Ilan Goldenberg
Foreign Affairs
Está claro, no entanto, que com esta intervenção americana, a guerra que Israel lançou contra o Irã há mais de uma semana entrou em uma nova fase. Os eventos podem tomar várias direções. O ataque americano pode, de fato, levar à capitulação iraniana em termos amigáveis a Israel e aos Estados Unidos. Mas é igualmente ou até mais provável que arraste os Estados Unidos ainda mais fundo na guerra, com consequências profundamente negativas. O Irã quase certamente buscará alguma forma de retaliação, talvez atacando bases americanas próximas e potencialmente matando soldados americanos. Isso pode levar a uma escalada cada vez maior, com efeitos devastadores para a região e o envolvimento americano em uma guerra que poucos americanos desejam.
Accidents and miscalculations could make things much worse. Iran could attempt to pursue a more limited missile response but end up stumbling into “catastrophic success” when one missile breaches American defenses and causes much more damage than the Iranians were expecting, in the process drawing the United States deeper into the conflict.
Iran’s other significant retaliatory capability is its fleet of small boats, which when dispersed are difficult to defeat and could start dropping mines in the Strait of Hormuz or attempting suicide bombing attacks against U.S. ships. This course of action could block roughly one third of the world’s oil trade, causing a spike in prices that could set off a global recession. If Iran were to go down this path, only the U.S. navy could reopen the Strait of Hormuz and a significant naval war would ensue, with U.S. ships and planes battling Iranian ships and coastal defenses.
To be sure, Iran would think twice before closing the Strait of Hormuz. The countries that would suffer the most pain from such an action are China—the largest purchaser of Gulf oil—and the Gulf states themselves. Iran’s entire strategy over the past few years has been to build better relations with both China and Gulf countries in order to end its diplomatic isolation. Going after oil shipping would leave Iran very much alone, which is why even now world oil markets view this as a relatively low probability, pricing in only a 10 percent increase in the global oil price since fighting started on June 13.
It is entirely plausible that in the aftermath of these U.S. strikes, the situation does not escalate. Iran could launch a limited number of missiles at U.S. targets that cause few or no casualties. Trump chooses to take the Iranian strikes and ends the cycle of escalation, and Israel, satisfied with the outcomes of the war, also holds back. Given the number of variables, however, much will depend on the wisdom and restraint of Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khameini, and the people around them. And that does not bode well in the short or long term.
Iran may also pursue other means of retribution, including terrorist attacks on American facilities all over the world. These could include targeted assassinations, such as those the Iranians have already attempted since the killing of Soleimani or as Saddam attempted against President George H. W. Bush after the first Gulf War.
Another danger is that with a more desperate and radicalized Iranian regime, its conflict with Israel could go on in perpetuity. As evident in Gaza, Ukraine, and during the first Iran-Iraq war, it’s much easier to start a war than to end one. For months or even years, Iran could regularly send small missile salvos into Israel and Israel could continue with air strikes on Iran. The United States would largely stay out of such a conflict, apart from providing Israel with defensive support. But this war would be horrible for civilians caught in the middle.
For a superpower like the United States, threats from a weak Iran will be manageable but come at a real cost. They will demand a lot of time and attention from senior American leaders as well as military resources and investments in the Middle East that would otherwise be focused on other theaters. They could also carry notable second order effects. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the large U.S. military footprint in the Middle East became a rallying cry for al-Qaeda and played a role in the events that ultimately led to the 9/11 attacks.
Finally, if the conflict escalates and the United States finds itself drawn further into the war and again bogged down in the Middle East, the American relationship with Israel could greatly change. In the aftermath of the American invasion of Iraq, blaming Israel for encouraging the U.S. intervention was the realm of fringe conspiracy theorists. However, if the United States gets drawn into a war that most Americans do not believe the country should enter, and it goes badly, the American public will justifiably blame Israel. Already, on the American left, Israel’s conduct in Gaza has dramatically reduced support for the U.S.-Israeli alliance, and an intense debate is now happening on the right about U.S. foreign policy, most notably evidenced by the contentious exchange between the political commentator Tucker Carlson and U.S. Senator Ted Cruz about support for Israel and the decision to go to war in Iran.
PROBABILIDADES ACUMULADAS
Esses ataques podem dar certo. Nos próximos dias ou semanas, o Irã pode ser forçado a aceitar termos favoráveis a Israel e aos Estados Unidos, e a guerra pode terminar rapidamente. Mas o histórico de intervenções militares americanas no Oriente Médio e a natureza da guerra ao longo da história humana mostram que o envolvimento americano acarreta um risco tremendo. A melhor e mais duradoura opção para os Estados Unidos, desde o início, era buscar um acordo diplomático que restringisse comprovadamente o programa nuclear iraniano. Infelizmente, após os eventos de hoje, essa opção é muito menos provável.
