Se a China se tornou um país imperialista é uma questão de crucial importância para a luta de classes global. Embora a China tenha desenvolvido uma relação exploratória com o Sul da Ásia, a África e outros exportadores de matérias-primas, no geral, a China continua a transferir uma quantidade maior de mais-valia para os países centrais do sistema capitalista mundial do que recebe da periferia. A China é, portanto, melhor descrita como um país semiperiférico no sistema capitalista mundial.
por Minqi Li
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| Volume 73, Issue 3 (July-August 2021) |
A China é atualmente a maior economia do mundo, em termos de paridade de poder de compra. À medida que a rápida expansão da economia chinesa remodela o mapa geopolítico global, a grande mídia ocidental começou a definir a China como uma nova potência imperialista que explora energia e matérias-primas baratas de países em desenvolvimento. Alguns intelectuais e grupos políticos marxistas, inspirados na teoria leninista do imperialismo, argumentam que a ascensão do capital monopolista chinês e sua rápida expansão no mercado mundial transformaram a China em um país capitalista imperialista.
Se a China se tornou ou não um país imperialista é uma questão de crucial importância para a luta de classes global. Argumento que, embora a China tenha desenvolvido uma relação de exploração com o Sul da Ásia, a África e outros exportadores de matérias-primas, no geral, a China continua a transferir uma quantidade maior de mais-valia para os países centrais do sistema capitalista mundial do que recebe da periferia. A China é, portanto, melhor descrita como um país semiperiférico no sistema capitalista mundial.
A verdadeira questão não é se a China se tornou imperialista, mas se ela avançará para o centro do sistema capitalista mundial em um futuro previsível. Devido às barreiras estruturais do sistema capitalista mundial, é improvável que a China se torne membro do centro. No entanto, se a China conseguir se tornar um país central, a extração de mão de obra e recursos energéticos necessária imporá um fardo insuportável ao resto do mundo. É duvidoso que tal desenvolvimento possa ser compatível com a estabilidade do sistema mundial existente ou com a estabilidade do sistema ecológico global.
A China é um Novo País Imperialista?
À medida que a China se torna a maior economia do mundo (medida pela paridade do poder de compra) e o maior produtor industrial, a demanda chinesa por diversas commodities energéticas e de matérias-primas tem aumentado exponencialmente. Em 2016-17, a China consumiu 59% do fornecimento total mundial de cimento, 47% do alumínio, 56% do níquel, 50% do carvão, 50% do cobre, 50% do aço, 27% do ouro, 14% do petróleo, 31% do arroz, 47% da carne suína, 23% do milho e 33% do algodão.1
Grande parte da demanda chinesa por commodities é suprida por países em desenvolvimento na Ásia, África e América Latina. Nesse contexto, a grande mídia ocidental descreveu a China como um novo país imperialista que explora países em desenvolvimento. Em junho de 2013, o New Yorker publicou um artigo criticando os capitalistas chineses na Zâmbia por explorarem recursos locais de cobre e violarem direitos trabalhistas.²
Em março de 2018, o The Week publicou um artigo de opinião argumentando que, com a disparada dos investimentos chineses no exterior, a África havia se tornado um destino fundamental para os investimentos chineses, resultando na exploração desmedida dos recursos locais e em desastres ecológicos. O autor argumentou ainda que, devido à natureza autoritária do sistema político chinês, o imperialismo chinês se mostraria consideravelmente pior do que o imperialismo ocidental.³
O New York Times questionou se a China havia se tornado uma nova potência colonial. O autor indicou que a China havia usado sua Iniciativa Um Cinturão, Uma Rota para apoiar ditadores corruptos, induzir os beneficiários de investimentos chineses a armadilhas de dívidas e promover invasões culturais.³
Um comentarista do Financial Times argumentou que, à medida que a China buscava a Iniciativa Um Cinturão, Uma Rota e promovia diversos projetos econômicos, a lógica do investimento inevitavelmente transformaria alguns países em desenvolvimento (como o Paquistão) em Estados clientes da China. A China corre, portanto, “o risco de… embarcar em sua própria aventura colonial”.5
Um dos artigos recentes do National Interest argumenta que “a China é a potência imperialista” em grande parte da África atualmente. Afirma que o que a China deseja na África não é alguma forma de socialismo, mas o controle sobre os recursos, a população e o potencial de desenvolvimento da África.6
Para acadêmicos e grupos políticos marxistas, os debates sobre imperialismo têm sido diretamente baseados ou inspirados pelo conceito de imperialismo de V. I. Lenin, originalmente proposto no início do século XX. Segundo Lenin, no final do século XIX, as relações básicas de produção no mundo capitalista desenvolvido haviam evoluído do capitalismo de livre concorrência para o capitalismo monopolista. A acumulação maciça de capital por capitalistas monopolistas, combinada com a saturação dos mercados internos, levou a um excedente de capital que só poderia ser investido lucrativamente em colônias e países subdesenvolvidos, aproveitando suas terras, mão de obra e matérias-primas baratas. A competição por destinos de exportação de capital, por sua vez, levou a partições territoriais do mundo pelas principais potências imperialistas.7
No capítulo 7 de "Imperialismo, Fase Superior do Capitalismo", Lenin definiu as cinco "características básicas" do imperialismo:
(1) a concentração da produção e do capital atingiu um estágio tão elevado que criou monopólios que desempenham um papel decisivo na vida econômica; (2) a fusão do capital bancário com o capital industrial e a criação, com base nesse "capital financeiro", de uma oligarquia financeira; (3) a exportação de capital, em contraste com a exportação de mercadorias, adquire importância excepcional; (4) a formação de associações capitalistas monopolistas internacionais que compartilham o mundo entre si; e (5) a divisão territorial de todo o mundo entre as maiores potências capitalistas é concluída.8
As condições políticas e econômicas mundiais mudaram drasticamente desde a publicação de "Imperialismo", de Lenin. Embora algumas das "características básicas" do imperialismo propostas por Lenin permaneçam relevantes, a "divisão territorial de todo o mundo entre as maiores potências capitalistas" não pode mais ser entendida em seu sentido original devido à vitória dos movimentos de libertação nacional e à descolonização da Ásia e da África em meados do século XX. As teorias marxistas do imperialismo (ou conceitos de imperialismo inspirados pela tradição marxista) que evoluíram após meados do século XX tipicamente definiram o imperialismo como uma relação de exploração econômica que leva à distribuição desigual de riqueza e poder em escala global.9
No debate contemporâneo sobre o "imperialismo chinês", os teóricos marxistas que afirmam que a China se tornou um "país capitalista imperialista" geralmente argumentam que a China se tornou imperialista no sentido leninista — isto é, internamente, a China se tornou um país capitalista monopolista; externamente, o capital monopolista chinês se manifestou por meio de exportações maciças de capital. Por exemplo, N. B. Turner argumentou que tanto o capital monopolista estatal quanto o privado haviam se estabelecido na China e que os quatro maiores bancos estatais controlavam os "altos comandos" da economia chinesa, demonstrando o domínio do capital financeiro. Turner observou ainda que a China acumulou enormes ativos no exterior e se tornou uma das maiores exportadoras de capital do mundo, explorando trabalhadores e saqueando recursos em várias partes do planeta.10
David Harvey, um dos intelectuais marxistas mais conhecidos do mundo, recentemente argumentou que a posse pela China de grandes parcelas da dívida pública dos EUA e a grilagem de terras capitalistas chinesas na África e na América Latina tornaram a questão de se "a China é a nova potência imperialista" digna de séria consideração.11
Também houve debates acalorados sobre se a China se tornou imperialista entre ativistas de esquerda chineses na China. Curiosamente, um dos principais defensores da tese de que a China se tornou imperialista é Fred Engst (Yang Heping), filho de Erwin Engst e Joan Hinton, dois revolucionários americanos que participaram da revolução socialista maoísta chinesa. Em "Imperialismo, Ultraimperialismo e a Ascensão da China", Yang Heping (usando o pseudônimo Hua Shi) argumentou que o grupo de capital estatal chinês havia se tornado a maior combinação de capital industrial e financeiro do mundo e o grupo capitalista monopolista mais poderoso do mundo. Segundo Yang, a demanda da China por recursos já levou a uma rivalidade imperial intensificada com os Estados Unidos na África e no Sudeste Asiático.12
Imperialismo e Superlucros
Lênin considerava o imperialismo uma etapa do desenvolvimento capitalista baseada no capital monopolista. Para Lênin, capital monopolista não significava simplesmente a formação de grandes grupos capitalistas, mas sim grandes empresas capitalistas com poder monopolista suficiente para gerar superlucros — lucros muito acima das taxas de retorno "normais" em condições de livre concorrência.
