Há um ano desde que a Organização dos Estados Americanos fez alegações infundadas de fraude eleitoral na Bolívia, líderes esquerdistas de toda a região pediram a renúncia de seu secretário-geral trumpista. Ao longo de sua história, a OEA tem sido uma ferramenta de domínio de Washington na América Latina - e um obstáculo aos esforços genuínos de integração regional.
Federico Fuentes
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| Former Bolivian President Evo Morales speaks during a press conference in Buenos Aires, Argentina. (Ricardo Ceppi / Getty Images) |
Tradução / Políticos progressistas e centristas de toda a América Latina estão pedindo ao secretário-geral da Organização dos Estados Americanos (OEA), Luis Almagro, que renuncie por seu papel no golpe do ano passado contra o presidente boliviano Evo Morales.
Em uma carta iniciada pelo Grupo de Puebla, 29 atuais e ex-presidentes, ministros e parlamentares afirmam que os eventos subsequentes confirmaram que “não houve fraude nas eleições de outubro de 2019 e que Evo Morales teria sido empossado como presidente legítimo do Bolívia se a OEA, em sua posição de observadora, não tivesse se recusado a reconhecer os resultados”.
Eles observam que quando a OEA questionou os resultados - apesar da falta de qualquer evidência de fraude - ajudou a “desencadear uma situação de violência política e social que resultou em um golpe e na conseqüente renúncia do presidente Evo Morales”.
Diante disso, “é óbvio que a liderança regional do secretário-geral da OEA, Luis Almagro, está sob sério escrutínio. O papel que desempenhou na desestabilização da democracia na Bolívia e as relações não inclusivas que manteve com outros países da região o impedem de continuar desempenhando essa função... ”
Essa menção de “relações não inclusivas” se refere ao papel de Almagro na coordenação com os Estados Unidos e o Grupo Lima, uma coalizão regional de governos de direita, para fazer lobby pela exclusão do governo da Venezuela, chefiado pelo presidente Nicolás Maduro, da OEA e outros órgãos regionais. O Grupo de Lima busca, em vez disso, o reconhecimento do líder da oposição Juan Guaidó, que se autoproclamou o “presidente interino” do país em 2018. Após a retirada da Venezuela da OEA em 2018, o órgão votou por dezoito a nove (com sete abstenções) para aceitar um enviado de Guaidó como Delegado da Venezuela.
A carta é assinada, entre outros, pelos ex-presidentes Dilma Rousseff (Brasil), Ernesto Samper (Colômbia), Rafael Correa (Equador) e Fernando Lugo (Paraguai); os ex-ministros Jorge Taiana (Argentina), Clara López (Colômbia), Ana Isabel Prera (Guatemala) e Aída García Naranjo (Peru); as ex-senadoras Adriana Salvatierra (Bolívia) e Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (México); e o senador titular Alejandro Navarro (Chile).
A carta conclui que a renúncia de Almagro "ajudaria a recuperar a paz na região e reativar a integração regional de que necessitamos desesperadamente nestes tempos de pandemia". Mas, embora não haja dúvida de que Almagro precisa ir, a história nos diz que os problemas da OEA são muito mais profundos do que apenas o atual secretário-geral.
Hegemonia regional dos EUA
Na verdade, longe de tentar reunir vizinhos como iguais, a OEA foi criada pelos Estados Unidos em 1948 como um instrumento para afirmar o poder geopolítico de Washington sobre o que tradicionalmente considerava seu "quintal". Embora os membros da OEA incluam todos os países da América do Norte, do Sul, Central e Caribe - exceto Cuba - ela tem sede em Washington e recebe a maior parte de seu financiamento dos Estados Unidos.
Criada em meio à Guerra Fria, a subordinação da OEA aos interesses anticomunistas dos Estados Unidos da época foi explicitada pela expulsão de Cuba após a revolução de 1959. “A adesão de qualquer membro... ao marxismo-leninismo”, argumentou-se na resolução de 1962 que expulsou Cuba do corpo regional, “é incompatível com o sistema interamericano”. As ditaduras anticomunistas que presidiram o massacre de insurgentes de esquerda foram bem-vindas, mesmo que ocasionalmente fossem criticadas pela Comissão Interamericana de Direitos Humanos da OEA.
