A força americana não vai depor Maduro, mas a diplomacia americana pode conseguir.
Francisco Rodríguez
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| A bandeira venezuelana em uma marcha em Caracas, novembro de 2025 Leonardo Fernandez Viloria / Reuters |
O presidente Donald Trump, ao que parece, tem uma rixa pessoal com a Venezuela. Durante o verão, seu governo começou a concentrar poder naval no Caribe, principalmente perto da costa do país, e a atacar navios logo após saírem de suas águas territoriais. Em outubro, ele autorizou a CIA a realizar operações dentro das fronteiras da Venezuela. E Trump tem repetidamente criticado o presidente Nicolás Maduro, acusando-o de esvaziar as prisões venezuelanas nos Estados Unidos e dizendo que seus dias no cargo estão contados. Esta semana, Washington deslocou um grupo de porta-aviões para o Caribe, e Trump foi informado sobre possíveis opções militares, incluindo ataques terrestres. Publicamente, a Casa Branca afirma que suas operações visam simplesmente combater o narcotráfico — e não facilitar uma mudança de regime. Mas a escala do destacamento militar (o maior no Caribe desde a crise dos mísseis de Cuba em 1962) e a retórica que o acompanha sugerem que o verdadeiro objetivo de Washington é derrubar o governo.
Se Trump atacar a Venezuela, é improvável que termine bem. A menos que ocorra uma invasão — uma medida para a qual há pouco apoio interno e para a qual a mobilização atual é inadequada — uma demonstração de força provavelmente não será suficiente para derrubar o regime de Maduro. Como escreveram os cientistas políticos Alexander Downes e Lindsey O’Rourke na revista Foreign Affairs, ataques aéreos por si só nunca derrubaram um líder. Mesmo que os esforços dos EUA tivessem algum sucesso, as forças armadas da Venezuela quase certamente substituiriam Maduro por alguém de dentro do próprio partido. E mesmo que, contra todas as expectativas, a oposição venezuelana assumisse o controle do país repentinamente, não há garantia de que sua ascensão levaria a uma transição democrática duradoura.
Trump, é claro, poderia decidir atacar de qualquer maneira. Mas a Casa Branca provavelmente sabe que uma simples demonstração de força não derrubará Maduro e, apesar de toda a retórica inflamada de Trump, ele historicamente se opôs a intervenções militares em larga escala que envolvam longos períodos de mobilização e reconstrução nacional.
Em vez disso, ao longo de seus dois mandatos, Trump abordou consistentemente questões espinhosas de política interna e externa por meio de uma estratégia que delineou em seu livro de 1987, A Arte da Negociação: escalar para negociar. Pouco depois de a Coreia do Norte testar mísseis nucleares capazes de atingir os Estados Unidos em 2018, Trump a ameaçou com “fogo e fúria como o mundo nunca viu”. Em seguida, realizou três cúpulas sobre desnuclearização com o líder norte-coreano Kim Jong-un. Trump ameaçou retirar os Estados Unidos da OTAN se outros membros não aumentassem seus próprios gastos militares. A maioria acatou o aumento, e Washington manteve sua posição. E em abril, Trump elevou as tarifas sobre quase todos os países do mundo, apenas para suspender muitas das taxas a fim de negociar com os países a redução das barreiras comerciais.
Se o plano de Trump é forçar uma mudança de regime na Venezuela, ele pode estar caminhando para um fracasso constrangedor e dispendioso. Mas se ele enxerga o fortalecimento militar como um prelúdio para uma abertura diplomática, ele tem a chance de alcançar talvez a vitória mais significativa em política externa de seu governo. Para ter sucesso, no entanto, Washington precisa entender que as transições democráticas não acontecem da noite para o dia. Em vez disso, tendem a ocorrer após extensas negociações nas quais a ditadura concorda em começar a compartilhar o poder com seus críticos. Eleições livres e justas acontecem no final — e não no início — dessas transições, porque reformas institucionais e um período de coexistência com o regime de saída são necessários para viabilizar uma transição pacífica.
Os Estados Unidos deveriam, portanto, usar sua influência para levar ambos os lados do conflito político interno da Venezuela à mesa de negociações. Deveriam então forçar cada um a abandonar seu objetivo maximalista — aniquilar o outro — e, em vez disso, aceitar compartilhar o poder. Um acordo que faça isso pode não ser tão satisfatório para alguns quanto um ataque militar. Ao contrário de uma operação da CIA para remover Maduro, não promete resultados imediatos. Mas é muito mais provável que seja eficaz para promover os interesses dos EUA, melhorar a vida dos venezuelanos e preparar o terreno para a democratização do país.
