Como o sistema internacional pode sobreviver a uma Washington hostil
Ngaire Woods
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| Vista do Monumento a Washington, Washington, D.C., janeiro de 2025 Daniel Cole / Reuters |
Em um período notavelmente curto, o segundo governo Trump subverteu muitos dos preceitos que norteavam a ordem internacional desde o fim da Segunda Guerra Mundial. O presidente Donald Trump redefiniu rapidamente o papel dos EUA na OTAN, questionando as garantias de defesa dos EUA à Europa e ao Japão, e até mesmo o compartilhamento de inteligência com seus parceiros do Five Eyes: Austrália, Canadá, Nova Zelândia e Reino Unido. Nas Nações Unidas, os Estados Unidos se aliaram à Rússia e a outros antigos adversários, como Bielorrússia e Coreia do Norte, e contra quase todos os seus aliados democráticos tradicionais. Autoridades europeias, apressadas em reagir, começaram a se perguntar se precisam desenvolver seus próprios sistemas de dissuasão nuclear e se Washington continuará a manter tropas americanas no continente.
No entanto, tão importante quanto essas considerações de segurança é a rejeição do governo aos tratados, organizações e instituições econômicas que os Estados Unidos tanto contribuíram para moldar. No primeiro dia de seu segundo mandato, Trump emitiu ordens executivas para se retirar do Acordo de Paris sobre o clima da ONU e da Organização Mundial da Saúde, e impôs uma pausa de 90 dias em toda a entrega de ajuda externa americana. No início de fevereiro, ele ordenou uma revisão abrangente de 180 dias de todas as organizações internacionais às quais os Estados Unidos pertencem e de "todas as convenções e tratados dos quais os Estados Unidos são signatários". E medidas mais agressivas podem estar por vir: o Projeto 2025, o projeto da Heritage Foundation para o segundo governo Trump, que antecipou muitas políticas do presidente, prevê a saída dos EUA do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) e do Banco Mundial, pilares do desenvolvimento global e da estabilidade econômica que os Estados Unidos têm guiado com firmeza por décadas.
De tudo isso, pode ser fácil concluir que a ordem do pós-guerra está se desintegrando. Ao renunciar à liderança americana, o governo Trump parece estar marcando o fim da primazia e da hegemonia benevolente americanas. Como argumentaram o historiador Robert Kagan e outros, na ausência da superpotência americana, uma selva caótica pode emergir. É claro que é possível que o governo Trump use o poder bruto para minar a estabilidade global e permitir que Estados Unidos, China, Rússia e outros criem suas próprias esferas de influência. Em tal mundo, as guerras podem ser mais frequentes, e antigos aliados próximos dos Estados Unidos, seja na Europa ou na Ásia, podem ser vulneráveis à coerção direta. No entanto, não está predestinado que esse tipo de colapso ocorra. A velha ordem pode estar desaparecendo, mas se isso levará ao caos e ao conflito também depende dos muitos outros países que até agora sustentaram as instituições nas quais ela se baseou.
Há muitas maneiras pelas quais a cooperação interestatal pode continuar a ser eficaz sem a liderança dos EUA e até mesmo atuar como uma força restritiva a movimentos unilaterais de Washington. Mas, para que isso aconteça, os membros centrais da ordem do pós-guerra, incluindo países europeus, Japão e outros parceiros na Ásia e em outros lugares, devem se unir preventivamente para reforçar a cooperação entre si. Eles não podem se dar ao luxo de esperar para ver, com o risco de que alguns se desviem. O governo Trump está agindo rapidamente para redefinir o que os Estados Unidos desejam e ignorando acordos multilaterais há muito estabelecidos para obtê-lo. Outros países devem agir com a mesma rapidez para proteger e desenvolver essas estruturas, das quais precisarão agora mais do que nunca.
OFERTA E DEMANDA
Nas abordagens tradicionais das relações internacionais, a ordem requer um hegemon poderoso, preparado para usar seu poder militar e econômico dominante para defender as regras, normas e instituições que regem as interações entre os Estados. Essa compreensão — conhecida como teoria da estabilidade hegemônica — é frequentemente invocada para explicar o colapso da ordem na Europa nas décadas de 1920 e 1930, quando nenhum país estava disposto e era capaz de garantir a cooperação: o Reino Unido estava disposto e os Estados Unidos eram capazes, mas nenhum dos dois era. Em contraste, após a Segunda Guerra Mundial, os Estados Unidos, impulsionados pela ameaça global do comunismo, tinham tanto a vontade quanto a capacidade de impor a ordem. Aplicada ao mundo atual, a teoria sugere que a retirada dos EUA dos tratados e organizações internacionais que ajudaram a criar causaria um colapso da ordem.
