Em um novo livro de memórias, Tariq Ali relata seu trabalho e ativismo no fim da era da Guerra Fria e na era da globalização neoliberal. Ele falou com a Jacobin sobre o que significa ser um anti-imperialista em um mundo transformado.
Uma entrevista com
Tariq Ali
https://jacobin.com/2024/12/tariq-ali-anti-imperialism-interview
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Tariq Ali em sua casa em Londres em 15 de julho de 2003. (Cambridge Jones / Getty Images) |
Entrevista por
Stathis Kouvelakis
O novo livro de Tariq Ali, You Can’t Please All, é uma continuação de sua "autobiografia dos anos 60", Street-Fighting Years. Essas novas memórias que cobrem o período de 1980 a 2024 refletem a atividade prolífica do autor e abrangem uma gama excepcionalmente ampla de tópicos. Eles abordam tudo, da América Latina ao Paquistão, Perestroika, Grã-Bretanha sob Margaret Thatcher e depois, o histórico familiar do autor, intervenções culturais na TV e no palco, críquete na era pós-colonial, uma leitura política de Dom Quixote e muito mais.
O relato de Ali testemunha a profunda mudança que o mundo viu desde o recuo global pós-1968. Refletindo sobre sua própria trajetória, ele explora as maneiras pelas quais revolucionários, movimentos de massa e intelectuais responderam a uma nova situação.
Entrevistado por Stathis Kouvelakis para Jacobin, Ali se concentra no fio condutor de sua vida política: o anti-imperialismo e seu significado no período pós-Guerra Fria do capitalismo neoliberal globalizado.
Anti-imperialismo e a esquerda, dos anos 1960 até hoje
Stathis Kouvelakis
O anti-imperialismo dominou sua vida inteira, desde sua primeira ação política — uma manifestação nas ruas de Lahore após o assassinato de Patrice Lumumba em 1961 — até os anos 2000, quando, após um longo período dedicado principalmente ao trabalho cultural, você retornou à política ativa em torno da política anti-guerra e anti-imperialista. Você sempre foi um internacionalista convicto, mas seu internacionalismo tem uma ponta definitivamente anti-imperialista, certo?
Tariq Ali
Eu acho que isso é verdade. Morando no Paquistão, eu era completamente obcecado desde muito jovem em ler todas as revistas que chegavam em casa. Eram principalmente revistas comunistas dos Estados Unidos — Masses and Mainstream, Monthly Review — e depois da Grã-Bretanha, New Statesman, Labour Monthly e só muito tarde a New Left Review. Eu as lia porque estava interessado na situação pós-colonial. No Paquistão, estávamos passando por uma fase pós-colonial, que não parecia diferente do que era nos últimos dias do imperialismo britânico. Tudo era comandado pelos britânicos, que então entregavam aos americanos.
Quando li sobre a morte de Lumumba, fiquei realmente furioso. Convocamos uma reunião na faculdade e eu disse: "Não podemos deixar de sair às ruas". Mas, de acordo com uma antiga lei imperial britânica, era punível com prisão pesada se manifestar com mais de cinco pessoas juntas. Mas decidimos que faríamos isso e cerca de duzentas apareceram. Explicamos quem era Lumumba e eles disseram: "Estamos marchando para o consulado dos EUA porque essas são as pessoas que o mataram". Um cara perguntou: "Há alguma prova?" O lugar inteiro caiu na gargalhada. Ninguém duvidou que fossem os americanos. Voltamos da embaixada e nos sentimos tão fortes e corajosos que começamos a gritar slogans contra a ditadura militar no Paquistão. Fizemos isso e o país ficou perplexo: Quem são essas crianças malucas? Quando li sobre a morte de Patrice Lumumba, fiquei realmente furioso. Convocamos uma reunião na faculdade, e eu disse: "Não podemos deixar de sair às ruas".
Foi uma manifestação memorável, porque pegou todo mundo de surpresa. Não houve uma única manifestação sobre Lumumba no Ocidente ou na Índia, em países onde seria legal, com grandes partidos comunistas. Ainda encontro pessoas que dizem: "Lembro-me da manifestação de Lumumba em Lahore". Eu digo: "Você estava nela?" Eles dizem: "Sim, sim, claro..." Então, parece que agora o tamanho da manifestação aumentou para 50.000 pessoas! [risos]
Então, a Revolução Chinesa estava acontecendo. Todo o movimento progressista de esquerda — sindicatos e movimentos camponeses na vanguarda — falava constantemente sobre a China. Quando eu era muito jovem, meus pais me levaram para a reunião do Primeiro de Maio e a única conversa era sobre a China: o slogan gritado era: "Vamos pegar o caminho chinês, camaradas".
Então, toda a noção de luta e revolução surgiu muito cedo para mim, e não teria acontecido se eu tivesse crescido em uma parte diferente da minha própria família. Foram meus pais sendo comunistas e pessoas daquele meio vindo regularmente à nossa casa — poetas, radicais — que me impulsionaram nesse caminho. Lembro-me de quando os franceses foram derrotados em Điện Biên Phủ, pessoas apolíticas estavam comemorando. Um primo da minha mãe, que era produtor de cinema, ligou para ela para comemorar e disse: "Meu filho nasceu hoje, eu o chamei de Ho Chi Minh". Minha mãe disse: "Se até essas pessoas estão comemorando Điện Biên Phủ, talvez não tenhamos tanto azar neste país". Era um sentimento semi-nacionalista, mas firmemente anti-europeu e anti-americano anti-imperialista entre as pessoas em geral. Toda a noção de luta e revolução surgiu muito cedo para mim, e não teria acontecido se eu tivesse crescido em uma parte diferente da minha própria família.
Stathis Kouvelakis
O que é notável no seu caso, vindo do Sul Global, não é que você se tornou um anti-imperialista nas décadas de 1960 e 1970, mas que você permaneceu assim. Desde que você reiniciou a atividade política no mundo após a queda da União Soviética, você tem feito campanha contra as novas guerras imperialistas, agindo e se conectando com vários experimentos, particularmente na América Latina, resistindo ao imperialismo americano. Muitos na esquerda permaneceram opostos ao neoliberalismo, mas abandonaram o anti-imperialismo.
