with countries across the developing world.
Yet China’s moral posture imposes constraints. From the 1980s through the early 2010s, Beijing emphasized partnership with the United States and the West; “socialism with Chinese characteristics” depended on integration into the U.S.-led global trade system and access to Western technology and finance. But to China’s leaders, integration was never the goal. It was merely the means to accelerate modernization and restore national strength. The party’s larger objective was to learn from the West without becoming it.
As China’s economic and military power grew and Washington became disillusioned with its stalled liberalization, the relationship soured and the party recalibrated. Since 2018, Xi has set aside integration and made self-reliance the organizing principle of China’s national strategy. This shift was reinforced by the first Trump administration’s restrictions on Chinese tech giants such as Huawei, which exposed China’s vulnerability to export controls. In response, “national rejuvenation” came to mean autonomy and insulation from Western pressure. China’s rapport with the United States and its allies has thus evolved from pragmatic engagement to principled divergence.
In credit analysis, a company’s character—its established way of conducting business and cultivating goodwill—relates to how it uses its capacity and capital. Analogously, China’s character, or the way it asserts itself on the world stage, can be understood by examining how it uses its vast industrial base and financial resources. Guided by its own creed, Beijing tends to wield economic power according to its own precepts rather than global norms or external expectations. Beijing’s approach is inseparable from the Communist Party’s pursuit of domestic legitimacy, which hinges on its promises to deliver ever-greater economic prosperity and end China’s century of humiliation at the hands of Western powers. In addition to justifying the party’s authority at home, this narrative of historical grievance provides the foundation for an assertive foreign policy, galvanizing Beijing’s recurring appeals to sovereignty and noninterference and its claims of affinity with countries across the developing world.
Yet China’s moral posture imposes constraints. From the 1980s through the early 2010s, Beijing emphasized partnership with the United States and the West; “socialism with Chinese characteristics” depended on integration into the U.S.-led global trade system and access to Western technology and finance. But to China’s leaders, integration was never the goal. It was merely the means to accelerate modernization and restore national strength. The party’s larger objective was to learn from the West without becoming it.
As China’s economic and military power grew and Washington became disillusioned with its stalled liberalization, the relationship soured and the party recalibrated. Since 2018, Xi has set aside integration and made self-reliance the organizing principle of China’s national strategy. This shift was reinforced by the first Trump administration’s restrictions on Chinese tech giants such as Huawei, which exposed China’s vulnerability to export controls. In response, “national rejuvenation” came to mean autonomy and insulation from Western pressure. China’s rapport with the United States and its allies has thus evolved from pragmatic engagement to principled divergence.
Pequim apresenta um déficit persistente de poder brando.
Nonetheless, Beijing does not seek to export an alternative set of Chinese values or send its ideology abroad, as the Soviet Union once did. Instead, its aims are almost exclusively strategic: to reshape global norms around sovereignty and development in ways that advance its own interests. By defining itself largely in negative terms—it is not Western, not liberal, not subordinate—Beijing has succeeded in cultivating solidarity among some states but has struggled to inspire genuine allegiance.
China’s global influence is further constrained by weak cultural affinities with other countries. Unlike Western powers, whose alliances are reinforced by shared heritage, language, and values, China lacks comparable cultural or societal linkages. Largely transactional, its partnerships are not grounded in moral obligation or historical kinship. China’s relations with its neighbors and closest cultural kin, Vietnam and Taiwan, remain among its most adversarial. And although the Chinese diaspora is vast and economically dynamic—a great many of the world’s major cities have a Chinatown—the party sees Chinese people living abroad as potential sources of ideological risk and has been known to monitor and intimidate them. In both cases, Beijing’s approach has inhibited the formation of organic, trust-based ties between China and other societies, leaving it with a persistent deficit of soft power.