Contudo, como apontou o cientista político Robert Keohane na década de 1980, a teoria da estabilidade hegemônica considera apenas o "lado da oferta": a disposição de um país poderoso em fornecer as condições para a cooperação. Mas o lado da demanda também importa. Muitos países, incluindo a vasta maioria que não possui poder dominante, apoiam diversas formas de cooperação multilateral para proteger seus próprios interesses. Essa demanda existe porque, em um mundo repleto de competição, incerteza e conflitos, a maioria dos países reconhece que a diplomacia ad hoc, acordo por acordo, dificilmente terá sucesso. Tais acordos tenderão a favorecer potências fortes e, assim, levarão ao tipo de comportamento coercitivo que Trump já utilizou contra países mais fracos, como Canadá e México. Como resultado, mesmo na ausência de um hegemon, os países podem buscar instituições coletivas para unir seu poder, construir uma proteção contra a instabilidade e capturar os ganhos mútuos que ocorrem quando um mínimo de cooperação é alcançado. Essa percepção sugere novas possibilidades para a ordem sem os Estados Unidos.
De fato, o multilateralismo sem um hegemon tem uma longa história na Europa. No Congresso de Viena, em 1814-15, as potências europeias se reuniram para criar uma ordem rudimentar. O que emergiu foi o Concerto da Europa, um grupo que viria a incluir Áustria, França, Prússia, Rússia e Reino Unido. Embora o Reino Unido tivesse grande poder naval e econômico na época, não detinha poder hegemônico sobre o continente. Em vez disso, uma combinação de cooperação diplomática e equilíbrio de poder manteve a ordem até que a Guerra da Crimeia e as unificações da Alemanha e da Itália a romperam. Um exemplo ainda mais antigo dessa cooperação é a Liga Hanseática, a confederação estabelecida por cidades do norte da Europa no século XIII para proteger e promover seus interesses comerciais. Extremamente bem-sucedida, ela floresceu por centenas de anos.
Since World War II, although Washington has occupied a hegemonic role in the overall order, there have been several prominent examples of demand-driven cooperation among groups of countries that do not include the United States. Take the European Union. Even in the face of U.S. apprehensions about protectionism, European countries successfully organized their economies as one large, powerful bloc. As a result, Europe has strong and durable institutions, including collective financial resources, such as the European Central Bank and the European Investment Bank, which now have major influence in international affairs. And as European countries scale up public investment to respond to the world’s overlapping crises amid volatile changes in American foreign and trade policy, the euro could provide an attractive alternative to the U.S. dollar as a global reserve currency.
Another prominent example of interstate cooperation without a hegemon is the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, a group that includes the major oil producers of Africa and the Middle East, as well as Venezuela. Since its establishment in 1960, OPEC has suffered defections, internal price wars, and regular cheating on its quota limits, but it has nonetheless empowered a group of resource-rich countries without strong armies or diversified economies to sway global affairs and generate leverage in capitals around the world. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the group has successfully coordinated production quotas among its own members and the ten other countries that form OPEC+ to stabilize and sustain high oil prices, furnishing its members more than a trillion dollars in gross revenue.
A looser form of demand-driven multilateral organization is the BRICS+ group of countries. Founded in 2009 by Brazil, Russia, India, and China, BRIC (as it was known then) has since grown to ten members. Although some have dismissed it as an ineffectual attempt to provide an alternative to Western-dominated international financial institutions, the group is held together by a shared interest in reducing risks. For example, many BRICS+ members worry that their reliance on the U.S. dollar and U.S.-led international institutions makes them vulnerable to coercion and sanctions. They have created institutions that they hope will make them more resilient, including the New Development Bank, which by the end of 2022 had approved more than $32.8 billion in loans for 96 projects in BRICS+ countries and other emerging economies.