CHANGE YOU CAN BELIEVE IN
When it comes to attempts at regime change, Venezuela is a graveyard of ideas. During Trump’s first administration, the United States imposed punitive economic sanctions on the country’s oil and mining sectors, believing that depriving the government of crucial resources would lead to its implosion. It didn’t: Maduro stayed in power, even as the sanctions helped provoke the largest peacetime economic contraction and migration exodus in modern history. The Biden administration took a different approach, offering partial sanctions relief in exchange for commitments to hold free elections. But this, too, floundered. During the country’s 2024 contest, more than half of Venezuelans turned out to vote, and according to the opposition’s methodical collection of official tally sheets, the former diplomat Edmundo González overwhelmingly prevailed. But electoral authorities declared Maduro the winner anyway, and his government forcefully put down the resulting protests.
But there is another approach to handling Maduro, one that has not been properly attempted: brokering a coexistence agreement between the president and his opponents. Rather than forcing Maduro to give up power immediately—a demand that has repeatedly proved unrealistic—the goal with such a deal would be to incentivize his government to gradually yet meaningfully democratize.
This idea shares some elements with the first Trump administration’s Democratic Transition Framework for Venezuela. That plan, outlined in 2020, would have created a Council of State featuring both government and opposition representatives to oversee a transition to free and fair elections. But the framework treated the power-sharing council as a short-term bridge to national elections, which would come within, at most, a year. To work, coexistence agreements almost always need to run for a longer time, as this one should.
Um presidente anti-chavista poderia se tornar a imagem espelhada de Maduro.
Done right, a coexistence deal would have good odds of democratizing Venezuela, at least relative to the alternatives. Decades of political science research show that these kinds of so-called pacted transitions offer one of the most stable avenues for ending authoritarian rule. Latin America alone has multiple states—Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay—in which reforms initiated by an authoritarian government created a level political playing field that has lasted across multiple governments. It is, by contrast, rare to find cases in which an external intervention has led to a durable process of democratization, in the absence of a prolonged military occupation.
And Venezuela, in particular, needs a pacted transition. After years of dictatorship, the country is deeply divided. Although most of the country opposes Maduro, nearly one-third of the population still identifies with him. Many more people—over half the country—have a positive view of Hugo Chávez, the populist former president who mentored Maduro and, before dying in 2013, named Maduro as his successor. To successfully undertake major reforms, Venezuela’s next leader will thus need support from at least some Chavistas.
Without a power-sharing deal, however, Venezuela’s opposition is unlikely to construct a big tent. Instead, it might use the presidency to seek revenge. It has, after all, failed to condemn the forced deportations and killings of Venezuelans in the Caribbean. It has advocated for sanctions that have severely damaged the country’s economy. It has, in other words, subordinated human rights concerns to political objectives—the hallmark of an authoritarian movement. Coupled with Venezuela’s winner-take-all political institutions, it is not hard to imagine an anti-Chavista president becoming the mirror image of Maduro and using the institutions of the state to viciously persecute opponents.
If anti-Chavista leaders do prioritize vengeance, Venezuela will not only face continued autocracy and economic malaise but also risk civil war. The country’s military is packed with Chavistas, and should Venezuela’s next leader systematically purge them, they might start an armed insurgency—drawing on support from Colombian guerrillas and organized criminal networks that have a strong presence in Venezuela. The result could be a prolonged internal conflict, reminiscent of the one that has plagued Colombia for over 50 years.
AN OFFER YOU CAN’T REFUSE
And Venezuela, in particular, needs a pacted transition. After years of dictatorship, the country is deeply divided. Although most of the country opposes Maduro, nearly one-third of the population still identifies with him. Many more people—over half the country—have a positive view of Hugo Chávez, the populist former president who mentored Maduro and, before dying in 2013, named Maduro as his successor. To successfully undertake major reforms, Venezuela’s next leader will thus need support from at least some Chavistas.
Without a power-sharing deal, however, Venezuela’s opposition is unlikely to construct a big tent. Instead, it might use the presidency to seek revenge. It has, after all, failed to condemn the forced deportations and killings of Venezuelans in the Caribbean. It has advocated for sanctions that have severely damaged the country’s economy. It has, in other words, subordinated human rights concerns to political objectives—the hallmark of an authoritarian movement. Coupled with Venezuela’s winner-take-all political institutions, it is not hard to imagine an anti-Chavista president becoming the mirror image of Maduro and using the institutions of the state to viciously persecute opponents.
If anti-Chavista leaders do prioritize vengeance, Venezuela will not only face continued autocracy and economic malaise but also risk civil war. The country’s military is packed with Chavistas, and should Venezuela’s next leader systematically purge them, they might start an armed insurgency—drawing on support from Colombian guerrillas and organized criminal networks that have a strong presence in Venezuela. The result could be a prolonged internal conflict, reminiscent of the one that has plagued Colombia for over 50 years.