Tariq Ali
Há uma contradição interessante aqui. Eu me juntei à Quarta Internacional [FI, o que era então conhecido como "Secretariado Unido"] porque era anti-imperialista e internacionalista, e essas eram suas características mais atraentes. Fiquei bastante chocado quando eles começaram a se afastar disso.
Eu me lembro de encontrar Daniel Bensaïd em Paris em algum café, e ele disse: "O quadragésimo aniversário de 1968 está chegando, o que devemos fazer? Você sempre tem boas ideias sobre como fazer grandes celebrações.” Eu disse, “Daniel, o internacionalismo, como o entendíamos antes, está apenas saindo de suas próprias fileiras. Em 1968, você estava renomeando as ruas do Quartier Latin de ‘Rua Heroica do Vietnã’.” Ele disse, “Ok, o que você está sugerindo?”
Eu disse, “Uma grande celebração das mudanças na América do Sul. Vamos chamar os zapatistas; não é impossível que Hugo Chávez venha. Teremos Evo [Morales] da Bolívia. Teremos a esquerda progressista neste país: há algumas pessoas que ainda estão persistindo. Eles não são revolucionários como nós éramos, mas são social-democratas de esquerda. Eles foram impulsionados ao poder por movimentos de massa.” Daniel disse, “É uma ideia muito interessante, mas não acho que ninguém entre os anticapitalistas a apoiará. Não é porque eles são hostis como tal, mas não os interessa.” Eu disse, “Isso é profundamente chocante.” Ele disse: "Posso imaginar que para alguém como você, é ainda mais chocante".
Ele sabia o que estava acontecendo, pois alguns outros camaradas dos velhos tempos estavam em negação.
Na época da Guerra do Iraque, tive uma grande discussão com Catherine Samary, da Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire. Claro, ela era contra a guerra. Mas perguntei a ela: "Como você explica o fato de que em todos os grandes países da Europa, vocês tiveram gigantescas manifestações antiguerra [em 15 de fevereiro de 2003]; milhões em Londres, Roma e Madri, até os alemães conseguiram 100.000. Você, na França, não conseguiu nada".
Stathis Kouvelakis
Mas houve manifestações: em Paris, os números foram semelhantes aos da Alemanha.
Mas houve manifestações: em Paris, os números foram semelhantes aos da Alemanha.
Tariq Ali
Eles eram comparativamente pequenos. O argumento de Catherine era que [o então presidente] Jacques Chirac se opôs à guerra, e é por isso que as pessoas se sentiam representadas. Eu disse: "Mas espere aí. Charles de Gaulle se opôs à Guerra do Vietnã. Isso não o impediu. É um problema estrutural profundo e fundamental no que aconteceu com a intelligentsia francesa e a esquerda francesa." Um pouco mais tarde, quando a edição francesa do meu livro sobre a Guerra do Iraque [Bush à Babylone: La Recolonisation de l'Iraq] saiu com La Fabrique, eu estava indo com Éric Hazan para livrarias em Paris e alguns outros lugares para dar palestras. Em um evento, eu disse: "Tenho a sensação de que uma parte da intelligentsia francesa, particularmente em torno do Parti Socialiste e dos liberais, realmente gostaria de ter feito parte desta guerra." Éric me interrompeu e disse: "Ele está completamente certo sobre isso." A Grã-Bretanha é o único país onde a Stop the War Coalition, mesmo em tempos ruins, sobreviveu. Não a deixamos afundar.
A evolução na França foi muito decepcionante. Tínhamos uma fé enorme naquele grupo [a Ligue Communiste, mais tarde a Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire] e seu élan, nas décadas de 1960 e 1970. É um pouco irônico que a ala "capitalista de estado" do movimento trotskista [o Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores Britânico (SWP) e sua rede internacional, a Tendência Socialista Internacional (IST)] tenha se mostrado muito mais afiada e muito melhor, na Iugoslávia, no Iraque e agora na Ucrânia. Eles se opuseram fortemente à OTAN e aos EUA. Um dos motivos pelos quais costumávamos criticar o grupo IST era por causa de sua falta de internacionalismo.
Mas se você olhar agora, são as correntes mandelistas que foram consideradas deficientes e meio que desapareceram. Enquanto isso, sem o punhado de trotskistas do SWP como Lindsey German e John Rees, não poderíamos ter construído a campanha antiguerra. A Grã-Bretanha é o único país do mundo onde a Coalizão Pare a Guerra, mesmo em tempos ruins, sobreviveu. Não deixamos isso ir por água abaixo.
Stathis Kouvelakis
Obviamente, há uma relação entre essa persistência e o tamanho do movimento em apoio à Palestina na Grã-Bretanha.
Tariq Ali
Sem dúvida. Sobre a Palestina, tínhamos pelo menos uma manifestação por ano, então o movimento progressista britânico estava pronto quando chegou. Essas são as pessoas que organizam as manifestações da Palestina, depois a Campanha de Solidariedade à Palestina. Eles vieram e foi fantástico, ficou cada vez maior. Eu os avisei que mais cedo ou mais tarde isso iria por água abaixo: temos que pensar em outras ações. E então outras ações começaram espontaneamente por uma nova geração, novata na política, que nunca esperávamos. Eles não são atraídos por pequenos grupos — a velha maneira de fazer as coisas.
Aqui chegamos ao problema, que é que enquanto na política francesa você tem Jean-Luc Mélenchon, aqui [na Grã-Bretanha] não há ninguém além de Jeremy Corbyn. Suas fraquezas como líder de esquerda vêm à tona. Ele é fisgado pelo trabalhismo mesmo quando é expulso dele.
Stathis Kouvelakis
It doesn’t make sense to say that because the Soviet Union imploded and China went capitalist that there is no longer an imperial power. I was very strongly against that view, but people were very reluctant to counter it. At academic conferences, when I talked about “US imperialism,” there was a slight shudder, meaning we thought we’d lost all that world. No, you didn’t lose that world, you lost another one. When I was in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s talking to senior party intellectuals, what was driving them mad was that Mikhail Gorbachev couldn’t see that they were going to be crushed by these bastards unless we had something. Yevgeny Primakov in particular feared that Gorbachev was preparing a capitulation.At academic conferences when I talked about ‘US imperialism,’ there was a slight shudder: people thought we’d lost all that world. No, you didn’t lose that world, you lost another one.