Each of these cases illustrates that countries that have common interests or a need to protect themselves against shared risks can make effective arrangements on their own. If the Trump administration decides to withdraw from international institutions, renege on U.S. commitments, and ignore established norms of diplomacy, that does not mean that other countries cannot create and sustain frameworks for negotiation and agreement. Indeed, there are several pathways by which the world could transition from U.S.-led institutions, treaties, and alliances to ones shaped by other countries.
De tudo isso, pode ser fácil concluir que a ordem do pós-guerra está se desintegrando. Ao renunciar à liderança americana, o governo Trump parece estar marcando o fim da primazia e da hegemonia benevolente americanas. Como argumentaram o historiador Robert Kagan e outros, na ausência da superpotência americana, uma selva caótica pode emergir. É claro que é possível que o governo Trump use o poder bruto para minar a estabilidade global e permitir que Estados Unidos, China, Rússia e outros criem suas próprias esferas de influência. Em tal mundo, as guerras podem ser mais frequentes, e antigos aliados próximos dos Estados Unidos, seja na Europa ou na Ásia, podem ser vulneráveis à coerção direta. No entanto, não está predestinado que esse tipo de colapso ocorra. A velha ordem pode estar desaparecendo, mas se isso levará ao caos e ao conflito também depende dos muitos outros países que até agora sustentaram as instituições nas quais ela se baseou.
Há muitas maneiras pelas quais a cooperação interestatal pode continuar a ser eficaz sem a liderança dos EUA e até mesmo atuar como uma força restritiva a movimentos unilaterais de Washington. Mas, para que isso aconteça, os membros centrais da ordem do pós-guerra, incluindo países europeus, Japão e outros parceiros na Ásia e em outros lugares, devem se unir preventivamente para reforçar a cooperação entre si. Eles não podem se dar ao luxo de esperar para ver, com o risco de que alguns se desviem. O governo Trump está agindo rapidamente para redefinir o que os Estados Unidos desejam e ignorando acordos multilaterais há muito estabelecidos para obtê-lo. Outros países devem agir com a mesma rapidez para proteger e desenvolver essas estruturas, das quais precisarão agora mais do que nunca.
OFERTA E DEMANDA
Nas abordagens tradicionais das relações internacionais, a ordem requer um hegemon poderoso, preparado para usar seu poder militar e econômico dominante para defender as regras, normas e instituições que regem as interações entre os Estados. Essa compreensão — conhecida como teoria da estabilidade hegemônica — é frequentemente invocada para explicar o colapso da ordem na Europa nas décadas de 1920 e 1930, quando nenhum país estava disposto e era capaz de garantir a cooperação: o Reino Unido estava disposto e os Estados Unidos eram capazes, mas nenhum dos dois era. Em contraste, após a Segunda Guerra Mundial, os Estados Unidos, impulsionados pela ameaça global do comunismo, tinham tanto a vontade quanto a capacidade de impor a ordem. Aplicada ao mundo atual, a teoria sugere que a retirada dos EUA dos tratados e organizações internacionais que ajudaram a criar causaria um colapso da ordem.
Contudo, como apontou o cientista político Robert Keohane na década de 1980, a teoria da estabilidade hegemônica considera apenas o "lado da oferta": a disposição de um país poderoso em fornecer as condições para a cooperação. Mas o lado da demanda também importa. Muitos países, incluindo a vasta maioria que não possui poder dominante, apoiam diversas formas de cooperação multilateral para proteger seus próprios interesses. Essa demanda existe porque, em um mundo repleto de competição, incerteza e conflitos, a maioria dos países reconhece que a diplomacia ad hoc, acordo por acordo, dificilmente terá sucesso. Tais acordos tenderão a favorecer potências fortes e, assim, levarão ao tipo de comportamento coercitivo que Trump já utilizou contra países mais fracos, como Canadá e México. Como resultado, mesmo na ausência de um hegemon, os países podem buscar instituições coletivas para unir seu poder, construir uma proteção contra a instabilidade e capturar os ganhos mútuos que ocorrem quando um mínimo de cooperação é alcançado. Essa percepção sugere novas possibilidades para a ordem sem os Estados Unidos.