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| O presidente dos EUA, Donald Trump, anunciando ataques ao Irã, Washington, D.C., junho de 2025 Carlos Barria / Reuters |
Os Estados Unidos atacaram o Irã. Poucos dias após sugerir que poderia adiar qualquer ação militar americana por semanas, o presidente americano Donald Trump anunciou em 21 de junho que aeronaves americanas atingiram três instalações nucleares iranianas, incluindo a instalação profundamente enterrada em Fordow. Autoridades iranianas confirmaram a ocorrência dos ataques. Embora Trump tenha insistido que as instalações foram "obliteradas", ainda não está claro quais danos os ataques causaram.
Está claro, no entanto, que com esta intervenção americana, a guerra que Israel lançou contra o Irã há mais de uma semana entrou em uma nova fase. Os eventos podem tomar várias direções. O ataque americano pode, de fato, levar à capitulação iraniana em termos amigáveis a Israel e aos Estados Unidos. Mas é igualmente ou até mais provável que arraste os Estados Unidos ainda mais fundo na guerra, com consequências profundamente negativas. O Irã quase certamente buscará alguma forma de retaliação, talvez atacando bases americanas próximas e potencialmente matando soldados americanos. Isso pode levar a uma escalada cada vez maior, com efeitos devastadores para a região e o envolvimento americano em uma guerra que poucos americanos desejam.
THE IRANIAN RESPONSE
More than a week into the war, Israel had refrained from striking one of Iran’s most critical nuclear facilities at Fordow—a facility that before the war began had enough enriched uranium and centrifuges to quickly produce material for multiple nuclear weapons. That wasn’t because Israel didn’t want to level Fordow but because it couldn’t. The facility is burrowed so deep underground that only bunker-busting Massive Ordnance Penetrator bombs, which the United States has but Israel does not, could destroy the facility. Any hope of making it impossible for Iran to quickly rush to a nuclear weapon required either the destruction of Fordow or an agreement by Iran to disassemble much of the facility. Ultimately, Trump grew impatient with the diplomatic option and chose to foreclose the possibility of a hurried Iranian nuclear breakout by joining the war and bombing facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan.
Washington has suggested that it communicated to Tehran that the strikes would mark the extent of American involvement as long as Iran refrained from retaliating. Trump probably hopes that the United States can absorb limited Iranian retaliation and try to stay out of deeper involvement in the war. Such a ploy could work, but it is incredibly risky.
More than a week into the war, Israel had refrained from striking one of Iran’s most critical nuclear facilities at Fordow—a facility that before the war began had enough enriched uranium and centrifuges to quickly produce material for multiple nuclear weapons. That wasn’t because Israel didn’t want to level Fordow but because it couldn’t. The facility is burrowed so deep underground that only bunker-busting Massive Ordnance Penetrator bombs, which the United States has but Israel does not, could destroy the facility. Any hope of making it impossible for Iran to quickly rush to a nuclear weapon required either the destruction of Fordow or an agreement by Iran to disassemble much of the facility. Ultimately, Trump grew impatient with the diplomatic option and chose to foreclose the possibility of a hurried Iranian nuclear breakout by joining the war and bombing facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan.
Washington has suggested that it communicated to Tehran that the strikes would mark the extent of American involvement as long as Iran refrained from retaliating. Trump probably hopes that the United States can absorb limited Iranian retaliation and try to stay out of deeper involvement in the war. Such a ploy could work, but it is incredibly risky.
In the aftermath of this strike, Iran’s most likely response will be to attack U.S. bases in the Arabian Peninsula or in Iraq just as Iran did in response to the American strike that killed the Iranian military leader Qasem Soleimani in 2020. Under siege from two powerful adversaries, Iran’s leadership may choose to launch a limited number of missiles at U.S. bases, just as it did in 2020. This response would certainly run the risk of killing American forces. U.S. forces could emerge from such an assault mostly unscathed, since the U.S. military has likely already moved many of its troops away from its bases near Iran, while adding extra missile defense assets to defeat an Iranian attack. If American casualties are limited, Trump can repeat the playbook of 2020 and the United States can choose to stand down.