O colapso da União Soviética e o retrocesso dos movimentos guerrilheiros de esquerda centro-americanos nas décadas de 1980 e 1990 levaram a uma mudança nos objetivos da política dos EUA na região. A prioridade agora era estender sua agenda econômica neoliberal por meio da expansão de seu recém-assinado Acordo de Livre Comércio da América do Norte (Nafta) para além do Canadá e do México.
With this in mind, it held the first Summit of the Americas in Miami in 1994, with a proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) at the top of the agenda. Although essentially comprised of the same members as the OAS, the aim of the Summit of the Americas was largely focused on the consolidation of US economic hegemony through a free-trade bloc.
The first signs of trouble for the United States, however, appeared at the third Summit of the Americas, held in Canada in 2001. As protesters took to the streets outside the meeting, inside, the first so-called “Pink Tide” progressive president to attend such a summit — Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez — raised a solitary voice against the pro-corporate trade agreement.
The following year, Chávez was briefly ousted by a military coup that lasted less than forty-eight hours before it was defeated by a popular uprising. While most countries in the region immediately condemned the coup and called on the OAS to do the same, the United States said Chávez “had provoked the crisis” and described the coup regime as a “transitional civilian government.” Only several days later, with Chávez firmly back in power, did the OAS finally condemn the coup.
By the next Summit of the Americas, held in Argentina in 2005, Venezuela, now in alliance not only with the social movements outside but new progressive and centrist governments from Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay inside, helped bury the FTAA project. The shifting balance of forces meant the United States was left with little option but to seek out bilateral free trade agreements with a shrinking number of right-wing governments.
Regional Integration
The emergence of these new governments — a direct result of the rising power of social movements across the continent — was accompanied by a growing sentiment of regional integration. This new spirit sought to put aside differences and bring the region together to discuss common problems, without US (and Canadian) involvement.
At a political level, this process of integration took the concrete form of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), formed in 2008, and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), established in 2011. Their emergence was not without difficulties, but these organizations slowly began to supplant the OAS as the main institutions for facilitating regional dialogue and resolving conflicts.
In March 2008, the region seemed on the precipice of war after Colombia illegally bombed a Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) camp on Ecuadorian territory. For many, the timing of the attack by a staunch US ally was not coincidental, occurring just weeks out from a preparatory meeting scheduled in Colombia to finalize details for launching UNASUR later that year.
In response, a Group of Rio summit involving representatives from nineteen Latin American member countries was immediately convened. Those present unanimously resolved to reject the actions of the Colombian government and any further violation of the sovereignty of another country. Colombian president Álvaro Uribe even issued a formal apology. In what was undoubtedly a first — at least since the formation of the OAS — a regional conflict was debated and resolved without direct US involvement.
Later that year, in September 2008, an emergency meeting of UNASUR was convened amid a coup attempt in Bolivia. At that meeting, the governments of South America unanimously expressed their “full and decided support for the constitutional government of President Evo Morales” and warned they would “not recognize any situation that entails an attempt for a civil coup that ruptures the institutional order, or that compromises the territorial integrity of the Republic of Bolivia.” The resolution was a significant blow to Bolivia’s right-wing opposition and contributed to the ultimate defeat of the coup.
Return of OAS?
It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that with the fall of several progressive and centrist governments during the past decade, right-wing forces have sought to dismantle (UNASUR) or put on hold (CELAC) these initiatives and breathe new life into the OAS.
Attempts under Almagro to restore the OAS to the center of regional politics are part of a greater push by Washington to reassert its role in the region, something that had diminished during the years when the “Pink Tide” was on the advance.
These attempts have not come without tensions, as evidenced by the rise of the Lima Group, aimed at isolating Venezuela and aiding the US intervention in that country, but also the Puebla Group, which is aimed at rebuilding the ties between the left-wing and progressive political groups and parties across the continent.