China’s defensive pragmatism has also made it reluctant to play a constructive role in conflict resolution. Although it claims to be a neutral power, for example, Beijing has maintained solidarity with Moscow in its war in Ukraine under the banner of opposing Western “hegemony.” The pro-Russian stance has fed growing concerns in Europe, whose leaders and policymakers increasingly view China as both an economic competitor and a security threat. Such tensions help explain why China often commands respect but not affection. It is seen as formidable but not completely trustworthy; its leadership powerful but not quite legitimate. Without moral leadership to complement its material strength, China’s global role remains that of a power to be managed—and, perhaps, feared—but not one to be followed.
MIDDLE KINGDOM MISTRUST
If capacity defines what a country can do, capital determines the resources it can draw on, and character describes how it chooses to act on the world stage, the fourth C addresses a more elusive question. In credit analysis, the function of collateral is to reassure lenders when there is a lack of trust that a company will make good on its loans. In geopolitics, this might be termed credibility, or whether a country can persuade other nations that it will make good on its promises and intentions. Achieving credibility is arguably the ultimate prerequisite for superpower status. It cannot be bought or declared by fiat; it must be earned through practice. It is the glue that sustains alliances, stabilizes expectations, and transforms influence into global leadership.
Credibility is the weakest dimension of China’s geopolitical power. Despite its immense capacity, great wealth, and expansive overseas footprint, the country faces persistent skepticism about its intentions. China has invested heavily in international campaigns to project its reliability and legitimacy—including in climate diplomacy, UN peacekeeping, and its sprawling Belt and Road Initiative, the global development program on which China has spent some $1.3 trillion and signed agreements with around 150 countries. Yet despite their scale, these efforts have not delivered the credibility Beijing seeks. In some cases, China has exaggerated its actual contributions, sowing mistrust about its agenda. For example, it has presented itself as a leading international source of development financing, even though multilateral development banks, private investors, and traditional Western lenders still account for a larger cumulative share.
In other cases, China’s overseas investments have unwittingly amplified doubts about its reliability and transparency. Consider the widely held view that Beijing has been deploying “debt trap” diplomacy with poorer countries, deliberately ensnaring them in unsustainable debt to seize strategic assets. Although empirical studies have found little evidence of such deliberate intent, the pervasiveness of this narrative shows the extent to which China’s opaque lending practices and the political leverage that appears to be built into its financing model have led to global unease.
International anxieties about China’s industrial overcapacity follow a similar pattern. In many Western capitals, a belief has taken hold that China’s enormous excess production is the result of a deliberate strategy to dump cheap goods in their markets and destroy their industrial bases. In fact, overcapacity appears to be largely an unintended consequence of China’s long-standing economic growth model. Yet Beijing has been unwilling to confront the problem because of its determined quest for industrial leadership and the entrenched interests of local governments, state-owned enterprises, and state-controlled banks. As a result, the charge has stuck, reinforcing broader misgivings about the country’s intentions.
If capacity defines what a country can do, capital determines the resources it can draw on, and character describes how it chooses to act on the world stage, the fourth C addresses a more elusive question. In credit analysis, the function of collateral is to reassure lenders when there is a lack of trust that a company will make good on its loans. In geopolitics, this might be termed credibility, or whether a country can persuade other nations that it will make good on its promises and intentions. Achieving credibility is arguably the ultimate prerequisite for superpower status. It cannot be bought or declared by fiat; it must be earned through practice. It is the glue that sustains alliances, stabilizes expectations, and transforms influence into global leadership.
Credibility is the weakest dimension of China’s geopolitical power. Despite its immense capacity, great wealth, and expansive overseas footprint, the country faces persistent skepticism about its intentions. China has invested heavily in international campaigns to project its reliability and legitimacy—including in climate diplomacy, UN peacekeeping, and its sprawling Belt and Road Initiative, the global development program on which China has spent some $1.3 trillion and signed agreements with around 150 countries. Yet despite their scale, these efforts have not delivered the credibility Beijing seeks. In some cases, China has exaggerated its actual contributions, sowing mistrust about its agenda. For example, it has presented itself as a leading international source of development financing, even though multilateral development banks, private investors, and traditional Western lenders still account for a larger cumulative share.