Utilizando informações comerciais disponíveis na época, Lênin citou vários exemplos de superlucros de empresas capitalistas monopolistas. A Standard Oil Company pagou dividendos entre 36% e 48% sobre seu capital entre 1900 e 1907. O American Sugar Trust pagou um dividendo de 70% sobre seu investimento original. Os bancos franceses conseguiram vender títulos a 150% de seu valor nominal. Os lucros médios anuais das ações industriais alemãs situaram-se entre 36% e 68% entre 1895 e 1900.13
Após elaborar as cinco características básicas do imperialismo, Lenin afirmou imediatamente que "veremos mais tarde que o imperialismo pode e deve ser definido de forma diferente se considerarmos não apenas os conceitos básicos, puramente econômicos... mas também a fase histórica desta fase do capitalismo em relação ao capitalismo em geral". No capítulo 8 de Imperialismo, Lenin argumentou ainda que a exportação de capital era "uma das bases mais essenciais do imperialismo", pois permitia aos países imperialistas "viver da exploração da mão de obra de vários países e colônias ultramarinos". Os superlucros explorados nas colônias, por sua vez, poderiam ser usados para comprar a "camada superior" da classe trabalhadora, que se tornaria a base social do oportunismo no movimento operário: "Imperialismo significa a partilha do mundo e a exploração de outros países além da China, o que significa altos lucros monopolistas para um punhado de países muito ricos, criando a possibilidade econômica de corromper as camadas superiores do proletariado."14
No prefácio das edições francesa e alemã, Lenin elaborou ainda mais:
[É] precisamente o parasitismo e a decadência do capitalismo que são os traços característicos de seu mais alto estágio histórico de desenvolvimento, ou seja, o imperialismo.… O capitalismo agora selecionou um punhado (menos de um décimo dos habitantes do globo; menos de um quinto, num cálculo mais "generoso" e liberal) de Estados excepcionalmente ricos e poderosos que saqueiam o mundo inteiro simplesmente "recortando cupons".… Obviamente, a partir desses superlucros (uma vez que são obtidos além (os lucros que os capitalistas extraem dos trabalhadores de seu "próprio" país), é possível subornar os líderes trabalhistas e o estrato superior da aristocracia trabalhista.15
Lênin considerava isso um "fenômeno histórico-mundial".
Assim, para Lênin, o imperialismo capitalista não está simplesmente associado à formação de grandes capitais e à exportação de capital. Ele inevitavelmente leva e deve ser caracterizado por "altos lucros monopolistas" ou "superlucros" por meio da pilhagem de todo o mundo. Também é interessante notar que, para Lênin, o imperialismo como um "fenômeno histórico-mundial" deve se basear na exploração da grande maioria da população mundial por um "punhado de Estados excepcionalmente ricos e poderosos", que Lênin estimou incluir uma população entre um décimo e um quinto do total mundial. Portanto, o imperialismo deve ser um sistema em que uma pequena minoria da população mundial explora a grande maioria. Não pode ser um sistema em que a maioria explora a minoria.
Se aplicarmos o conceito de superlucros imperialistas de Lenin ao contexto chinês, o que encontramos? A China já se tornou um país imperialista que está saqueando o mundo inteiro simplesmente "recortando cupons"?
Usando a contabilidade convencional da balança de pagamentos internacional, a China de fato se tornou uma grande exportadora de capital e acumulou enormes ativos no exterior. Mas esses "ativos" precisam ser analisados.
De 2004 a 2018, o total de ativos estrangeiros da China aumentou de US$ 929 bilhões para US$ 7,32 trilhões. Durante o mesmo período, o total de passivos externos da China (ou seja, o investimento estrangeiro total na China) aumentou de US$ 693 bilhões para US$ 5,19 trilhões.16 Isso significa que a China tinha uma posição líquida de investimento de US$ 2,13 trilhões no final de 2018. Ou seja, a China não apenas acumulou trilhões de dólares em ativos no exterior, mas também se tornou uma grande credora líquida no mercado global de capitais. Isso parece apoiar o argumento de que a China agora está exportando enormes quantidades de capital e, portanto, se qualifica como um país imperialista.
No entanto, a estrutura dos ativos da China no exterior é muito diferente da estrutura dos ativos estrangeiros na China. Do total de ativos da China no exterior em 2018, 43% são ativos de reserva, 26% são investimentos diretos no exterior, 7% são investimentos de portfólio no exterior e 24% são outros investimentos (moeda e depósitos, empréstimos, créditos comerciais e assim por diante). Em comparação, do total de investimentos estrangeiros na China em 2018, 53% são investimentos estrangeiros diretos, 21% são investimentos estrangeiros de portfólio e 26% são outros investimentos.
Assim, embora o investimento estrangeiro na China seja dominado por investimentos diretos, uma forma de investimento consistente com a tentativa do capitalismo estrangeiro de explorar a mão de obra barata e os recursos naturais da China, os ativos de reserva representam o maior componente dos ativos chineses no exterior.
Os ativos de reserva da China refletem em grande parte a acumulação dos superávits comerciais históricos da China e são investidos principalmente em instrumentos de baixo retorno, mas "líquidos", como títulos do governo dos EUA. Esses ativos, teoricamente, representam as reivindicações da China sobre o fornecimento futuro de bens e serviços dos Estados Unidos e de outros países capitalistas desenvolvidos. Mas essas reivindicações podem nunca se concretizar porque os Estados Unidos e outros países capitalistas desenvolvidos simplesmente não têm capacidade de produção para produzir, em um prazo razoável, os bens e serviços extras que podem corresponder aos mais de três trilhões de dólares em reservas cambiais detidas pela China. Se a China utilizar grande parte de suas reservas para comprar matérias-primas ou trocar as reservas por outros ativos, isso elevaria drasticamente os preços dessas commodities ou de outros ativos, e a China sofreria uma enorme perda de capital (uma grande redução do poder de compra das reservas chinesas). Além disso, a China precisa manter vários trilhões de dólares em reservas para se proteger contra possíveis fugas de capitais ou crises financeiras.