My view about China and Russia is that they are essentially nationalist, that they will defend their nationalism, or national sovereignty if you want to call it that. The Russians said this includes not having NATO surrounding us, or NATO trying to break us up into little bits. And the Chinese say similar things. Leave us alone, don’t provoke us with Taiwan. The Americans could have done this, it was there for them to grab, but they did exactly the contrary.
Perry [Anderson] and I had this discussion in private and my view was that the debate between Karl Kautsky and [Vladimir] Lenin on ultraimperialism versus interimperialist contradictions seems to have been solved in favor of Kautsky. For most of the twentieth century, Lenin was more or less correct, but now after the fall of the Soviet Union, it looks as if we’re going to get an ultraimperialism in some form in which all the European powers would more or less capitulate. There’s no question of them fighting back. I felt that even more strongly now, during the assault on Palestine.
In the 1990s, the Russians and the Chinese were prepared to go along with US ultraimperialism and the Europeans, but they were too huge to be swallowed up like Europe has been, especially China. There was a big debate within Chinese economic circles on whether they should just cave in to the neoliberal way of going to capitalism. Then there came a big backlash from inside the Communist Party of China saying, “No, we can’t go like that, we can’t make the Gorbachev mistake.” Deng Xiaoping had advised Gorbachev that perestroika [restructuring] is fine, but you can’t do perestroika properly unless you forget about glasnost [openness and transparency]. From a purely cynical standpoint, he was not so wrong.In the 1990s, the Russians and the Chinese were prepared to go along with US ultraimperialism and the Europeans, but they were too huge to be swallowed up like Europe has been, especially China.
The whole strategy of the US and of the thinkers and military specialists who run that country is that the only way to maintain its hegemony is by breaking everything up into little bits, so that no country emerges that can ever challenge it, till the end of humanity. That’s what the US has been doing wherever you look. That’s what they did in Yugoslavia, albeit unthinkingly. [Bill] Clinton told an audience in some American town that the war in Yugoslavia was in the interest of the US. And they’ve done the same in the Middle East: to break it up, divide the three countries that had huge armies that threatened Israel and the American hegemony in the region.
Você poderia comentar a seguinte declaração feita por outro líder trotskista, Michel Raptis, também conhecido como Pablo. Perto do fim de sua vida, ele disse ao revolucionário e teórico mexicano Adolfo Gilly: "O significado mais profundo do século XX foi esse imenso movimento pela libertação das colônias, dos povos oprimidos e das mulheres, não a revolução do proletariado, que era nosso mito e nosso Deus". Você concorda?
Tariq Ali
Em parte. É isso que Ernest Mandel costumava chamar às vezes — em relação ao que ele chamava de "centristas" — de adoração de fatos consumados.
Stathis Kouvelakis
Mas, como você diz em seu livro, ele estava acusando a New Left Review de fazer isso...
Tariq Ali
Sim, e ele estava certo. No entanto, em Portugal, chegamos muito perto de um desfecho revolucionário, na minha opinião, muito mais perto do que na França em maio e junho de 1968, porque lá o Partido Comunista Francês era um grande baluarte, enquanto em Portugal o Partido Comunista, gostemos ou não, estava do lado da extrema esquerda. Mas eles foram totalmente superados. Lembro-me de grandes manifestações de trabalhadores, soldados e camponeses em Portugal, onde o cântico era "Revolução, revolução, socialismo". Em Portugal, chegamos muito perto de um desfecho revolucionário, na minha opinião, muito mais perto do que na França em maio e junho de 1968.
Então Mário Soares, o líder social-democrata, veio e disse: "Sim, teremos socialismo. Mas queremos o socialismo da Europa Oriental? Não. Queremos o socialismo dos russos? Não. Então por que nosso querido camarada Álvaro Cunhal [secretário-geral do Partido Comunista Português] fala constantemente sobre a ditadura do proletariado? Nós nos livramos de uma ditadura, e eles querem trazer outra nesse modelo.” Cunhal nunca poderia responder a isso. Ideologicamente, fomos derrotados em Portugal.
Ernest [Mandel] ficou abalado porque estava muito animado, embora a FI tenha subestimado Portugal porque [Mandel] estava convencido de que a revolução iria estourar primeiro na Espanha. Vários de nós que conhecíamos melhor a Espanha, dissemos a ele: “Haverá um grande compromisso na Espanha.” Ele disse: “Você está errado. As tradições do POUM [Partido dos Trabalhadores da Unificação Marxista], do anarquismo etc. . . .” Os camaradas bascos [da ETA-VI], que eram muito afiados, disseram que a sucessão pós-[Francisco] Franco será boa porque seremos legais, mas nada mudará muito. Portugal pegou a FI completamente de surpresa.
Stathis Kouvelakis
Então, para você, o século XX ainda foi o século das oportunidades revolucionárias perdidas, mesmo na Europa ou nos países capitalistas avançados.
Tariq Ali
Sim, acho que foi esse o caso até 1975, a derrota da Revolução Portuguesa foi o fator decisivo. Fidel Castro sentiu fortemente que agora tínhamos sido derrotados pelas gerações vindouras, mas essa não era a sensação que tínhamos na Europa.
Stathis Kouvelakis
Mais do que o golpe no Chile?
Tariq Ali
O golpe no Chile teve, é claro, um grande impacto. Mas havia uma enorme simpatia pelo Chile, mesmo entre os círculos burgueses, não havia uma sensação de que a revolução tinha sido derrotada. Lembro-me de Hortensia Allende sendo recebida pelo então primeiro-ministro britânico e líder do Partido Trabalhista, Jim Callaghan, que a abraçou em público. Ela discursou na conferência do Partido Trabalhista dizendo: "O camarada Allende foi assassinado", e toda a conferência ficou em silêncio. Fidel Castro sentiu fortemente que agora tínhamos sido derrotados pelas gerações vindouras, mas essa não era a sensação que tínhamos na Europa. Na Europa, o teste crucial era Portugal, e os americanos sabiam disso. O dinheiro da OTAN foi despejado em Soares e seu partido [reformista].
Imperialismo Hoje: Um Império Global Americano?