In other cases, China’s overseas investments have unwittingly amplified doubts about its reliability and transparency. Consider the widely held view that Beijing has been deploying “debt trap” diplomacy with poorer countries, deliberately ensnaring them in unsustainable debt to seize strategic assets. Although empirical studies have found little evidence of such deliberate intent, the pervasiveness of this narrative shows the extent to which China’s opaque lending practices and the political leverage that appears to be built into its financing model have led to global unease.
International anxieties about China’s industrial overcapacity follow a similar pattern. In many Western capitals, a belief has taken hold that China’s enormous excess production is the result of a deliberate strategy to dump cheap goods in their markets and destroy their industrial bases. In fact, overcapacity appears to be largely an unintended consequence of China’s long-standing economic growth model. Yet Beijing has been unwilling to confront the problem because of its determined quest for industrial leadership and the entrenched interests of local governments, state-owned enterprises, and state-controlled banks. As a result, the charge has stuck, reinforcing broader misgivings about the country’s intentions.
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| Robôs em uma fábrica de automóveis em Baoding, China, novembro de 2025. Maxim Shemetov / Reuters |
Western theories about China’s stagnating growth have provided yet another reason to doubt the country’s credibility. According to the “peak China” thesis, Beijing faces a fatal long-term economic slowdown because of mounting and irreversible structural problems. In this view, the disparity between China’s official optimism and the observable malaise in the Chinese economy raises questions not only about the reliability of Chinese data but also about China’s projection of power in the world. Some China watchers have speculated that accumulating economic pressures could cause Beijing to abandon its peaceful rise, opting for aggressive or coercive action to secure its interests while it can.
China’s expanding control of overseas ports and critical infrastructure has added to these suspicions. Chinese state-affiliated entities now hold stakes in more than 100 overseas port projects around the world, over 70 percent of which have potential military as well as civilian capabilities. Although evidence of militarization remains limited, Western defense strategists warn that these dual-use facilities could evolve into a global network for the Chinese navy. Once again, negative perceptions have been fueled by Beijing’s lack of transparency as well as its unhelpful tendency to blur boundaries between state and commercial actors. Although the fears may be overstated, they remain plausible enough to call into question China’s overseas investments on national security grounds. In this sense, Beijing’s credibility deficit is cumulative and largely self-inflicted.
Of course, rising powers have invited suspicion about their motives throughout history. In the 1980s, Japan faced accusations of “aid imperialism,” and its growing trade surplus, high-profile purchases of American assets, and strong technological and manufacturing prowess fueled fears that it threatened American dominance, prompting protectionist measures. Yet the speed and scale of China’s rise have brought it a credibility problem far greater than that of its predecessors. Beijing’s opacity, fragmented policymaking, and continual fusion of state, commercial, and strategic motives have thus created a self-reinforcing cycle. The more China asserts leadership, the more its actions invite skepticism—leaving it strong in capacity and financial power yet uncertain in character and weak in credibility.
TESTE DE RESISTÊNCIA
A China não deve ser subestimada. Sob a liderança de Xi Jinping, o país passou os últimos 13 anos consolidando sua força e se preparando para uma competição pelo poder global que pode durar décadas. Sofreu reveses, principalmente durante a pandemia de COVID-19, quando os lockdowns draconianos do Partido Comunista exacerbaram problemas econômicos estruturais, corroendo a fé da sociedade chinesa em uma prosperidade crescente. Mesmo assim, o país manteve sua trajetória geral: acúmulo gradual de força econômica combinado com uma crescente afirmação de autonomia estratégica. Isso tem sido muito útil para a China na guerra comercial com os Estados Unidos. Nenhum outro governo entrou na mesma moeda com Washington em relação a tarifas e restrições à exportação e saiu praticamente ileso. Pela primeira vez desde sua rivalidade com a União Soviética, os Estados Unidos enfrentam um concorrente de mesmo nível capaz não apenas de desafiar seu poder, mas também de forçá-lo a uma acomodação.