Do ponto de vista dos EUA, o acúmulo de reservas cambiais pela China (principalmente em ativos denominados em dólares) essencialmente permitiu que ela "comprasse" trilhões de dólares em produtos chineses, em grande parte imprimindo dinheiro, sem fornecer quaisquer bens materiais em troca. Os ativos de reserva da China, em vez de fazerem parte da riqueza imperialista chinesa, constituem essencialmente um tributo informal da China ao imperialismo norte-americano, pagando pelo "privilégio de senhoriagem" deste último.
Embora o total de ativos da China no exterior seja superior ao seu passivo em US$ 2,13 trilhões, a receita de investimentos recebida pela China em 2018 foi, na verdade, menor do que a receita de investimentos paga em US$ 61 bilhões.17 O Gráfico 1 compara as taxas de retorno do investimento total da China no exterior com as do investimento estrangeiro na China entre 2010 e 2018.
Gráfico 1. Taxas de Retorno sobre o Investimento (2010-2018)
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| Fontes: As taxas de retorno são calculadas como a razão entre a renda do investimento e o estoque de investimento total. Os dados sobre o investimento chinês no exterior, o investimento estrangeiro na China e a renda de investimento recebida e paga são de "Dados de Séries Temporais da Posição de Investimento Internacional da China", Administração Estatal de Câmbio, República Popular da China, 26 de março de 2021; "Dados de Séries Temporais da Balança de Pagamentos da China", Administração Estatal de Câmbio, República Popular da China, 26 de março de 2021. |
De 2010 a 2018, as taxas de retorno sobre os ativos chineses no exterior foram, em média, de cerca de 3%, e as taxas de retorno sobre o investimento estrangeiro total na China variaram principalmente na faixa de 5% a 6%. Uma taxa média de retorno de cerca de 3% sobre o investimento chinês no exterior obviamente não constitui "superlucros". Além disso, os capitalistas estrangeiros na China conseguem obter cerca de duas vezes mais lucro do que o capital chinês consegue obter no resto do mundo com um determinado montante de investimento.
Às vésperas da Primeira Guerra Mundial, a renda líquida de propriedade do exterior representava 8,6% do Produto Interno Bruto britânico e a renda total de propriedade, 9,6%. Foi observando esses superlucros massivos que Lenin considerou as exportações de capital de "importância excepcional" na era do imperialismo. Em comparação, a renda total de investimentos da China recebida em 2018 foi de US$ 215 bilhões, ou 1,6% do Produto Interno Bruto (PIB) da China, e a renda líquida de investimentos da China no exterior é negativa.18
O padrão geral dos investimentos da China no exterior pode ser ainda mais revelado examinando-se onde o investimento chinês ocorre. O estoque total de investimentos diretos da China no exterior em 2017 foi de US$ 1,81 trilhão, incluindo US$ 1,14 trilhão investidos na Ásia (63%), US$ 43 bilhões investidos na África (2,4%), US$ 111 bilhões investidos na Europa (6,1%), US$ 387 bilhões investidos na América Latina e Caribe (21%), US$ 87 bilhões investidos na América do Norte (4,8%) e US$ 42 bilhões investidos na Austrália e Nova Zelândia (2,3%).
Na Ásia, cerca de US$ 1,04 trilhão foram investidos em Hong Kong, Macau e Cingapura. Hong Kong e Macau são regiões administrativas especiais da China e Cingapura é uma cidade-estado de etnia chinesa. Cerca de US$ 9 bilhões foram investidos no Japão e na Coreia do Sul. Na América Latina e no Caribe, US$ 372 bilhões foram investidos nas Ilhas Cayman e nas Ilhas Virgens Britânicas.19
Os enormes investimentos da China em Hong Kong, Macau, Cingapura, Ilhas Cayman e Ilhas Virgens Britânicas (no total, US$ 1,41 trilhão ou 78% do investimento direto da China no exterior) obviamente não visam explorar os abundantes recursos naturais ou a mão de obra nessas cidades ou ilhas. Parte do investimento chinês em Hong Kong é o chamado "investimento de ida e volta", que será reciclado de volta à China para ser registrado como "investimento estrangeiro" e receber tratamento preferencial.20 Grande parte do investimento chinês nesses locais pode simplesmente estar relacionada à lavagem de dinheiro e fuga de capitais. Em 2012, a Bloomberg noticiou que a família de Xi Jinping possuía vários imóveis em Hong Kong com um valor combinado de £ 35 milhões. Em 2014, um relatório do Consórcio Internacional de Jornalistas Investigativos revelou ainda que o cunhado de Xi chegou a ser proprietário de duas empresas de fachada sediadas nas Ilhas Virgens Britânicas. O investimento da China nesses paraísos fiscais tem mais semelhanças com transferências de riqueza por governos corruptos do Terceiro Mundo do que com projetos de pilhagem imperialista. Grande parte do investimento chinês na Europa, América do Norte, Japão, Coreia do Sul, Austrália e Nova Zelândia provavelmente tem caráter semelhante. Em vez de "explorar" os países capitalistas desenvolvidos, essa fuga de capitais, na verdade, transfere recursos da China para o núcleo do sistema capitalista mundial.21
Isso deixa cerca de US$ 158 bilhões (8,7% do estoque total de investimento direto da China no exterior ou 2,2% do total de ativos da China no exterior) investidos na África, América Latina e no restante da Ásia. Essa parte do investimento chinês, sem dúvida, explora a mão de obra e os recursos naturais dos povos da Ásia, África e América Latina. Mas representa uma pequena fração do investimento total da China no exterior e uma parte quase insignificante da enorme riqueza total acumulada pelos capitalistas chineses (o estoque de capital doméstico da China é cerca de cinco vezes maior que seus ativos no exterior). Alguns capitalistas chineses podem ser responsabilizados por seus comportamentos de cunho imperialista nos países em desenvolvimento, mas, no geral, o capitalismo chinês permanece não imperialista.
Troca Desigual e Exploração Global
Lênin considerava a exportação de capital excepcionalmente importante na era imperialista. Em meados do século XX, os teóricos marxistas do imperialismo já percebiam que, na era pós-colonial, a exploração imperial dos países subdesenvolvidos assumia principalmente a forma de troca desigual. Ou seja, os países subdesenvolvidos (países capitalistas periféricos) tipicamente exportam mercadorias que incorporam comparativamente mais trabalho do que o trabalho incorporado nas mercadorias exportadas pelos países capitalistas desenvolvidos (países imperialistas). No século XXI, a terceirização global por corporações transnacionais, baseada nas enormes diferenças salariais entre trabalhadores em países imperialistas e periféricos, pode ser vista como uma forma especial de troca desigual.22
Dado o desenvolvimento da divisão capitalista globalizada do trabalho e as complexas interações do comércio internacional e dos fluxos de capital, é difícil (senão impossível) identificar qualquer país no mundo atual como sendo "100%" explorador em suas relações econômicas com o restante do sistema capitalista mundial ou "100%" explorado. Mais provavelmente, um país pode simultaneamente se envolver em relações de exploração com alguns países, mas ter relações de exploração com outros. Portanto, para identificar a posição de um país no sistema capitalista mundial, é importante não se concentrar apenas em um lado das relações (por exemplo, chamar a China de imperialista simplesmente porque exportou capital). Em vez disso, é necessário considerar todas as relações comerciais e de investimento envolvidas e descobrir se, no geral, o país recebe mais mais-valia do resto do mundo do que transfere para o resto do mundo. Por um lado, se um país recebe substancialmente mais mais-valia do resto do mundo do que transfere, então o país se qualifica claramente como um país imperialista no sentido de ser um país explorador no sistema capitalista mundial. Por outro lado, se um país transfere substancialmente mais mais-valia para os países imperialistas do que recebe da transferência do resto do mundo, o país seria um membro periférico ou semiperiférico do sistema capitalista mundial (dependendo de um estudo mais aprofundado da posição do país em relação a outros países periféricos e semiperiféricos).