Such tensions were also on display in the divided vote over Almagro’s reelection this March. Such divisions within the OAS had not been seen in decades — previous secretary generals had been approved unanimously, and often by acclamation, despite it being a secret vote.
The OAS can never be a democratic forum for regional dialogue or conflict resolution, and not just because of its infrastructural and financial dependence on Washington. Rather, what dictates this is the reality of the unequal power dynamics that exist between the imperialist countries of North America and the rest of the Americas. This also explains why the United States cannot tolerate its neighbors down south uniting without its presence — a move that inherently weakens US regional hegemony.
Today, the bid to invoke the political and diplomatic support of the United States as a guarantor of “stability” is again becoming more apparent, across the region. The attempted coup by Juan Guaidó in Venezuela in 2019 and his “Twitter presidency” have been openly and directly financed and sustained by resources of US-backed agencies such as the USAID and the NED, while the consolidation of Jeanine Añez’s post-coup regime in Bolivia was largely possible through the diplomatic support of the Trump administration, leading to a “domino effect” of official recognitions by the right-wing governments of the region.
With political winds once again blowing to the left in the region, governments south of the Río Grande will be faced with a choice regarding the kind of regional integration they want to pursue. The chance to restart CELAC exists with progressive governments now in power in two of the three largest countries in the region, Argentina and Mexico (who currently holds the presidency of the organization).
These same two governments played key roles in the Bolivian crisis last year. In Bolivia, the new MAS government, overwhelmingly returned to power in the October 2020 elections, has signaled its intentions to revitalize UNASUR. Jair Bolsonaro’s right-wing government in Brazil will be an important, but not necessarily insurmountable, obstacle to overcome in these processes.
At the same time, the existential crisis within the Lima Group continues to escalate with every right-wing government being voted out, deposed, or facing a severe structural crisis.
With the departure of the governments of Enrique Peña Nieto in Mexico, Mauricio Macri in Argentina, Añez in Bolivia, Donald Trump in the United States, the removal of Martín Vizcarra in Peru, and the guaranteed departure of Lenín Moreno’s government in Ecuador and Sebastián Piñera’s in Chile, it has become clear that the original objective of isolating Venezuela has failed, though not without substantial damage to the latter’s economy as a result.
On the other hand, working with Almagro, the United States will want to cement the OAS’s role in the region. It will no doubt seek to push this agenda as host of the next Summit of the Americas in 2021. Yet for people’s movements and progressive forces in the region, the hope is that they can instead use this summit as a space to promote the kind of solidarity-based integration that helped defeat the FTAA.
The emergence of these new governments — a direct result of the rising power of social movements across the continent — was accompanied by a growing sentiment of regional integration. This new spirit sought to put aside differences and bring the region together to discuss common problems, without US (and Canadian) involvement.
At a political level, this process of integration took the concrete form of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), formed in 2008, and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), established in 2011. Their emergence was not without difficulties, but these organizations slowly began to supplant the OAS as the main institutions for facilitating regional dialogue and resolving conflicts.
In March 2008, the region seemed on the precipice of war after Colombia illegally bombed a Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) camp on Ecuadorian territory. For many, the timing of the attack by a staunch US ally was not coincidental, occurring just weeks out from a preparatory meeting scheduled in Colombia to finalize details for launching UNASUR later that year.
In response, a Group of Rio summit involving representatives from nineteen Latin American member countries was immediately convened. Those present unanimously resolved to reject the actions of the Colombian government and any further violation of the sovereignty of another country. Colombian president Álvaro Uribe even issued a formal apology. In what was undoubtedly a first — at least since the formation of the OAS — a regional conflict was debated and resolved without direct US involvement.