De fato, o multilateralismo sem um hegemon tem uma longa história na Europa. No Congresso de Viena, em 1814-15, as potências europeias se reuniram para criar uma ordem rudimentar. O que emergiu foi o Concerto da Europa, um grupo que viria a incluir Áustria, França, Prússia, Rússia e Reino Unido. Embora o Reino Unido tivesse grande poder naval e econômico na época, não detinha poder hegemônico sobre o continente. Em vez disso, uma combinação de cooperação diplomática e equilíbrio de poder manteve a ordem até que a Guerra da Crimeia e as unificações da Alemanha e da Itália a romperam. Um exemplo ainda mais antigo dessa cooperação é a Liga Hanseática, a confederação estabelecida por cidades do norte da Europa no século XIII para proteger e promover seus interesses comerciais. Extremamente bem-sucedida, ela floresceu por centenas de anos.
Since World War II, although Washington has occupied a hegemonic role in the overall order, there have been several prominent examples of demand-driven cooperation among groups of countries that do not include the United States. Take the European Union. Even in the face of U.S. apprehensions about protectionism, European countries successfully organized their economies as one large, powerful bloc. As a result, Europe has strong and durable institutions, including collective financial resources, such as the European Central Bank and the European Investment Bank, which now have major influence in international affairs. And as European countries scale up public investment to respond to the world’s overlapping crises amid volatile changes in American foreign and trade policy, the euro could provide an attractive alternative to the U.S. dollar as a global reserve currency.
Another prominent example of interstate cooperation without a hegemon is the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, a group that includes the major oil producers of Africa and the Middle East, as well as Venezuela. Since its establishment in 1960, OPEC has suffered defections, internal price wars, and regular cheating on its quota limits, but it has nonetheless empowered a group of resource-rich countries without strong armies or diversified economies to sway global affairs and generate leverage in capitals around the world. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the group has successfully coordinated production quotas among its own members and the ten other countries that form OPEC+ to stabilize and sustain high oil prices, furnishing its members more than a trillion dollars in gross revenue.
A looser form of demand-driven multilateral organization is the BRICS+ group of countries. Founded in 2009 by Brazil, Russia, India, and China, BRIC (as it was known then) has since grown to ten members. Although some have dismissed it as an ineffectual attempt to provide an alternative to Western-dominated international financial institutions, the group is held together by a shared interest in reducing risks. For example, many BRICS+ members worry that their reliance on the U.S. dollar and U.S.-led international institutions makes them vulnerable to coercion and sanctions. They have created institutions that they hope will make them more resilient, including the New Development Bank, which by the end of 2022 had approved more than $32.8 billion in loans for 96 projects in BRICS+ countries and other emerging economies.
Each of these cases illustrates that countries that have common interests or a need to protect themselves against shared risks can make effective arrangements on their own. If the Trump administration decides to withdraw from international institutions, renege on U.S. commitments, and ignore established norms of diplomacy, that does not mean that other countries cannot create and sustain frameworks for negotiation and agreement. Indeed, there are several pathways by which the world could transition from U.S.-led institutions, treaties, and alliances to ones shaped by other countries.
BUILD BANK BETTER
Among the most promising areas in which the rest of the world can sustain multilateral cooperation without the United States is international development. When the United States began erecting the postwar economic order at Bretton Woods in 1944, key pillars included the creation of the IMF and the World Bank and, subsequently, the designation of the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency. From then on, U.S. policy dominated both institutions and the way they managed economic crises. But the second Trump administration has already shown its hostility to many international institutions, and some policy analysts close to the president have called for a dramatic reduction of or even an end to U.S. support for the IMF and the World Bank.
If Washington takes such extreme steps, they need not lead to the collapse of economic order. On the contrary, these moves could provide a spur to other countries to rethink the institutional framework, either by remaking existing organizations or by finding alternatives to them. Consider the World Bank and its lending agencies, the International Development Association, which provides funds to the poorest countries, and the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, which provides loans and development policy advice to middle-income countries. The IDA’s effectiveness is undisputed: it can sustain aid efforts at a fraction of what it would cost individual countries to do so alone. For every dollar a country puts in, the IDA is able to raise and lend nearly four dollars to countries most in need. The agency can achieve this multiplier effect because it fortifies countries’ direct contributions with international capital market borrowing, repayments from past IDA loans, and profit transfers from the IBRD.