O Gráfico 2 compara os termos de troca médios de trabalho da China e dos Estados Unidos. Os termos de troca de trabalho são definidos como as unidades de trabalho estrangeiro que podem ser trocadas por uma unidade de trabalho doméstico por meio do comércio de bens exportados e importados de igual valor de mercado.
Gráfico 2. Termos de Troca Médios de Trabalho (1990-2017)
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| Fontes: “World Development Indicators”, Banco Mundial, acessado em 31 de maio de 2021. Os termos de troca médios de trabalho são calculados como a razão entre o trabalho total incorporado em um conjunto médio de um milhão de dólares em bens e serviços importados e o trabalho total incorporado em um conjunto médio de um milhão de dólares em bens e serviços exportados. Para detalhes da metodologia, veja Minqi Li, China and the 21st Century Crisis (Londres: Pluto, 2015), 200–2. |
The United States is a typical imperialist country. In the 1990s, one unit of U.S. labor could be exchanged for more than four units of foreign labor. By the early 2000s, the U.S. labor terms of trade further improved; one unit of U.S. labor could be exchanged for about five units of foreign labor. Although the U.S. labor terms of trade declined after the global financial crisis of 2008–09, it has since partially recovered. In 2016–17, one unit of U.S. labor could be exchanged for about four units of foreign labor.
By comparison, China was a typical peripheral country in the 1990s. In the early 1990s, China’s labor terms of trade was about 0.05. That is, one unit of foreign labor could be exchanged for about twenty units of Chinese labor. Since then, China’s labor terms of trade has improved dramatically. By 2016–17, China’s labor terms of trade rose to about 0.5. That is, two units of Chinese labor could be exchanged for about one unit of foreign labor. On balance, China remains an economy exploited by the imperialist countries in the capitalist world system, although the degree of exploitation has declined rapidly in recent years.
Chart 3 compares the net labor gain received by the United States and the net labor loss suffered by China through unequal exchange from 1990 to 2017. Net labor gain received by the United States is calculated as the total labor embodied in the imported goods and services minus the total labor embodied in exported goods and services. The net labor gain calculated in this way includes not only the net labor transfer through the favorable labor terms of trade enjoyed by the United States, but also the labor embodied in the U.S. “trade deficits.” Being a leading imperialist country, the United States benefits from its “seigniorage privilege.” Because of the other countries’ need to hold massive amounts of foreign exchange reserves in the form of dollar-denominated assets, the United States can “purchase” trillions of dollars of goods simply by printing money without providing material goods in return. The labor embodied in the U.S. “trade deficits” therefore should be treated essentially as unilateral transfers from the rest of the world and included in the unequal exchange.
Chart 3. Net Labor Transfer (Million Worker-Years, 1990-2017)
Li Chart 3. Net Labor Transfer (Million Worker-Years, 1990-2017).png
Sources: “World Development Indicators,” World Bank, accessed May 31, 2021. Net labor transfer is defined as the difference between the total labor embodied in a country’s imported goods and services and the total labor embodied in the country’s exported goods and services. If the difference is positive, it constitutes a net labor gain; if negative, it constitutes a net labor loss.
For China, the net labor loss is calculated as the total labor embodied in China’s exported goods and services minus the total labor embodied in China’s imported goods and services. It includes not only the net labor transfer that results from China’s unfavorable labor terms of trade, but also the labor embodied in China’s “trade surpluses.”
It is interesting to see that China’s net labor loss has largely paralleled the U.S. net labor gain since 1990. In 1990, the U.S. net labor gain was thirty-four million worker-years and China’s net labor loss was thirty-nine million worker-years. In 1997, the U.S. net labor gain was fifty-two million worker-years and China’s net labor loss was fifty-seven million worker-years. In 2005, the U.S. net labor gain peaked at eighty-four million worker-years. In 2007, China’s net labor loss peaked at ninety-four million worker-years. By 2014, China’s net labor loss fell to fifty-eight million worker-years and the U.S. net labor gain fell to fifty-six million worker-years. Since then, the U.S. net labor gain and China’s net labor loss have moved in different directions. In 2017, the U.S. net labor gain was sixty-three million worker-years and China’s net labor gain fell to forty-seven million worker-years.
Therefore, in the neoliberal era, Chinese capitalism has functioned as a crucial pillar for the global capitalist economy by transferring surplus value produced by tens of millions of workers to the imperialist countries. At its peak, China’s net labor loss equaled 48 percent of China’s industrial labor force in 2007. Had there not been unequal exchange, ninety-four million workers could be withdrawn from China’s export sector without reducing China’s material consumption levels and the extra ninety-four million workers could help to nearly double China’s industrial output.
Had there not been unequal exchange, the massive amounts of material goods currently supplied to the United States by the rest of the world would have to be produced through domestic production to maintain existing levels of U.S. material consumption. About sixty million workers (38 percent of the total U.S. labor force) would have to be withdrawn from service sectors and transferred to material production sectors. This would result in a massive reduction of services output (by about two-fifths of U.S. GDP) without raising levels of material consumption.
Based on these observations, can we therefore conclude that China remains a peripheral country in the capitalist world system? The answer to this question depends on not only the economic relations between China and the imperialist part of the world system, but also on the relations between China and the peripheral part of the world system. Chart 4 shows China’s labor terms of trade compared to various regions in the world from 1990 to 2017.
Chart 4. China’s Labor Terms of Trade (1990-2017))
Li Chart 4. China's Labor Terms of Trade (1990-2017).png
Sources: “World Development Indicators,” World Bank, accessed May 31, 2021. EAP: East Asia and Pacific (low- and middle-income countries, excluding China); ECA: Eastern Europe and Central Asia (low- and middle-income countries); LAC: Latin America and Caribbean (low- and middle-income countries); MENA: Middle East and North Africa (low- and middle-income countries); SAS: South Asia; SSA: sub-Saharan Africa (low- and middle-income countries); HIC: high-income countries (excluding the United States); USA: United States.
In the early 1990s, China was clearly a part of the periphery. China had unfavorable labor terms of trade against not only the United States and other high-income countries but also every group of low- and middle-income countries. Since then, China has succeeded in improving its labor terms of trade against every country group. By 2015–17, while it would still take about five units of Chinese labor to exchange for one unit of U.S. labor and four units of Chinese labor to exchange for one unit of labor from other high-income countries, China had clearly established exploitative positions in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. One unit of Chinese labor can now be exchanged for about two units of labor from sub-Saharan Africa or four units of labor from South Asia. One unit of Chinese labor is roughly on a par with one unit of labor from the low- and middle-income countries of Latin America, Caribbean, Middle East, North Africa, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. In addition, China has also established a significant advantage relative to other East Asian low- and middle-income countries.