AN OFFER YOU CAN’T REFUSE
To work, a Venezuelan grand bargain will need to ensure that both dueling factions are represented in the country’s many political and legal institutions. A stable democracy requires not just elections but also arrangements that limit executive power and make political competition safe and meaningful. Transitioning away from autocracy is difficult precisely because autocratic governments lack such bodies and rules; instead, they tend to concentrate authority, opening the temptation for opposition movements to similarly abuse power once they reach office. Venezuela’s constitution, for example, allows the president to convene elections for a constitutional convention that can dissolve the other branches of government at any time. This prerogative would almost certainly be used by the opposition upon taking charge to drive Chavistas from all state institutions.
But Trump might be able to prevent a vicious cycle—while still easing out Maduro—by compelling Venezuela’s two camps to forge a joint agreement. The country’s opposition is highly dependent on Washington and thus ill positioned to refuse its demands. Meanwhile, by confronting the Maduro regime with an existential threat unlike any it has faced, Trump has gained new leverage over Caracas. This puts him in a position to make both sides an offer they can’t refuse: a framework for political coexistence with institutional guarantees, backed by the United States and other major international actors (who would also promise to help facilitate economic recovery).
In practice, this would mean representatives from the regime would need to agree to carve out quotas for the opposition in key branches of government. Opposition figures should, for example, receive guaranteed representation in the supreme court, the electoral council, and the country’s key oversight institutions. A credible arrangement would appoint opposition representatives to eight of the 20 seats in the supreme court, with another four justices chosen from figures acceptable to both sides; similar ratios should be used for appointments to the electoral council. Opposition-nominated justices should hold a majority of votes in some key supreme court chambers, such as the Criminal Cassation Chamber, which reviews prosecutions for human rights abuses and can overturn politically motivated convictions. Similarly, negotiators must agree to the appointment of a new prosecutor general, comptroller general, and ombudsperson. At least one of these positions should be held by an opposition nominee, and another by a figure acceptable to both sides. An impartial or opposition-aligned comptroller general (who oversees the use of public funds and investigates corruption in public administration), for example, could reassess the bans on political participation that have played a key role in reducing the competitiveness of Venezuelan elections.
Na Venezuela, não existem atalhos para um futuro melhor.
But Trump might be able to prevent a vicious cycle—while still easing out Maduro—by compelling Venezuela’s two camps to forge a joint agreement. The country’s opposition is highly dependent on Washington and thus ill positioned to refuse its demands. Meanwhile, by confronting the Maduro regime with an existential threat unlike any it has faced, Trump has gained new leverage over Caracas. This puts him in a position to make both sides an offer they can’t refuse: a framework for political coexistence with institutional guarantees, backed by the United States and other major international actors (who would also promise to help facilitate economic recovery).
In practice, this would mean representatives from the regime would need to agree to carve out quotas for the opposition in key branches of government. Opposition figures should, for example, receive guaranteed representation in the supreme court, the electoral council, and the country’s key oversight institutions. A credible arrangement would appoint opposition representatives to eight of the 20 seats in the supreme court, with another four justices chosen from figures acceptable to both sides; similar ratios should be used for appointments to the electoral council. Opposition-nominated justices should hold a majority of votes in some key supreme court chambers, such as the Criminal Cassation Chamber, which reviews prosecutions for human rights abuses and can overturn politically motivated convictions. Similarly, negotiators must agree to the appointment of a new prosecutor general, comptroller general, and ombudsperson. At least one of these positions should be held by an opposition nominee, and another by a figure acceptable to both sides. An impartial or opposition-aligned comptroller general (who oversees the use of public funds and investigates corruption in public administration), for example, could reassess the bans on political participation that have played a key role in reducing the competitiveness of Venezuelan elections.
Na Venezuela, não existem atalhos para um futuro melhor.
Some of these reforms will require that Venezuela amend its constitution. Right now, it is the text of an electoral autocracy, not a democracy. A revised document must reduce the power of the executive branch and enshrine protections that ensure the losers of future elections will not be persecuted. It must also abolish the power of constitutional conventions to dissolve nonexecutive branches of government, create a bicameral legislature with binding supermajority requirements for key laws, and establish explicit provisions blocking whatever side wins the next election from manipulating the country’s transitional judiciary and oversight bodies. Most important, the new constitution should emerge from an inclusive national discussion and be approved by Venezuelan voters in a referendum. That referendum would double as an opportunity for the new electoral authority to establish its credibility before Venezuelans—and before the world.
Reforming Venezuela’s institutions will, naturally, be a protracted process. But there are steps the country could take immediately, including ending political persecution and other human rights abuses. The government should begin with the release of all political prisoners and the approval of a new law to limit arbitrary detention. It could create an impartial oversight body, assisted by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and empower it to supervise the conditions of any remaining or new detainees in real time and to order investigations for human rights abuses. This body would also have the authority to ensure that the country’s National Telecommunications Office stops using its regulatory authority to censor speech.