Another possibility, however, is that Iran could launch a much more comprehensive attack against U.S. forces in the Middle East that could result in significant casualties and draw the United States into a protracted war. Iran’s leadership may have learnt the lesson from Trump’s actions earlier this year in Yemen, where he escalated the military campaign against the Houthis only to back off a month later when American attacks failed to show results. Persistence and aggression, Tehran could reason, are the best way to get Trump to back down. Although Israel has significantly degraded Iran’s longer range missile capabilities, it’s unclear what damage has been done to Iran’s stock of shorter range missiles that could reach U.S. bases in Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and elsewhere.
O Irã buscará alguma forma de retaliação.
Another possibility, however, is that Iran could launch a much more comprehensive attack against U.S. forces in the Middle East that could result in significant casualties and draw the United States into a protracted war. Iran’s leadership may have learnt the lesson from Trump’s actions earlier this year in Yemen, where he escalated the military campaign against the Houthis only to back off a month later when American attacks failed to show results. Persistence and aggression, Tehran could reason, are the best way to get Trump to back down. Although Israel has significantly degraded Iran’s longer range missile capabilities, it’s unclear what damage has been done to Iran’s stock of shorter range missiles that could reach U.S. bases in Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and elsewhere.
O Irã buscará alguma forma de retaliação.
Accidents and miscalculations could make things much worse. Iran could attempt to pursue a more limited missile response but end up stumbling into “catastrophic success” when one missile breaches American defenses and causes much more damage than the Iranians were expecting, in the process drawing the United States deeper into the conflict.
Iran’s other significant retaliatory capability is its fleet of small boats, which when dispersed are difficult to defeat and could start dropping mines in the Strait of Hormuz or attempting suicide bombing attacks against U.S. ships. This course of action could block roughly one third of the world’s oil trade, causing a spike in prices that could set off a global recession. If Iran were to go down this path, only the U.S. navy could reopen the Strait of Hormuz and a significant naval war would ensue, with U.S. ships and planes battling Iranian ships and coastal defenses.
To be sure, Iran would think twice before closing the Strait of Hormuz. The countries that would suffer the most pain from such an action are China—the largest purchaser of Gulf oil—and the Gulf states themselves. Iran’s entire strategy over the past few years has been to build better relations with both China and Gulf countries in order to end its diplomatic isolation. Going after oil shipping would leave Iran very much alone, which is why even now world oil markets view this as a relatively low probability, pricing in only a 10 percent increase in the global oil price since fighting started on June 13.
It is entirely plausible that in the aftermath of these U.S. strikes, the situation does not escalate. Iran could launch a limited number of missiles at U.S. targets that cause few or no casualties. Trump chooses to take the Iranian strikes and ends the cycle of escalation, and Israel, satisfied with the outcomes of the war, also holds back. Given the number of variables, however, much will depend on the wisdom and restraint of Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khameini, and the people around them. And that does not bode well in the short or long term.
THE TROUBLES TO COME
In the long term, the outcomes from the decision to strike Iran are hugely uncertain. It is highly implausible that, as some in Israel and the United States hope, these attacks will precipitate the collapse of the Iranian regime. The regime still has the guns and there is no ground force coming to invade Iran and topple the Islamic Republic. This isn’t Bashar al-Assad’s Syria, a country that was ravaged and hollowed out by a decade of civil war before the regime collapsed in December 2024. And even if the conflict and the death of so many senior Iranian officials does by some chance cause the regime to crumble, the instability and violence that would come with it would be unlikely to produce a democracy and could instead lead to a more radical leadership or a dangerous vacuum.
The best-case scenario is that more moderate voices inside the regime such as Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, former President Hassan Rouhani, and others of their reformist ilk win an internal power struggle and conclude that Iran needs to change course. They could insist that the nuclear program and the country’s support for proxies across the Middle East were expensive and misguided boondoggles that have brought only misery to Iran. They would accept a deal similar to the one Hezbollah accepted last fall—a ceasefire on Israeli and American terms.
But Iran is not Hezbollah. It is a country of 90 million people. Its government is likely to be much more resilient. The more likely scenario is akin to what happened to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq after the first Gulf War. What will be left in Iran is a weakened regime, but one that is more radicalized, hostile to the United States, and willing to take risks.
In this scenario, Iran will certainly attempt to obtain a nuclear weapon. Given the blows already delivered to Iran’s program and its resources, it is unclear how long this would take. Saddam failed to develop a bomb in the 1990s, although Iraq’s program did not have nearly the same level of know-how and capacity as Iran’s does today. And with the International Atomic Energy Association unlikely to regain access to Iran and monitor what happens to Iran’s nuclear program in the aftermath of the war, it is possible an Iranian regime could pick up the pieces and get to a bomb in a couple of years. To be sure, American and Israeli intelligence will certainly keep a close eye on developments in any iteration of a postwar Iran.