If one adds up the population of South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and low- and middle-income East Asia (excluding China), the total population accounts for about 45 percent of the world population. Thus, China has established exploitative relations against nearly one-half of the world population. China can no longer be treated simply as a peripheral country in the capitalist world system.
China as a Semi-Peripheral Country
According to world-systems theory, the capitalist world system is divided into three structural positions: core, semi-periphery, and periphery. The core countries specialize in quasi-monopolistic, high-profit production processes, and the peripheral countries specialize in highly competitive, low-profit production processes. Surplus value is transferred from the peripheral producers to the core producers, resulting in unequal exchange and concentration of world wealth in the core. By comparison, semi-peripheral countries have “a relatively even mix” of core-like and periphery-like production processes.23
Ideally, to find the relative position of various countries in the capitalist world system, one should conduct a detailed study of labor flows between countries, evaluating whether and to what extent a country benefits or suffers from transfer of surplus value. However, detailed data for trade flows and labor productivity are not available for earlier historical periods. Nevertheless, a country’s position in the global hierarchy of unequal exchange is usually highly correlated with its position in the global hierarchy of per capita GDP. Therefore, statistical information about the global hierarchy of per capita GDP and the distribution of global populations across different income levels can be used to decide the approximate thresholds for the division of the world system into the three structural positions.
Chart 5 shows the index of per capita GDP of all countries in the world ranked from highest to lowest in relation to the countries’ cumulative share of the world population in 1870, 1913, 1950, and 1970.
Chart 5. World Hierarchy of Per Capita GDP, 1870-1970
Li Chart 5. World Hierarchy of Per Capita GDP, 1870-1970.png
Sources: Angus Maddison, “Statistics on World Population, GDP, and Per Capita GDP, 1–2008 AD,” Groningen Growth & Development Centre, 2010. Per capita GDP is measured by constant 1990 international dollars.
In a study of global inequalities, Giovanni Arrighi used the weighted average per capita gross national product of about a dozen Western capitalist economies that had occupied the top positions of the global hierarchy of wealth. Arrighi referred to these Western capitalist economies as the “organic core” and their average per capita gross national product as the “standard of wealth,” a standard for the rest of the world that helped determine whether a country had “succeeded” or “failed” in the capitalist world system.24
I use a similar concept here. Instead of calculating the average per capita GDP of a dozen Western economies, I focus on four major historical imperialist powers: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. The four countries were leading imperialist powers in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century and have stayed consistently among the wealthiest countries in the capitalist world system since 1870. In this sense, it may be argued that the four countries combined have set the “imperial standard” for the capitalist world system. In Chart 5, the per capita GDP of every country is calculated as an index using the weighted average of the four imperialist countries as 100 (that is, “the imperial standard”).
From 1870 to 1970, world income distribution patterns had remained mostly stable. During those one hundred years, about 60 percent of the world population lived in countries with per capita GDP less than 25 percent of the imperial standard; about 20 percent of the world population lived in countries with per capita GDP between 25 and 50 percent of the imperial standard; and the remaining 20 percent lived in countries with per capita GDP greater than 50 percent of the imperial standard.
Within the top 20 percent of the world population, the most privileged had per capita GDP greater than 75 percent of the imperial standard. From 1870 to 1970, the share of the world population that lived in countries with per capita GDP greater than 75 percent of the imperial standard varied between 10 percent (in 1950) and 17 percent (in 1913). This is a range consistent with the population share of “a handful of exceptionally rich and powerful states” suggested by Lenin.
The United States consistently stayed above the imperial standard from 1870 to 1970. The United Kingdom had a per capita GDP that was 139 percent of the imperial standard in 1870 but its relative per capita GDP declined to 82 percent of the imperial standard by 1970, reflecting the historical decline of British imperialism. French per capita GDP was 82 percent of the imperial standard in 1870 and 77 percent in 1913. German per capita GDP was 80 percent of the imperial standard in 1870 and 81 percent in 1913. The relative positions of both countries fell sharply in 1950, because of the massive destruction of the Second World War. In 1970, French per capita GDP was 87 percent of the imperial standard and German per capita GDP was 83 percent. Thus, with the exception of the period just before and after 1950, French and German per capita GDP stayed above 75 percent of the imperial standard between 1870 and 1970.
It is therefore reasonable to use 75 percent of the imperial standard as the approximate threshold between the core of the capitalist world system and the semi-periphery. It is important to note that this is only an approximate threshold and other important characteristics (such as state strength, degree of political and economic independence, technological sophistication, and so on) also need to be considered when deciding whether a country is a member of the core or simply has a core-like income level. For example, in 1970, among the wealthiest countries were rich oil exporters such as Qatar, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela that clearly do not qualify as core countries.
At the other end of the hierarchy, China and India in 1870 had a per capita GDP just below 25 percent of the imperial standard. India was a British colony and China was a semi-colonial country under the competing influence of several imperialist powers. Both were a part of the periphery in 1870. From 1870 to 1970, the share of the world population that lived in countries with per capita GDP less than 25 percent of the imperial standard increased from 57 percent to 66 percent, suggesting widening global inequalities. I use 25 percent of the imperial standard as the approximate threshold between the periphery and the semi-periphery.
Chart 6 shows the index of per capita GDP of all countries in the world ranked from the highest to the lowest in relation to the countries’ cumulative share of the world population in 1990, 2000, 2010, and 2017.
Chart 6. World Hierarchy of Per Capita GDP, 1990-2017
Li Chart 6. World Hierarchy of Per Capita GDP, 1990-2017.png
Sources: “World Development Indicators,” World Bank, accessed May 31, 2021. Per capita GDP is measured by constant 2011 international dollars.
From 1990 to 2010, the world income distribution patterns were largely similar to what prevailed from 1870 to 1970. The share of the population that lived in countries with per capita GDP higher than 75 percent of the imperial standard varied in the narrow range of 13 to 14 percent. The share of the population that lived in countries with per capita GDP less than 25 percent of the imperial standard varied from 68 to 71 percent.
However, by 2017, as China’s per capita GDP advanced to 31 percent of the imperial standard, the structure of world income distribution was radically transformed. The share of the population that lived in countries with per capita GDP less than 25 percent of the imperial standard fell to 50 percent (the lowest since 1870). The share of the population that lived in countries with per capita GDP higher than 75 percent of the imperial standard narrowed to 12 percent. At the same time, the share of the population that lived in countries with per capita GDP between 25 and 75 percent of the imperial standard expanded to 38 percent (almost double the historical semi-peripheral share of the world population).
As China’s per capita GDP rises to levels significantly above 25 percent of the imperial standard and data from labor transfer flows show that China has established exploitative relations against nearly half of the world population, China now clearly qualifies as a semi-peripheral country in the capitalist world system. Given China’s current growth momentum, it is not difficult to conceive a scenario in which China advances into the core of the capitalist world system and becomes a contemporary imperialist country by subjecting the overwhelming majority of the world population to its exploitation. However, is this possible given the structural constraints of the capitalist world system as well as global ecological limits?