Later that year, in September 2008, an emergency meeting of UNASUR was convened amid a coup attempt in Bolivia. At that meeting, the governments of South America unanimously expressed their “full and decided support for the constitutional government of President Evo Morales” and warned they would “not recognize any situation that entails an attempt for a civil coup that ruptures the institutional order, or that compromises the territorial integrity of the Republic of Bolivia.” The resolution was a significant blow to Bolivia’s right-wing opposition and contributed to the ultimate defeat of the coup.
Return of OAS?
It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that with the fall of several progressive and centrist governments during the past decade, right-wing forces have sought to dismantle (UNASUR) or put on hold (CELAC) these initiatives and breathe new life into the OAS.
Attempts under Almagro to restore the OAS to the center of regional politics are part of a greater push by Washington to reassert its role in the region, something that had diminished during the years when the “Pink Tide” was on the advance.
These attempts have not come without tensions, as evidenced by the rise of the Lima Group, aimed at isolating Venezuela and aiding the US intervention in that country, but also the Puebla Group, which is aimed at rebuilding the ties between the left-wing and progressive political groups and parties across the continent.
Such tensions were also on display in the divided vote over Almagro’s reelection this March. Such divisions within the OAS had not been seen in decades — previous secretary generals had been approved unanimously, and often by acclamation, despite it being a secret vote.
The OAS can never be a democratic forum for regional dialogue or conflict resolution, and not just because of its infrastructural and financial dependence on Washington. Rather, what dictates this is the reality of the unequal power dynamics that exist between the imperialist countries of North America and the rest of the Americas. This also explains why the United States cannot tolerate its neighbors down south uniting without its presence — a move that inherently weakens US regional hegemony.
Today, the bid to invoke the political and diplomatic support of the United States as a guarantor of “stability” is again becoming more apparent, across the region. The attempted coup by Juan Guaidó in Venezuela in 2019 and his “Twitter presidency” have been openly and directly financed and sustained by resources of US-backed agencies such as the USAID and the NED, while the consolidation of Jeanine Añez’s post-coup regime in Bolivia was largely possible through the diplomatic support of the Trump administration, leading to a “domino effect” of official recognitions by the right-wing governments of the region.
With political winds once again blowing to the left in the region, governments south of the Río Grande will be faced with a choice regarding the kind of regional integration they want to pursue. The chance to restart CELAC exists with progressive governments now in power in two of the three largest countries in the region, Argentina and Mexico (who currently holds the presidency of the organization).
These same two governments played key roles in the Bolivian crisis last year. In Bolivia, the new MAS government, overwhelmingly returned to power in the October 2020 elections, has signaled its intentions to revitalize UNASUR. Jair Bolsonaro’s right-wing government in Brazil will be an important, but not necessarily insurmountable, obstacle to overcome in these processes.
At the same time, the existential crisis within the Lima Group continues to escalate with every right-wing government being voted out, deposed, or facing a severe structural crisis.
With the departure of the governments of Enrique Peña Nieto in Mexico, Mauricio Macri in Argentina, Añez in Bolivia, Donald Trump in the United States, the removal of Martín Vizcarra in Peru, and the guaranteed departure of Lenín Moreno’s government in Ecuador and Sebastián Piñera’s in Chile, it has become clear that the original objective of isolating Venezuela has failed, though not without substantial damage to the latter’s economy as a result.
On the other hand, working with Almagro, the United States will want to cement the OAS’s role in the region. It will no doubt seek to push this agenda as host of the next Summit of the Americas in 2021. Yet for people’s movements and progressive forces in the region, the hope is that they can instead use this summit as a space to promote the kind of solidarity-based integration that helped defeat the FTAA.
Sobre o autor
Federico Fuentes é um ativista solidário e escritor sobre a política latino-americana. Ele foi coautor de Latin America's Turbulent Transitions: The Future of Twenty-First Century Socialism, bem como livros sobre a nova esquerda na Bolívia, Equador e Paraguai.
Federico Fuentes é um ativista solidário e escritor sobre a política latino-americana. Ele foi coautor de Latin America's Turbulent Transitions: The Future of Twenty-First Century Socialism, bem como livros sobre a nova esquerda na Bolívia, Equador e Paraguai.
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