Stathis Kouvelakis
Vamos agora para o mundo pós-1990. Sua posição é que há apenas um império global, o império dos EUA. Como você caracterizaria a China e a Rússia? Elas são potências imperialistas; elas precisam ser colocadas no mesmo plano que os EUA? Esta é a posição de toda uma parte da esquerda radical hoje, que faz um paralelo entre a situação atual e a configuração interimperialista do período pré-Primeira Guerra Mundial. As mesmas pessoas acrescentam que, ao pensar que um imperialismo é de longe o dominante, e portanto mais perigoso para qualquer governo progressista, você comete o pecado do "campismo".
Tariq Ali
Eu fui bem claro sobre esta questão em The Clash of Fundamentalisms. Quem foi o grande vencedor do colapso da União Soviética e da virada chinesa para o caminho capitalista? Foram os Estados Unidos. O capitalismo americano continuou sendo o capitalismo mais forte, não apenas militarmente, mas econômica e tecnologicamente. Não é por acaso que a Internet surgiu na costa oeste dos EUA, não na costa oeste da China. A dominação ideológica dos EUA era virtualmente incontestável. Tínhamos que desafiá-la, é claro, mas não seríamos capazes de fazer isso se parássemos de dizer que a América era uma potência imperial.
It doesn’t make sense to say that because the Soviet Union imploded and China went capitalist that there is no longer an imperial power. I was very strongly against that view, but people were very reluctant to counter it. At academic conferences, when I talked about “US imperialism,” there was a slight shudder, meaning we thought we’d lost all that world. No, you didn’t lose that world, you lost another one. When I was in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s talking to senior party intellectuals, what was driving them mad was that Mikhail Gorbachev couldn’t see that they were going to be crushed by these bastards unless we had something. Yevgeny Primakov in particular feared that Gorbachev was preparing a capitulation.At academic conferences when I talked about ‘US imperialism,’ there was a slight shudder: people thought we’d lost all that world. No, you didn’t lose that world, you lost another one.
My view about China and Russia is that they are essentially nationalist, that they will defend their nationalism, or national sovereignty if you want to call it that. The Russians said this includes not having NATO surrounding us, or NATO trying to break us up into little bits. And the Chinese say similar things. Leave us alone, don’t provoke us with Taiwan. The Americans could have done this, it was there for them to grab, but they did exactly the contrary.
Perry [Anderson] and I had this discussion in private and my view was that the debate between Karl Kautsky and [Vladimir] Lenin on ultraimperialism versus interimperialist contradictions seems to have been solved in favor of Kautsky. For most of the twentieth century, Lenin was more or less correct, but now after the fall of the Soviet Union, it looks as if we’re going to get an ultraimperialism in some form in which all the European powers would more or less capitulate. There’s no question of them fighting back. I felt that even more strongly now, during the assault on Palestine.
In the 1990s, the Russians and the Chinese were prepared to go along with US ultraimperialism and the Europeans, but they were too huge to be swallowed up like Europe has been, especially China. There was a big debate within Chinese economic circles on whether they should just cave in to the neoliberal way of going to capitalism. Then there came a big backlash from inside the Communist Party of China saying, “No, we can’t go like that, we can’t make the Gorbachev mistake.” Deng Xiaoping had advised Gorbachev that perestroika [restructuring] is fine, but you can’t do perestroika properly unless you forget about glasnost [openness and transparency]. From a purely cynical standpoint, he was not so wrong.In the 1990s, the Russians and the Chinese were prepared to go along with US ultraimperialism and the Europeans, but they were too huge to be swallowed up like Europe has been, especially China.
The whole strategy of the US and of the thinkers and military specialists who run that country is that the only way to maintain its hegemony is by breaking everything up into little bits, so that no country emerges that can ever challenge it, till the end of humanity. That’s what the US has been doing wherever you look. That’s what they did in Yugoslavia, albeit unthinkingly. [Bill] Clinton told an audience in some American town that the war in Yugoslavia was in the interest of the US. And they’ve done the same in the Middle East: to break it up, divide the three countries that had huge armies that threatened Israel and the American hegemony in the region.
Stathis Kouvelakis
So you don’t see China’s economic rise and expansion at a global scale turning into a new imperialism.
So you don’t see China’s economic rise and expansion at a global scale turning into a new imperialism.
Tariq Ali
It could, if the United States provokes them. I don’t deny that possibility. The Americans had two big plans for destabilizing China: Tibet and Taiwan. Tibet is now integrated by a mega-influx of Han Chinese migrants. They’ve done this also by modernizing Tibet and making lots of jobs available for Tibetans. The result is quite astonishing: it’s a classic, imperial-style operation, but not like what the Brits did when they took a place like India. They are building infrastructure, not just trains and things for supply routes.
Concerning Taiwan, any attempt by the West to encourage any provocations by the government in Taipei is unlikely to work since trade between the two regions is intense and any armed adventures would be totally counterproductive for Taiwan and its citizens. So how is this going to shake out? It is difficult to predict. But if the Americans try and break China into tiny parts, the Chinese could do anything. They will not take it lying down.The whole strategy of the United States and of the thinkers and military specialists who run that country is that the only way to maintain US hegemony is by breaking everything up into little bits.
It could, if the United States provokes them. I don’t deny that possibility. The Americans had two big plans for destabilizing China: Tibet and Taiwan. Tibet is now integrated by a mega-influx of Han Chinese migrants. They’ve done this also by modernizing Tibet and making lots of jobs available for Tibetans. The result is quite astonishing: it’s a classic, imperial-style operation, but not like what the Brits did when they took a place like India. They are building infrastructure, not just trains and things for supply routes.
Concerning Taiwan, any attempt by the West to encourage any provocations by the government in Taipei is unlikely to work since trade between the two regions is intense and any armed adventures would be totally counterproductive for Taiwan and its citizens. So how is this going to shake out? It is difficult to predict. But if the Americans try and break China into tiny parts, the Chinese could do anything. They will not take it lying down.The whole strategy of the United States and of the thinkers and military specialists who run that country is that the only way to maintain US hegemony is by breaking everything up into little bits.
Stathis Kouvelakis
Let’s come now to Ukraine, another crucial development of recent years. There is no question of supporting the [Vladimir] Putin regime or thinking it is somehow friendly to the Left. I assume that you agree with Susan Watkins’s analysis of the Ukraine war, which sees it as a combination of three kinds of wars. Inspired by Mandel’s analysis of World War II, she sees it as an interimperialist war, a national war against a foreign invasion, and a civil war particularly affecting the Donbas. The most controversial element here is probably the interimperialist dimension, which means US imperialism’s responsibility in provoking this war by constantly expanding NATO eastward.