The capitalist world system and the system of imperialist exploitation have been based on the exploitation of the majority by a small minority that historically included no more than one-sixth of the world population (what Lenin called “a handful of exceptionally rich and powerful states”). Neither capitalism nor imperialism is compatible with an arrangement where the majority of the world population exploits the minority, or even with a situation where a large minority exploits the rest of the world. Given the size of the Chinese population (almost one-fifth of the world population), if China were to advance into the core, the total core population would have to rise to about one-third of the world population. Can the rest of the world afford to provide sufficient surplus value (in the form of labor embodied in commodities) as well as energy resources to support such a top-heavy capitalist world system?
Table 1 shows the balances of international labor transfer for various parts of the world in 2017.
Table 1. Balances of International Labor Transfer, 2017 (Million Worker-Years)
Labor Embodied in Exports Labor Embodied in Imports Net Labor Loss Net Labor Gain
China 91 44 47
East Asia and Pacific (ex. China) 53 25 28
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 36 24 12
Latin America and Caribbean 38 26 12
Middle East and North Africa 16 11 5
South Asia 88 23 65
Sub-Saharan Africa 31 16 15
High Income (ex. U.S.) 121 251 130
United States 16 80 64
Statistical Discrepancies -10 -10
World 490 490 184 184
Sources: “World Development Indicators,” World Bank, accessed May 31, 2021. All country groups other than the high-income countries refer to low- and middle-income countries. For details of methodology, see Minqi Li, China and the 21st Century Crisis (London: Pluto, 2015), 200–2.
China is the single largest provider of labor embodied in exported goods among all groups of low- and middle-income countries, providing exports that embody about 90 million worker-years annually. But South Asia has recently overtaken China to become the largest source of net labor transfer in the global capitalist economy. In 2017, South Asia suffered a net labor loss of 65 million worker-years. All the low- and middle-income countries combined provided a total net labor transfer of 184 million worker-years in 2017. The United States absorbed about one-third of the surplus value transferred from the low- and middle-income countries; the rest of the high-income countries received about two-thirds. It should be noted that the World Bank definition of high-income countries includes not only all the core capitalist countries but also high-income oil exporters (Saudi Arabia and several small Gulf states), high-income small islands, wealthy cities and city-states (Singapore and China’s special administration regions – Hong Kong and Macao), and a number of relatively well-to-do semi-peripheral countries, such as Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Uruguay.
If China were to become a core country, then it would cease to be a net provider of surplus value to the capitalist world system and be turned into a net recipient of surplus value from the rest of the world. Assuming that China’s average labor terms of trade rises from the current level of about 0.5 (one unit of Chinese labor exchanges for about half of a unit of foreign labor) to about 2 (one unit of Chinese labor exchanges for about two units of foreign labor, similar to the current average labor terms of trade of the non-U.S. high-income countries), then the total labor embodied in China’s imported goods and services would have to rise to about 180 million worker-years. Rather than providing a net labor transfer of nearly 50 million worker-years, China will have to extract 90 million worker-years from the rest of the world. The total shift of 140 million worker-years represents about three-quarters of the total surplus value currently received by the core and the upper-level semi-periphery from the rest of the world and is roughly comparable to the total net labor transfer currently provided by all the low- and middle-income countries (excluding China).
Thus, if China were to become a core country in the capitalist world system, the existing core countries would have to give up most of the surplus value they are currently extracting from the periphery. It is inconceivable that the core countries would remain economically and politically stable under such a development. Alternatively, the capitalist world system would have to develop new schemes of exploitation that manage to extract 140 million worker-years of additional surplus value from the remaining part of the periphery. It is difficult to see how the exploitation imposed on the periphery can be increased by such a massive extent without causing either rebellion or collapse.
China’s advance into the core would require not only the extraction of hundreds of millions of worker-years from the rest of the world, but also massive amounts of energy resources.
Energy Limits to Economic Growth
China is now simultaneously the world’s largest importer of oil, natural gas, and coal. Chart 7 shows China’s imports of oil, natural gas, and coal as shares of world production from 2000 to 2018.
Chart 7. Chinese Energy Imports (as a Percent of World Production, 2000-2018)
Li Chart 7. Chinese Energy Imports (as a Percent of World Production, 2000-2018).png
Sources: BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2020 (London: BP, 2019). Oil imports are measured by million barrels per day; natural gas imports are measured by billion cubic meters; and coal imports are measured by million metric tons of oil equivalent.
China’s oil imports were 2.5 percent of the world oil production in 2000. By 2018, China’s oil imports surged to 11.7 percent of the world oil production. From 2000 to 2018, the share of Chinese oil imports in the world oil production had increased at an average annual rate of 0.5 percentage points. At this rate, China’s oil imports will need to absorb about one-fifth of the total world oil production by the early 2030s.
China did not import natural gas before 2006. By 2018, China was already the world’s largest natural gas importer and China’s natural gas imports accounted for 3.1 percent of the world’s natural gas production. China’s coal imports peaked at 4.6 percent of the world coal production in 2013 and had stayed just under 4 percent of the world coal production from 2016 to 2018. Will the rest of the world have the capacity to meet China’s insatiable energy demand as the Chinese ruling class aspires to lead China toward its “great rejuvenation”?
A country’s per capita energy consumption (and especially per capita oil consumption) is closely correlated with its per capita GDP. Chart 8 shows the correlations between per capita GDP (measured by constant 2011 international dollars) and per capita oil consumption (in metric tons) in 2018 for seventy-seven significant energy consuming countries reported by BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy.25
Chart 8. Per Capita GDP and Per Capita Oil Consumption
Li Chart 8. Per Capita GDP and Per Capita Oil Consumption.png
Sources: Oil consumption data are from BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2020 (London: BP, 2019). GDP and population data are from “World Development Indicators,” World Bank, accessed May 31, 2021.
A simple cross-country regression finds that a 1 percent increase in per capita GDP is associated with a 1.24 percent increase in per capita oil consumption, with a regression R-square of 0.85 (that is, cross-country variations in per capita GDP can statistically explain 85 percent of the observed variations in per capita oil consumption).
The weighted average per capita GDP of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany in 2018 was $50,312 (in constant 2011 international dollars). This implies that 75 percent of the “imperial standard” is $37,734. Based on the cross-country regression, the implied per capita oil consumption that corresponds to a per capita GDP of $37,734 would be 1.55 metric tons. By comparison, U.S. per capita oil consumption in 2018 was 2.51 metric tons and China’s per capita oil consumption was 543 kilograms. Given China’s population of about 1.4 billion, if China’s per capita oil consumption were to rise to 1.55 metric tons, China’s total oil consumption would have to increase by about 1.4 billion metric tons (on top of China’s existing level of oil consumption). The increased amount is equivalent to 31 percent of world oil production in 2018 or the sum of oil production by the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. It is obvious that it is simply impossible for such a massive increase in oil demand to be met under any conceivable circumstances.