These institutional and legal reforms would go a long way in facilitating Venezuela’s democratic transition. But they are not enough to secure the country’s future. As part of any agreement, the government and the opposition must work together to revive Venezuela’s moribund economy. They can start by crafting an internationally backed economic reconstruction program aimed at reinserting the country into global oil and financial markets. To do so, the government and opposition could jointly appoint nonpartisan experts to head the country’s central bank and oil company. The United States would lift all economic sanctions on the country and, in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund and private creditors, coordinate to give Venezuela the financial and technical assistance it needs to embark on reforms aimed at restoring its economic competitiveness and rebuilding its social and physical infrastructure.
Eventually, the country would hold elections at different levels of government. But the timetable for doing so must be gradual. Venezuela will be unable to carry out a free and fair contest until its new institutional framework is consolidated and the economy is clearly rebounding—a process that is likely to take three to five years. Even then, elections must proceed under a predetermined schedule: first local, then regional, then parliamentary, and finally presidential. The transitory judiciary, electoral, and oversight bodies that embody the power-sharing arrangements will have to remain in place, with the same split membership, through at least the first post-transition presidential term.
Reforming Venezuela’s institutions will, naturally, be a protracted process. But there are steps the country could take immediately, including ending political persecution and other human rights abuses. The government should begin with the release of all political prisoners and the approval of a new law to limit arbitrary detention. It could create an impartial oversight body, assisted by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and empower it to supervise the conditions of any remaining or new detainees in real time and to order investigations for human rights abuses. This body would also have the authority to ensure that the country’s National Telecommunications Office stops using its regulatory authority to censor speech.
These institutional and legal reforms would go a long way in facilitating Venezuela’s democratic transition. But they are not enough to secure the country’s future. As part of any agreement, the government and the opposition must work together to revive Venezuela’s moribund economy. They can start by crafting an internationally backed economic reconstruction program aimed at reinserting the country into global oil and financial markets. To do so, the government and opposition could jointly appoint nonpartisan experts to head the country’s central bank and oil company. The United States would lift all economic sanctions on the country and, in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund and private creditors, coordinate to give Venezuela the financial and technical assistance it needs to embark on reforms aimed at restoring its economic competitiveness and rebuilding its social and physical infrastructure.
Eventually, the country would hold elections at different levels of government. But the timetable for doing so must be gradual. Venezuela will be unable to carry out a free and fair contest until its new institutional framework is consolidated and the economy is clearly rebounding—a process that is likely to take three to five years. Even then, elections must proceed under a predetermined schedule: first local, then regional, then parliamentary, and finally presidential. The transitory judiciary, electoral, and oversight bodies that embody the power-sharing arrangements will have to remain in place, with the same split membership, through at least the first post-transition presidential term.
APRENDENDO A CONVIVER JUNTOS
Para as autoridades americanas ansiosas por se livrar de Maduro, uma transição negociada pode parecer lenta e complexa demais. Mas na Venezuela, não há atalhos para um futuro melhor, e o ritmo deliberado desta proposta é o que a torna mais promissora do que qualquer alternativa que prometa soluções imediatas. Ao limitar a capacidade do governo de fraudar eleições e restringir a capacidade da oposição de abusar do poder executivo, ela gera os incentivos necessários para que uma transferência pacífica de poder seja viável para ambos os lados. Mais importante, causaria melhorias imediatas nas condições de vida dos venezuelanos — libertando centenas de presos políticos e levando a uma rápida recuperação econômica que estancaria a emigração. Também contribuiria para atender às prioridades políticas de Washington, permitindo que os Estados Unidos e a Venezuela trabalhassem juntos para reduzir a criminalidade transnacional e a pressão migratória.
Este acordo enfrentará forte oposição de extremistas em ambos os extremos do espectro político venezuelano. Mas isso não é incomum: as transições democráticas são, acima de tudo, um processo de busca de pontos em comum entre moderados em lados opostos de sistemas políticos polarizados. Outros países conseguiram superar essas divisões, e a Venezuela também pode. Os Estados Unidos e seus parceiros podem ajudar apoiando negociações que visem auxiliar o país a estabelecer um amplo consenso político sobre um caminho a seguir.
O potencial benefício do atual aumento da presença militar dos EUA na costa da Venezuela pode residir justamente na incerteza que gerou. Em um estilo clássico de negociação, Trump, sozinho, elevou a tensão do conflito político venezuelano. Os riscos agora são altos não apenas para o governo Maduro, que enfrenta a perspectiva real de um ataque militar massivo, mas também para a oposição, cuja dependência quase total do apoio dos EUA ficou exposta. A ameaça de fogo e fúria de Trump pode prenunciar violência. Mas também pode criar uma oportunidade para uma transição negociada — uma transição que rompa o impasse catastrófico e permita que os venezuelanos retomem seu futuro.
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