Let’s come now to Ukraine, another crucial development of recent years. There is no question of supporting the [Vladimir] Putin regime or thinking it is somehow friendly to the Left. I assume that you agree with Susan Watkins’s analysis of the Ukraine war, which sees it as a combination of three kinds of wars. Inspired by Mandel’s analysis of World War II, she sees it as an interimperialist war, a national war against a foreign invasion, and a civil war particularly affecting the Donbas. The most controversial element here is probably the interimperialist dimension, which means US imperialism’s responsibility in provoking this war by constantly expanding NATO eastward.
Tariq Ali
That brings us back to what these Soviet comrades were telling me: that Gorbachev is giving all this away without even a written treaty, that previous semi-capitulations or whatever have always had a treaty, and the Germans were prepared even to offer one. The Americans weren’t. They gave verbal assurances: “not one inch eastward” as explained in Mary E. Sarotte’s book. She’s a right-wing liberal but her book gives a solid account of how the Americans operated and what they did from the beginning when Gorbachev asked mildly, “What do we get in return for handing over East Germany to you?” He was given an assurance by the Americans, not one step eastward with NATO. And Gorbachev believed it. This should have been enshrined in a treaty — which could have been disregarded, of course, but still, it would have been there and given some legal basis.
So then they started moving NATO regularly [eastward] till they landed in Ukraine. William J. Burns, who’s now head of the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], was ambassador to Russia between 2005 and 2008. When he got back to the United States, he wrote a paper to Condoleezza Rice, [then secretary of state], saying very clearly the one thing we shouldn’t provoke them on, which they regard as a red line, is incorporating Ukraine into NATO. He now, of course, says: “I warned them in private and I was proved right.”
Personally, I didn’t think Putin would invade. He took everyone by surprise. Of course, we have strongly criticized him and he should get out. But the only way now is to come out [of the war] via negotiations. One of his senior advisers told a friend of mine: “Putin kept this as a total secret. But, when I later asked about the mounting casualties, etc., he said, ‘Don’t be too critical of me. We are the last generation who could take on the Americans. If I hadn’t done this, the next generation would never have done it. They sort of half live in that world themselves.’”
That brings us back to what these Soviet comrades were telling me: that Gorbachev is giving all this away without even a written treaty, that previous semi-capitulations or whatever have always had a treaty, and the Germans were prepared even to offer one. The Americans weren’t. They gave verbal assurances: “not one inch eastward” as explained in Mary E. Sarotte’s book. She’s a right-wing liberal but her book gives a solid account of how the Americans operated and what they did from the beginning when Gorbachev asked mildly, “What do we get in return for handing over East Germany to you?” He was given an assurance by the Americans, not one step eastward with NATO. And Gorbachev believed it. This should have been enshrined in a treaty — which could have been disregarded, of course, but still, it would have been there and given some legal basis.
So then they started moving NATO regularly [eastward] till they landed in Ukraine. William J. Burns, who’s now head of the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], was ambassador to Russia between 2005 and 2008. When he got back to the United States, he wrote a paper to Condoleezza Rice, [then secretary of state], saying very clearly the one thing we shouldn’t provoke them on, which they regard as a red line, is incorporating Ukraine into NATO. He now, of course, says: “I warned them in private and I was proved right.”
Personally, I didn’t think Putin would invade. He took everyone by surprise. Of course, we have strongly criticized him and he should get out. But the only way now is to come out [of the war] via negotiations. One of his senior advisers told a friend of mine: “Putin kept this as a total secret. But, when I later asked about the mounting casualties, etc., he said, ‘Don’t be too critical of me. We are the last generation who could take on the Americans. If I hadn’t done this, the next generation would never have done it. They sort of half live in that world themselves.’”
Stathis Kouvelakis
How do you respond to a moral argument that has some purchase, even on the Left: if Ukrainians want to join NATO and be part of the West, why should we deny them the right to do so? Wouldn’t that go against the notion that they have agency and reproduce a kind of colonial attitude toward Ukrainians? Some suggest that this is the sin of the Western radical left, which disregards Eastern European people and doesn’t take seriously their desire to get rid of Russian domination.
How do you respond to a moral argument that has some purchase, even on the Left: if Ukrainians want to join NATO and be part of the West, why should we deny them the right to do so? Wouldn’t that go against the notion that they have agency and reproduce a kind of colonial attitude toward Ukrainians? Some suggest that this is the sin of the Western radical left, which disregards Eastern European people and doesn’t take seriously their desire to get rid of Russian domination.
Tariq Ali
My response is that the last elections in Ukraine before the “Euromaidan revolution” returned an overtly pro-Russian candidate, Viktor Yanukovych. That president was removed by an American “color revolution,” i.e., a regime change that they organized. Who believes that they would ever support anything like genuine democracy? Putin destroyed his own chances, because even people who were very pro-Russian can’t have anything to do with him now.The Chinese are serious in at least pushing back on American plans. But I don’t think that of the Global South as such.
So, it’s a mess. I’m in favor in general of having referendums, but let’s have them openly. Let’s have no military presence in that country at all and let the fascist wing of the [Ukrainian military] be completely disarmed. Otherwise, how can you have the proper conditions for a referendum? The Ukrainians may then vote for [NATO], which I doubt since lots of reports and articles that Volodymyr Ishchenko is writing indicate a growing dissatisfaction.
My response is that the last elections in Ukraine before the “Euromaidan revolution” returned an overtly pro-Russian candidate, Viktor Yanukovych. That president was removed by an American “color revolution,” i.e., a regime change that they organized. Who believes that they would ever support anything like genuine democracy? Putin destroyed his own chances, because even people who were very pro-Russian can’t have anything to do with him now.The Chinese are serious in at least pushing back on American plans. But I don’t think that of the Global South as such.
So, it’s a mess. I’m in favor in general of having referendums, but let’s have them openly. Let’s have no military presence in that country at all and let the fascist wing of the [Ukrainian military] be completely disarmed. Otherwise, how can you have the proper conditions for a referendum? The Ukrainians may then vote for [NATO], which I doubt since lots of reports and articles that Volodymyr Ishchenko is writing indicate a growing dissatisfaction.