Chart 8 also shows the historical evolution of China’s per capita oil consumption from 1990 to 2018 and the historical trend. Interestingly, China’s oil consumption has grown at a less rapid pace than what would be implied by the cross-country regression. A simple regression of the historical relationship between China’s per capita oil consumption and per capita GDP finds that for each 1 percent increase in China’s per capita GDP, China’s per capita oil consumption tends to rise by 0.65 percent. If China’s oil consumption were to grow according to its historical trend, then when China’s per capita GDP rises to $37,734 or reaches 75 percent of the imperial standard, China’s per capita oil consumption should rise to 812 kilograms and China’s total oil consumption should rise to about 1.14 billion metric tons. Compared to China’s oil consumption of 628 million metric tons in 2018, this represents an increase of about 510 million metric tons. As China’s oil production peaked in 2014 and has been in decline, any additional increase in oil consumption will have to be met from imports. An additional oil demand in the amount of 510 million metric tons is larger than the total annual oil exports by either the Russian Federation (which exported 449 million metric tons in 2018) or Saudi Arabia (which exported 424 million metric tons in 2018). Can the world find another Saudi Arabia (and more) to meet China’s additional oil demand corresponding to China’s expected core status?
From 2008 to 2018, the world oil production increased from 4 billion metric tons to 4.47 billion metric tons, or by about 470 million metric tons over a ten-year period. During the same period, U.S. oil production increased from 302 million metric tons to 669 million metric tons and Canada’s oil production increased from 153 million metric tons to 256 million metric tons. The combined increase from U.S. and Canadian oil production was 470 million metric tons, accounting for 100 percent of the world oil production growth over the ten-year period. That is, the entire world oil production growth now depends on the development of U.S. “shale oil” (using environmentally disruptive hydraulic fracturing techniques) and heavily polluting Canadian tar sands. Outside the United States and Canada, the rest of the world’s oil production has stagnated. David Hughes, an independent geologist, argued that the U.S. official energy agency had vastly exaggerated the potential resources of shale oil and the U.S. oil boom would prove to be short-lived.26 If Hughes is correct, world oil production is likely to stagnate (if not enter into permanent decline) beyond the 2020s.
It may be argued that China’s future oil consumption can be reduced substantially through energy efficiency improvement. However, the projections based on China’s historical trend already place China’s future per capita oil consumption at the lower end of the range of cross-country variations in per capita oil consumption given different income levels (see Chart 8). However, the projection is based on the assumption of the imperial standard using 2018 levels of per capita GDP. In the future, if the per capita GDP of four major historical imperialist powers continues to increase (as is likely to be the case), the imperial standard will rise accordingly and bring up the per capita oil consumption level associated with the imperial standard. Any “saving” of oil consumption through energy efficiency improvement is likely to be largely or completely offset by the opposite effect brought about by the rising imperial standard.
China could also attempt to reduce its oil consumption by pursuing a massive program of electrification, replacing oil by domestically produced electricity. In particular, China could try to replace its car fleet with electric vehicles. However, the production of electric vehicles requires large quantities of raw materials, such as lithium and cobalt, that are often produced in politically unstable countries under environmentally damaging conditions. Using the current technology, the production of each electric vehicle requires about ten kilograms of lithium. China is currently producing about twelve million cars a year. Thus, to replace China’s current annual car production by electric vehicles would require the consumption of 120,000 metric tons of lithium annually. World total lithium production in 2018 was only 62,000 metric tons. Therefore, even if China uses up the entire world’s lithium production, it would only be sufficient to replace about one-half of China’s conventional car production.27
China currently has about 140 million passenger cars, or approximately one car for every ten persons.28 If China were to have the same population-car ratio as the United States (two cars for every three persons), China’s total number of cars would need to rise to about one billion. To produce one billion electric cars, China would need a cumulative consumption of ten million metric tons of lithium, using about 72 percent of the world’s current lithium reserves.
Most of China’s oil consumption is not used for cars but for freight transportation and various industrial purposes, which cannot be easily electrified given the current technology and likely technological development in the near term. China’s gasoline consumption for transportation purposes accounts for only about one-tenth of China’s total oil consumption. Therefore, even if in the unlikely event that China turns out to be extremely successful in its effort to promote electric cars, it would at best replace no more than one-tenth of China’s current oil consumption.
Regardless of whether the world can find sufficient energy resources to meet China’s future demand, China’s current energy consumption level is already generating greenhouse gas emissions that are several times the level required for global sustainability.
Climate Crisis and the Exhaustion of the Global Emissions Budget
A scientific consensus has been established that if global average surface temperature rises to two degrees Celsius higher than the preindustrial level, dangerous climate change with catastrophic consequences cannot be avoided. According to James Hansen and his colleagues, global warming by two degrees will lead to the melting of the West Antarctica ice sheets, causing sea levels to rise by five to nine meters over the next fifty to two hundred years. Bangladesh, European lowlands, the U.S. eastern coast, North China plains, and many coastal cities will be submerged. Further increases in global average temperature may eventually lead to runaway warming, turning much of the world unsuitable for human inhabitation. For global ecological sustainability and the long-term survival of human civilization, it is imperative to keep global warming below two degrees Celsius.29
In 2018, the global average surface temperature was 1.12 degrees Celsius higher than the average temperature from 1880 to 1920 (used as a proxy for preindustrial time). The ten-year average temperature from 2009 to 2018 was 1.04 degrees Celsius higher than the preindustrial level.30 To prevent global warming by two degrees Celsius by the end of this century, the world must ensure less than 0.96 degrees Celsius of additional warming.
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, cumulative carbon dioxide emissions will largely determine the global mean surface warming over the next century or so. In previous work, I calculated that the remaining global budget for cumulative carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels burning for the rest of the twenty-first century should be no more than 1.4 trillion metric tons. Glen P. Peters and his colleagues used a different set of assumptions and calculated the remaining emissions budget from fossil fuels burning to be only 765 billion metric tons.31
The world population in 2018 was 7.59 billion. Using the more generous 1.4 trillion metric tons as the global emissions budget for the rest of the twenty-first century, an average person in the future is entitled to an average annual emissions budget of about 2.3 metric tons per person per year (1.4 trillion metric tons / 80 years / 7.6 billion people). By comparison, China’s per capita carbon dioxide emissions in 2018 were 6.77 metric tons and the U.S. per capita carbon dioxide emissions were 15.73 metric tons.
Chart 9 shows the correlations between per capita GDP (measured by constant 2011 international dollars) and per capita carbon dioxide emissions (in metric tons) in 2018 for seventy-seven significant energy consuming countries reported by BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy.32 The figure also shows the historical evolution of China’s per capita carbon dioxide emissions from 1990 to 2018.
Chart 9. Per Capita GDP and Per Capita CO2 Emissions
Li Chart 9. Per Capita GDP and Per Capita CO2 Emissions.png
Sources: Carbon dioxide emissions are from BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2020 (London: BP, 2019). GDP and population data are from “World Development Indicators,” World Bank, accessed May 31, 2021.
From 1990 to 2013, China’s per capita carbon dioxide emissions surged from 2.05 metric tons to 6.81 metric tons. If this trend were to continue, China’s per capita carbon dioxide emissions would rise to 12.85 metric tons when China’s per capita GDP rises to $37,734 (75 percent of the imperial standard). If every person in the world were to generate this level of emissions every year between now and the end of the century, global cumulative emissions over the last eight decades of this century would amount to 7.8 trillion metric tons, leading to 5.5 degrees Celsius of additional warming (using the approximate calculation that every one trillion tons of carbon dioxide emissions would bring about 0.7 degrees Celsius of additional warming).