Esses ataques provavelmente não levarão ao colapso do regime.
In the long term, the outcomes from the decision to strike Iran are hugely uncertain. It is highly implausible that, as some in Israel and the United States hope, these attacks will precipitate the collapse of the Iranian regime. The regime still has the guns and there is no ground force coming to invade Iran and topple the Islamic Republic. This isn’t Bashar al-Assad’s Syria, a country that was ravaged and hollowed out by a decade of civil war before the regime collapsed in December 2024. And even if the conflict and the death of so many senior Iranian officials does by some chance cause the regime to crumble, the instability and violence that would come with it would be unlikely to produce a democracy and could instead lead to a more radical leadership or a dangerous vacuum.
The best-case scenario is that more moderate voices inside the regime such as Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, former President Hassan Rouhani, and others of their reformist ilk win an internal power struggle and conclude that Iran needs to change course. They could insist that the nuclear program and the country’s support for proxies across the Middle East were expensive and misguided boondoggles that have brought only misery to Iran. They would accept a deal similar to the one Hezbollah accepted last fall—a ceasefire on Israeli and American terms.
But Iran is not Hezbollah. It is a country of 90 million people. Its government is likely to be much more resilient. The more likely scenario is akin to what happened to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq after the first Gulf War. What will be left in Iran is a weakened regime, but one that is more radicalized, hostile to the United States, and willing to take risks.
In this scenario, Iran will certainly attempt to obtain a nuclear weapon. Given the blows already delivered to Iran’s program and its resources, it is unclear how long this would take. Saddam failed to develop a bomb in the 1990s, although Iraq’s program did not have nearly the same level of know-how and capacity as Iran’s does today. And with the International Atomic Energy Association unlikely to regain access to Iran and monitor what happens to Iran’s nuclear program in the aftermath of the war, it is possible an Iranian regime could pick up the pieces and get to a bomb in a couple of years. To be sure, American and Israeli intelligence will certainly keep a close eye on developments in any iteration of a postwar Iran.
Esses ataques provavelmente não levarão ao colapso do regime.
Iran may also pursue other means of retribution, including terrorist attacks on American facilities all over the world. These could include targeted assassinations, such as those the Iranians have already attempted since the killing of Soleimani or as Saddam attempted against President George H. W. Bush after the first Gulf War.
Another danger is that with a more desperate and radicalized Iranian regime, its conflict with Israel could go on in perpetuity. As evident in Gaza, Ukraine, and during the first Iran-Iraq war, it’s much easier to start a war than to end one. For months or even years, Iran could regularly send small missile salvos into Israel and Israel could continue with air strikes on Iran. The United States would largely stay out of such a conflict, apart from providing Israel with defensive support. But this war would be horrible for civilians caught in the middle.
For a superpower like the United States, threats from a weak Iran will be manageable but come at a real cost. They will demand a lot of time and attention from senior American leaders as well as military resources and investments in the Middle East that would otherwise be focused on other theaters. They could also carry notable second order effects. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the large U.S. military footprint in the Middle East became a rallying cry for al-Qaeda and played a role in the events that ultimately led to the 9/11 attacks.
Finally, if the conflict escalates and the United States finds itself drawn further into the war and again bogged down in the Middle East, the American relationship with Israel could greatly change. In the aftermath of the American invasion of Iraq, blaming Israel for encouraging the U.S. intervention was the realm of fringe conspiracy theorists. However, if the United States gets drawn into a war that most Americans do not believe the country should enter, and it goes badly, the American public will justifiably blame Israel. Already, on the American left, Israel’s conduct in Gaza has dramatically reduced support for the U.S.-Israeli alliance, and an intense debate is now happening on the right about U.S. foreign policy, most notably evidenced by the contentious exchange between the political commentator Tucker Carlson and U.S. Senator Ted Cruz about support for Israel and the decision to go to war in Iran.
PROBABILIDADES ACUMULADAS
Esses ataques podem dar certo. Nos próximos dias ou semanas, o Irã pode ser forçado a aceitar termos favoráveis a Israel e aos Estados Unidos, e a guerra pode terminar rapidamente. Mas o histórico de intervenções militares americanas no Oriente Médio e a natureza da guerra ao longo da história humana mostram que o envolvimento americano acarreta um risco tremendo. A melhor e mais duradoura opção para os Estados Unidos, desde o início, era buscar um acordo diplomático que restringisse comprovadamente o programa nuclear iraniano. Infelizmente, após os eventos de hoje, essa opção é muito menos provável.
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