Stathis Kouvelakis
There is a lot of talk about the rise of the Global South as an independent actor on the global scene. This has been confirmed by the North-South divide we’ve seen both on the issue of Ukraine and on Palestine. This isn’t homogeneous — Narendra Modi’s India, for instance, refused to apply sanctions against Russia but is very pro-Israel. All in all, do you think that we are moving toward a multipolar world? If so, is there something positive in this change, despite the fact that all these emerging powers in the Global South are just capitalist countries?
There is a lot of talk about the rise of the Global South as an independent actor on the global scene. This has been confirmed by the North-South divide we’ve seen both on the issue of Ukraine and on Palestine. This isn’t homogeneous — Narendra Modi’s India, for instance, refused to apply sanctions against Russia but is very pro-Israel. All in all, do you think that we are moving toward a multipolar world? If so, is there something positive in this change, despite the fact that all these emerging powers in the Global South are just capitalist countries?
Tariq Ali
I would say that it’s an attempt to move to a multipolar world that would never have happened without the Chinese. It is a sign that the Chinese are serious in at least pushing back on American plans. But I don’t think that of the Global South as such. They can obviously resist on Palestine, as it’s so blatant what the Americans and the West are up to. But the notion that they would do it on everything . . . that I doubt very much. Most of the bourgeois forces in these countries can be bought off. It’s really not so much about ideology as of who pays out more cash. It’s the same with Pakistan. India is obviously different, but even in Brazil some pressure has been exercised on [Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva] to pull back from his initial position, which was very strongly against the United States and in support of the Palestinians.
Lula used to say, “They’ve taken me for a fool.” Once he was tricked by Barack Obama, who flattered him and he fell for it, he said, “This will never happen again.” It’s not a personal thing. It’s American interest, US support for Jair Bolsonaro and involvement in the parliamentary coup against Dilma Rousseff. So, he hasn’t gone back, but he has been playing with them. He’s also nervous that the military is still infected with Bolsonaro.
I think that each country is playing things according to its own interests. There’s no overriding theme of opposing the United States. We had a better version of it in the 1960s with the Bandung Conference.
I would say that it’s an attempt to move to a multipolar world that would never have happened without the Chinese. It is a sign that the Chinese are serious in at least pushing back on American plans. But I don’t think that of the Global South as such. They can obviously resist on Palestine, as it’s so blatant what the Americans and the West are up to. But the notion that they would do it on everything . . . that I doubt very much. Most of the bourgeois forces in these countries can be bought off. It’s really not so much about ideology as of who pays out more cash. It’s the same with Pakistan. India is obviously different, but even in Brazil some pressure has been exercised on [Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva] to pull back from his initial position, which was very strongly against the United States and in support of the Palestinians.
Lula used to say, “They’ve taken me for a fool.” Once he was tricked by Barack Obama, who flattered him and he fell for it, he said, “This will never happen again.” It’s not a personal thing. It’s American interest, US support for Jair Bolsonaro and involvement in the parliamentary coup against Dilma Rousseff. So, he hasn’t gone back, but he has been playing with them. He’s also nervous that the military is still infected with Bolsonaro.
I think that each country is playing things according to its own interests. There’s no overriding theme of opposing the United States. We had a better version of it in the 1960s with the Bandung Conference.
Stathis Kouvelakis
Sim, mas havia um projeto social diferente lá.
Sim, mas havia um projeto social diferente lá.
Tariq Ali
Concordo, não há nenhum projeto social agora, e é por isso que é tão fácil desmantelá-lo se os americanos quisessem fazê-lo.
Concordo, não há nenhum projeto social agora, e é por isso que é tão fácil desmantelá-lo se os americanos quisessem fazê-lo.
The Palestinian Cause: A New Vietnam?
Stathis Kouvelakis
The movement in support of Palestine, has been, I think, the most hopeful development in the West in the recent period. Can we establish a parallel between this and the movement against the Vietnam War in the 1960s, of which you were a protagonist? Do you think that Western governments’ near-unanimous support for the genocide in Gaza will somehow backfire, provoking a moral and political crisis and a crisis of legitimacy in the imperial center like the movement in support of Vietnam did?
Tariq Ali
There are several things to be said on this. First, it is not like the Vietnamese movement and the solidarity movement with Vietnam because that movement for most of us who participated in it had a very clear social content. It was not just for national liberation. However faulty, it was led by a communist party whose central leader was a Comintern guy, Ho Chi Minh. That had a big impact all over, especially where there were mass communist parties. It created tensions within these parties, with the leaderships who were saying, “We support the Vietnamese, but don’t say it too loudly.” It was [a conflict of] “peace in Vietnam” versus “victory to the Vietnamese.” That enabled us to divide these parties, in particular their youth wings, all over Europe.
Here, in Britain, the far left combined was larger than the Communist Party’s youth wing. The far left and its periphery hegemonized the youth very quickly. That’s why we organized university occupations. The SWP [at the time, called International Socialists] and the young International Marxist Group played a big role in that, even if numbers were small. It varied from country to country, but it happened at the height of the twentieth century.The way the Vietnamese called for internationalism was absolutely crucial.
Then, the way the Vietnamese struggle was carried out, the way the Vietnamese called for internationalism, was absolutely crucial. I recall once in North Vietnam, when I was with the North Vietnamese prime minister, Pham Van Dong, I said, in front of lots of people, “Comrade, time for International Brigades.” He took me aside and said, “Look, I’ll tell you what the problem is. This isn’t Spain, which is part of Europe. This is a country far away. So, just transporting you guys over for political propaganda would cost us a lot of money, and we don’t have that much. Then, we have to make sure that you guys are protected. Because this isn’t a war fought with rifles, the Americans are bombing us all the time, they will kill some of you.”
I said “So what? Your people are dying.” He said, using these words, “No, it’s not a good idea. A better idea is to go back and build mass movements in solidarity with us. Much more useful than a tiny show.” I said, “The British consul general in Hanoi, who fought in World War II, told me over tea three days ago that when he heard the bombers coming, he felt like grabbing a gun and going out onto the ceiling and firing at them.” Pham Van Dong said, “Well, why doesn’t he? We won’t stop him.” He meant: you guys are sweet and nice and we appreciate it. He hugged me very warmly and said it would not be useful because times have changed.