As China’s energy efficiency improves and China makes efforts to substitute natural gas and renewable energies for coal, China’s per capita carbon dioxide emissions have actually leveled off since 2013. However, as China’s oil and natural gas consumption continues to grow rapidly, China’s per capita emissions may resume growth in the future, though at a slower pace.
China’s current per capita carbon dioxide emissions are substantially above what would be predicted by the cross-country regression given China’s current income level. Using the cross-country regression, if China’s per capita GDP were to rise to $37,734, China’s per capita carbon dioxide emissions should be 8.67 metric tons. If every person in the world were to generate emissions of 8.67 tons every year between now and the end of the century, global cumulative emissions over the last eight decades of this century would amount to 5.3 trillion metric tons, leading to 3.7 degrees Celsius of additional warming. As the global average temperature is already about one degree Celsius higher than the preindustrial level, global warming by the end of the century would be 4.7 degrees Celsius. This will lead to inevitable runaway global warming and reduce the areas suitable for human inhabitation to a small fraction of the earth’s land surface.
Can China reduce its per capita emissions to levels consistent with its climate stabilization obligations without abandoning its ambition to become a part of the core of the capitalist world system?
To meet the climate stabilization obligations, China (as well as every other country) should keep per capita carbon dioxide emissions to below 2.3 metric tons, which is consistent with a per capita GDP of $9,339 based on the cross-country regression (equaling 19 percent of the imperial standard in 2018). In other words, climate stabilization and global ecological sustainability can be accomplished if every country either accepts a massive reduction of per capita income to peripheral levels or stays with the peripheral levels.
Alternatively, China may hope that energy efficiency technology may improve rapidly and consumption of fossil fuels can be mostly substituted by renewable energies so that China can simultaneously accomplish substantial economic growth and rapid reduction of emissions in the future. From 2008 to 2018, world economic output grew at an average annual rate of 3.3 percent and world carbon dioxide emissions grew at an average annual rate of 1.1 percent, implying an average annual reduction rate of emissions intensity of GDP of 2.2 percent. If the world average emissions intensity of GDP continues to fall at this rate in the future, it will take sixty years to reduce the per capita carbon dioxide emissions associated with the per capita GDP of $37,734 from 8.67 metric tons to 2.3 metric tons. But this has not taken into account the offsetting effect of a rising imperial standard in the future. If the weighted average per capita GDP of the four major historical imperialist powers keeps growing by 1 percent a year, then the effective emissions reduction rate relative to the rising imperial standard would be only 1.2 percent. At this rate, it would take 110 years to reduce the per capita carbon dioxide emissions associated with 75 percent of the imperial standard to 2.3 metric tons. But the world simply does not have 110 years to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to stabilize the climate. If the world keeps its current emissions levels (about thirty-four billion metric tons a year), it will take less than twenty years before the world’s remaining emissions budget (required to keep global warming at less than two degrees Celsius) becomes completely exhausted.33
Considerações Finais
As evidências atualmente disponíveis não sustentam o argumento de que a China se tornou um país imperialista no sentido de que pertence à pequena minoria privilegiada que explora a grande maioria da população mundial. De modo geral, a China continua a ter uma posição explorada na divisão capitalista global do trabalho e transfere mais mais-valia para o centro (países historicamente imperialistas) do que recebe da periferia. No entanto, o PIB per capita da China aumentou para níveis substancialmente acima dos níveis de renda da periferia e, em termos de fluxos internacionais de transferência de mão de obra, a China estabeleceu relações de exploração com quase metade da população mundial (incluindo África, Sul da Ásia e partes do Leste Asiático). Portanto, a China é melhor considerada um país semiperiférico no sistema capitalista mundial.
A verdadeira questão é se a China continuará a avançar para o centro do sistema capitalista mundial e quais podem ser as implicações globais. Historicamente, o sistema capitalista mundial tem se baseado na exploração da grande maioria por uma pequena minoria que vive no centro ou nos países historicamente imperialistas. Dada a sua enorme população, não há como a China se tornar um país central sem expandir drasticamente a participação populacional da camada superior rica do sistema mundial. A extração de mão de obra implícita (ou transferência de mais-valia) exigida do resto do mundo seria tão grande que dificilmente seria atendida pela periferia remanescente, com população reduzida. Além disso, os recursos energéticos necessários (especialmente petróleo) associados ao esperado status central da China não podem ser realisticamente satisfeitos nem pelo crescimento futuro da produção mundial de petróleo nem por mudanças técnicas concebíveis. No improvável caso de a China avançar para o centro, as emissões de gases de efeito estufa associadas contribuirão para o rápido esgotamento do orçamento de emissões restante do mundo, tornando o aquecimento global em menos de dois graus Celsius praticamente impossível.
Vários cenários podem se desenvolver no futuro. Primeiro, a China pode seguir os passos de países semiperiféricos históricos. À medida que o crescimento econômico da China continuar nos próximos anos, o processo de crescimento poderá gerar diversas contradições econômicas e sociais (talvez semelhantes ao que ocorreu com os países do Leste Europeu e da América Latina nas décadas de 1970 e 1980), e o rápido crescimento da China será interrompido por uma grande crise econômica, que poderá ser seguida por instabilidades políticas. Se tal cenário se concretizar, a China ficará presa na camada de semiperiferia, consistente com as leis históricas do sistema capitalista mundial que vigoraram até o momento.
O segundo cenário possível é que a China continue subindo na hierarquia global de renda, além da faixa histórica da maioria dos países semiperiféricos. Por exemplo, o PIB per capita da China pode ultrapassar 50% do padrão imperial e começar a se aproximar de 75%. Se tal cenário se concretizar, a exploração de mão de obra e recursos energéticos do resto do mundo pela China poderá se tornar tão massiva que imporá fardos insuportáveis a regiões periféricas como a África, o Sul da Ásia e partes do Leste Asiático. Como resultado, instabilidades generalizadas se abatem sobre essas regiões, o que pode abrir caminho para uma transformação revolucionária ou para um colapso geral do sistema. No entanto, a enorme demanda energética da China pode levar a uma intensa rivalidade com outros grandes importadores de energia, causando instabilidades geopolíticas crescentes, com a própria economia chinesa talvez se tornando vulnerável a tais instabilidades (por exemplo, uma revolução na Arábia Saudita).
Finalmente, existe o cenário improvável de que a China, de alguma forma, "obtenha sucesso" em seu projeto nacional de "alcançar" o Ocidente e se junte ao núcleo do sistema mundial capitalista. Nesse cenário, a demanda energética combinada da China e dos países centrais existentes, bem como as enormes emissões de gases de efeito estufa e outros poluentes gerados por um núcleo imperialista amplamente expandido, sobrecarregarão completamente o sistema ecológico global, destruindo não apenas o meio ambiente, mas também qualquer esperança significativa de uma civilização humana sustentável. Portanto, é do interesse da humanidade, bem como da China, que tal cenário não se materialize.
Notas
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29 James Hansen et al., “Ice Melt, Sea Level Rise and Superstorms: Evidence from Paleoclimate Data, Climate Modeling, and Modern Observations that 2°C Global Warming Could Be Dangerous,” Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics 16, no. 6 (2016): 3761–812.
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32 BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2020.
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Minqi Li é professor de economia na Universidade de Utah. Li pode ser contatado em minqi.li [at] economics.utah.edu.
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