Avaliados pelos mesmos quatro Cs, os Estados Unidos não podem mais contar com suas vantagens tradicionais. Após a Segunda Guerra Mundial, a capacidade dos Estados Unidos era incomparável; Seu poderio industrial avassalador, sua força financeira e suas conquistas científicas estabeleceram o padrão de excelência em praticamente todos os campos. Por décadas, os Estados Unidos também lideraram o mundo em caráter e credibilidade, exportando seus valores, sua prosperidade e sua proteção de segurança para dezenas de países, enquanto defendiam o sistema de mercados globais baseado no dólar americano e no Estado de Direito, que em grande parte construíram. Mas esses pontos fortes diminuíram e, com eles, a sensação de que a preeminência americana é um fato incontestável.
Quando Washington enfrentou pela última vez uma superpotência emergente, no início da Guerra Fria, podia contar com uma coalizão de aliados confiantes. Isso é menos verdade hoje. Somado à irresponsabilidade fiscal e à instrumentalização da política econômica que os Estados Unidos demonstraram nos últimos anos, o desprezo do segundo governo Trump por alianças e sua postura comercial maximalista tiveram um efeito real nas percepções internacionais. Em outubro de 2025, o Canadá anunciou sua intenção de dobrar suas exportações para países que não os Estados Unidos — uma espécie de abordagem de “redução de riscos” que antes era reservada à China. Pequim percebeu essas fissuras e está trabalhando metodicamente para alargá-las.
Os Estados Unidos não podem mais contar com suas vantagens tradicionais.
Por outro lado, a China enfrenta suas próprias limitações persistentes. Precisamente por ter tamanho poder para transformar indústrias e mercados, a capacidade e o capital incomparáveis do país se tornaram passivos. Na ausência de uma visão positiva e sólida de liderança global, o país continua a apresentar deficiências tanto em caráter quanto em credibilidade, levantando questionamentos sobre suas intenções mais amplas e os termos de sua ascensão. Além disso, seus problemas internos, incluindo o fraco consumo e uma mudança demográfica que desacelera o crescimento, representam desafios significativos. Mesmo que Pequim consiga mitigar esses problemas, a posição incumbente dos Estados Unidos na ordem mundial e seus invejáveis recursos naturais podem fornecer baluartes estruturais que a China não conseguirá superar.
O melhor cenário, portanto, é provavelmente um confronto estabilizado — confinado às esferas política, econômica e diplomática e cuidadosamente protegido de uma escalada militar — no qual nenhum dos lados consiga uma vitória decisiva. A China já concluiu que está em uma disputa prolongada com os Estados Unidos. Se Washington não quiser corroer ainda mais sua posição, precisa deixar de lado as táticas de curto prazo e adotar a mesma estratégia de longo prazo. Mas também é preciso reconhecer a verdadeira essência da disputa. Ao contrário do que muitos formuladores de políticas dos EUA presumem, a liderança chinesa não busca destronar os Estados Unidos nem substituir um sistema global do qual a China se beneficiou enormemente. O que busca, sim, é pôr fim à estratégia de contenção dos EUA e obter um veto de fato sobre ações unilaterais americanas, como as sanções. Ao intensificar suas ações contra a China, o governo Trump reforçou, inadvertidamente, a determinação de Pequim em consolidar seu status de superpotência.
Para os Estados Unidos, o sucesso nessa disputa, portanto, dificilmente residirá em ações punitivas contra Pequim. Em vez disso, Washington precisa fortalecer sua credibilidade tradicional no mundo e usá-la para conduzir a China por um caminho menos hostil, apresentando dilemas a Pequim em vez de ultimatos e buscando moldar os resultados ao longo do tempo, em vez de ditá-los imediatamente. Para a China, por sua vez, o sucesso exigirá resistir à pressão dos EUA e sustentar sua trajetória atual até o ponto em que sua ascensão se torne custosa demais para os Estados Unidos tentarem contê-la. E isso exigirá superar o ceticismo internacional em relação aos objetivos mais amplos de Pequim. Considerando suas forças e fraquezas desiguais e a crescente desconfiança mútua em relação ao resto do mundo, ambos os lados provavelmente descobrirão que qualquer vitória mais expressiva permanece inatingível. Essa disputa não dependerá de momentos decisivos, mas sim do teste gradual de resistência estratégica.
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