The other reason Pham Van Dong gave me for not having volunteers was that they were on a very tricky path between the Russians and the Chinese: “If we make a big appeal, we know thousands of people will come from Europe and elsewhere, but we’ll be summoned by Chairman Mao and the Russian leadership, saying, ‘What do you want? Why let these crazy people in? Are you saying we’re not giving you enough arms?’ So, we don’t get into that. It’s just easier.” So, the FI decided that building the solidarity movement with Vietnam was a central priority — one of the best things they ever did.Unlike the Palestinians, the Vietnamese had a state in the North and huge material support from the Soviets and the Chinese.
The other big difference was that unlike the Palestinians, the Vietnamese had a state in the North and huge material support from the Soviets and the Chinese. They scored more and more victories on the ground. I attended a talk in Hanoi by their top military commanders, where some of us were allowed in. A high-ranked officer explained how they were going to crush the Americans.
I was skeptical. I said, “Crush the Americans? Look what’s going on.” The colonel said, “We have a plan, a combination of guerrilla attacks and sudden mass attacks on them to take them.” He basically described the Tet Offensive. So, they were very convinced, and we said, “We might actually win this one. That would be a huge blow against the Americans.” And they did. That was the atmosphere.
Palestine is also different in the sense that for the younger generation — not for the previous ones — the war in Gaza came as a huge shock. At the beginning, the good elements reacted to it like they would react to Black Lives Matter: occupy the parks and all that. But gradually it deepened, and something happened that didn’t happen with all these Black Lives Matter–style movements: they began to read and to ask questions. A very important element in the United States was the entry of young Jewish people into the movement. I couldn’t believe my eyes when I saw that the anti-Zionist young Jews had occupied Grand Central Station and said to the rest of the movement, “This is our business, just let us do it alone.” In Britain, too, they had their own banners, but they never did independent things like young American Jews did.
That shook the Israelis and the AIPAC [American Israel Public Affairs Committee], but it didn’t touch the politicians, of course. My own feeling is that this created a new consciousness. If we can’t describe it as totally anti-imperialist, it’s not that far from it. People realize that is what the Israelis are doing with our money, with our bombs, in some cases with our soldiers, and it’s unacceptable.
I’m optimistic that something will come out of it. There is admiration for the Palestinians who do fight back and total disgust for the soldiers they see muttering Nazi-style obscenities against the Palestinians like “Our children need protection because they’re not like Arab children.” These sort of “Kill the Arabs” chants are repeated by their supporters here. This has created a strong feeling that all institutions created by the United States after World War II are useless unless the Americans support them, starting with the great so-called United Nations, and all the international courts that they’ve tried to sabotage.A very important element in the United States was the entry of young Jewish people into the Palestine solidarity movement.
The effect on the new generations is very positive. Ironically, the American state will soon realize this. Any other country can now say: “Who are you to tell us anything? We can go and do our own atrocities like the Israelis did. Why should we listen to you?” Actually, the whole structure of international relations has been dented by this particular war. The Israelis, backed by the West, have waged a genocide against the Palestinian people and its consequences will be with us for a long time. This is a memory that will not go — and wherever else the US does it now, people will react saying, “Go away! Don’t do it. We don’t believe you.” And I think it also has had an effect, whether people like it or not, on perceptions of Ukraine: “You say Ukraine is sacred, you defend them. We can’t do this, we can’t do that, because it might offend them. And in Palestine, you just watch freely.”
The movement in support of Palestine, has been, I think, the most hopeful development in the West in the recent period. Can we establish a parallel between this and the movement against the Vietnam War in the 1960s, of which you were a protagonist? Do you think that Western governments’ near-unanimous support for the genocide in Gaza will somehow backfire, provoking a moral and political crisis and a crisis of legitimacy in the imperial center like the movement in support of Vietnam did?
Tariq Ali
There are several things to be said on this. First, it is not like the Vietnamese movement and the solidarity movement with Vietnam because that movement for most of us who participated in it had a very clear social content. It was not just for national liberation. However faulty, it was led by a communist party whose central leader was a Comintern guy, Ho Chi Minh. That had a big impact all over, especially where there were mass communist parties. It created tensions within these parties, with the leaderships who were saying, “We support the Vietnamese, but don’t say it too loudly.” It was [a conflict of] “peace in Vietnam” versus “victory to the Vietnamese.” That enabled us to divide these parties, in particular their youth wings, all over Europe.
Here, in Britain, the far left combined was larger than the Communist Party’s youth wing. The far left and its periphery hegemonized the youth very quickly. That’s why we organized university occupations. The SWP [at the time, called International Socialists] and the young International Marxist Group played a big role in that, even if numbers were small. It varied from country to country, but it happened at the height of the twentieth century.The way the Vietnamese called for internationalism was absolutely crucial.
Then, the way the Vietnamese struggle was carried out, the way the Vietnamese called for internationalism, was absolutely crucial. I recall once in North Vietnam, when I was with the North Vietnamese prime minister, Pham Van Dong, I said, in front of lots of people, “Comrade, time for International Brigades.” He took me aside and said, “Look, I’ll tell you what the problem is. This isn’t Spain, which is part of Europe. This is a country far away. So, just transporting you guys over for political propaganda would cost us a lot of money, and we don’t have that much. Then, we have to make sure that you guys are protected. Because this isn’t a war fought with rifles, the Americans are bombing us all the time, they will kill some of you.”
I said “So what? Your people are dying.” He said, using these words, “No, it’s not a good idea. A better idea is to go back and build mass movements in solidarity with us. Much more useful than a tiny show.” I said, “The British consul general in Hanoi, who fought in World War II, told me over tea three days ago that when he heard the bombers coming, he felt like grabbing a gun and going out onto the ceiling and firing at them.” Pham Van Dong said, “Well, why doesn’t he? We won’t stop him.” He meant: you guys are sweet and nice and we appreciate it. He hugged me very warmly and said it would not be useful because times have changed.
The other reason Pham Van Dong gave me for not having volunteers was that they were on a very tricky path between the Russians and the Chinese: “If we make a big appeal, we know thousands of people will come from Europe and elsewhere, but we’ll be summoned by Chairman Mao and the Russian leadership, saying, ‘What do you want? Why let these crazy people in? Are you saying we’re not giving you enough arms?’ So, we don’t get into that. It’s just easier.” So, the FI decided that building the solidarity movement with Vietnam was a central priority — one of the best things they ever did.Unlike the Palestinians, the Vietnamese had a state in the North and huge material support from the Soviets and the Chinese.
The other big difference was that unlike the Palestinians, the Vietnamese had a state in the North and huge material support from the Soviets and the Chinese. They scored more and more victories on the ground. I attended a talk in Hanoi by their top military commanders, where some of us were allowed in. A high-ranked officer explained how they were going to crush the Americans.
I was skeptical. I said, “Crush the Americans? Look what’s going on.” The colonel said, “We have a plan, a combination of guerrilla attacks and sudden mass attacks on them to take them.” He basically described the Tet Offensive. So, they were very convinced, and we said, “We might actually win this one. That would be a huge blow against the Americans.” And they did. That was the atmosphere.
Palestine is also different in the sense that for the younger generation — not for the previous ones — the war in Gaza came as a huge shock. At the beginning, the good elements reacted to it like they would react to Black Lives Matter: occupy the parks and all that. But gradually it deepened, and something happened that didn’t happen with all these Black Lives Matter–style movements: they began to read and to ask questions. A very important element in the United States was the entry of young Jewish people into the movement. I couldn’t believe my eyes when I saw that the anti-Zionist young Jews had occupied Grand Central Station and said to the rest of the movement, “This is our business, just let us do it alone.” In Britain, too, they had their own banners, but they never did independent things like young American Jews did.
That shook the Israelis and the AIPAC [American Israel Public Affairs Committee], but it didn’t touch the politicians, of course. My own feeling is that this created a new consciousness. If we can’t describe it as totally anti-imperialist, it’s not that far from it. People realize that is what the Israelis are doing with our money, with our bombs, in some cases with our soldiers, and it’s unacceptable.
I’m optimistic that something will come out of it. There is admiration for the Palestinians who do fight back and total disgust for the soldiers they see muttering Nazi-style obscenities against the Palestinians like “Our children need protection because they’re not like Arab children.” These sort of “Kill the Arabs” chants are repeated by their supporters here. This has created a strong feeling that all institutions created by the United States after World War II are useless unless the Americans support them, starting with the great so-called United Nations, and all the international courts that they’ve tried to sabotage.A very important element in the United States was the entry of young Jewish people into the Palestine solidarity movement.
The effect on the new generations is very positive. Ironically, the American state will soon realize this. Any other country can now say: “Who are you to tell us anything? We can go and do our own atrocities like the Israelis did. Why should we listen to you?” Actually, the whole structure of international relations has been dented by this particular war. The Israelis, backed by the West, have waged a genocide against the Palestinian people and its consequences will be with us for a long time. This is a memory that will not go — and wherever else the US does it now, people will react saying, “Go away! Don’t do it. We don’t believe you.” And I think it also has had an effect, whether people like it or not, on perceptions of Ukraine: “You say Ukraine is sacred, you defend them. We can’t do this, we can’t do that, because it might offend them. And in Palestine, you just watch freely.”
Intervenções Imperialistas no Oriente Médio
Stathis Kouvelakis
Uma última pergunta sobre os últimos acontecimentos no Oriente Médio. Qual é sua atitude quando ditadores são derrubados no Iraque, Líbia e agora na Síria?
Tariq Ali
Não há motivo para comemoração quando esses atos são realizados por imperialismos ocidentais sob a liderança dos Estados Unidos. Quando eles são derrubados por seu próprio povo, eu comemoro. O Ocidente remove as pessoas de quem não gosta em um momento específico. Saddam [Hussein] do Iraque foi um herói quando agiu pelos EUA e começou uma guerra com o Irã. Ele se tornou um "Hitler" apenas quando invadiu o Kuwait, imaginando que tinha sinal verde dos EUA. Então, depois do 11 de setembro, eles acabaram com ele e um milhão de outros iraquianos. Cinco milhões de órfãos. Então eles lincharam Saddam. Motivo para comemoração? Eu escrevi contra ele e produzi um documentário zombando dele quando ele estava vivo.
Na Líbia, a OTAN matou mais de 30.000 líbios para forçar a mudança de regime e linchar Muammar Gaddafi. "Nós viemos, nós vimos, ele morreu" foi a celebração de Hillary Clinton. Políticos franceses e britânicos tiraram dinheiro de Gaddafi. A [London School of Economics implorou por uma grande doação e seus professores escreveram o doutorado do jovem Gaddafi para ele. Lord Anthony Giddens [o teórico da "Terceira Via" de Tony Blair] comparou a Líbia a uma "Noruega do Norte da África".
As mesmas pessoas apoiaram o ataque da OTAN. Eu o critiquei severamente por muitos anos. Eu não comemorei sua morte. O que há para comemorar nas palhaçadas do imperialismo ocidental? O mesmo para a Síria. O Iraque ainda não se recuperou. A Líbia está em ruínas, governada por jihadistas rivais. A Síria já foi dividida. O enorme triunfo do Ocidente ainda está se desenrolando.
Eles não têm mais vergonha de exibir seus padrões duplos como observamos com o genocídio israelense na Palestina, mas os idiotas úteis da OTAN em Londres, Paris, Roma, Berlim, adornos da mídia burguesa e seus apoiadores na esquerda quase inexistente, ainda fingem que avanços estão sendo feitos. Em uma de suas observações sobre teatro, Bertolt Brecht enfatizou que estava interessado nos "novos dias ruins, não nos velhos bons". Não há mais bons dias restantes. Séculos antes dele, Baruch Spinoza — que acabou de ter sua sentença de expulsão anulada pela Sinagoga em Amsterdã — ofereceu seu próprio conselho: "Nem rir nem chorar, mas entender". Os liberais da OTAN devem refletir sobre isso.
Colaboradores
Tariq Ali é editor da New Left Review.
Stathis Kouvelakis é um pesquisador independente em teoria política. Membro do comitê central do Syriza de 2012 a 2015, ele foi candidato pela MeRA25-Aliança pela Ruptura nas eleições gerais gregas de maio de 2023.
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