If the United States stopped funding the IDA, however, other donor countries would need to step up fast. In fact, there is a strong strategic incentive for them to do so. For years, the United States, as the largest single donor, has been able to tailor IDA lending to its own interests, supported by the U.S.-led power structure of the World Bank itself. But Washington’s dominance of the IDA has long been disproportionate to its contributions. In the agency’s last replenishment, agreed to in December 2021, the United States contributed a mere 14.89 percent of overall funding, only fractionally more than Japan, which accounted for 14.63 percent. By contrast, the countries of Europe, taken together, contributed more than 50 percent. Other important donors include China at 5.62 percent, Canada at 5.04 percent, and Saudi Arabia at 2.98 percent. If the United States ceased to contribute, other donors would have an opportunity to correct this imbalance and demand more of a direct say in how the agency spent its funds.
Among the most promising areas in which the rest of the world can sustain multilateral cooperation without the United States is international development. When the United States began erecting the postwar economic order at Bretton Woods in 1944, key pillars included the creation of the IMF and the World Bank and, subsequently, the designation of the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency. From then on, U.S. policy dominated both institutions and the way they managed economic crises. But the second Trump administration has already shown its hostility to many international institutions, and some policy analysts close to the president have called for a dramatic reduction of or even an end to U.S. support for the IMF and the World Bank.
If Washington takes such extreme steps, they need not lead to the collapse of economic order. On the contrary, these moves could provide a spur to other countries to rethink the institutional framework, either by remaking existing organizations or by finding alternatives to them. Consider the World Bank and its lending agencies, the International Development Association, which provides funds to the poorest countries, and the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, which provides loans and development policy advice to middle-income countries. The IDA’s effectiveness is undisputed: it can sustain aid efforts at a fraction of what it would cost individual countries to do so alone. For every dollar a country puts in, the IDA is able to raise and lend nearly four dollars to countries most in need. The agency can achieve this multiplier effect because it fortifies countries’ direct contributions with international capital market borrowing, repayments from past IDA loans, and profit transfers from the IBRD.
If the United States stopped funding the IDA, however, other donor countries would need to step up fast. In fact, there is a strong strategic incentive for them to do so. For years, the United States, as the largest single donor, has been able to tailor IDA lending to its own interests, supported by the U.S.-led power structure of the World Bank itself. But Washington’s dominance of the IDA has long been disproportionate to its contributions. In the agency’s last replenishment, agreed to in December 2021, the United States contributed a mere 14.89 percent of overall funding, only fractionally more than Japan, which accounted for 14.63 percent. By contrast, the countries of Europe, taken together, contributed more than 50 percent. Other important donors include China at 5.62 percent, Canada at 5.04 percent, and Saudi Arabia at 2.98 percent. If the United States ceased to contribute, other donors would have an opportunity to correct this imbalance and demand more of a direct say in how the agency spent its funds.
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| Ministros das Relações Exteriores do G-7 em reunião em Charlevoix, Canadá, março de 2025 Saul Loeb / Reuters |
Of course, the United States will resist any loss of influence. The Trump administration may well try to ratchet up its control over both the IDA and the IBRD, even as it drastically decreases its own contributions. There is precedent for this: in the 1980s, the Reagan administration reduced U.S. funding to the United Nations, the IMF, and the World Bank while seeking greater control over them. Other countries failed to find an effective way to push back, and the result was yet greater U.S. influence. Similarly, the Trump administration will likely put enormous pressure on the head of each organization and perhaps even on the staff to do Washington’s bidding. The World Bank has already had to warn some of its staff not to travel through the United States after two Colombian staff members had their diplomatic visas revoked and were denied entry into the country by U.S. immigration authorities, as the Trump administration pressed the Colombian government to accept U.S. military flights carrying deportees.
Nonetheless, by acting together, other donor countries have significant leverage of their own. They must not automatically accept any new conditions imposed by the United States or leave the heads of these agencies to fend for themselves. Nor should they simply abandon the bank or let it wither. Instead, these countries must make clear to the Trump administration that the United States can either maintain its influence by contributing or lose it. And they have the tools to do so: according to World Bank rules, if one member fails to meet any of its obligations to the bank—even if it is the most powerful member—a simple majority of other countries, exercising a majority of the total voting power, can suspend that member. This rule has yet to be used.
More drastically, the United States could exit the World Bank entirely, as called for by Project 2025. European states, Japan, and other countries need to prepare for such an outcome now. According to the bank’s founding charter, if the leading contributor to the bank decides to leave, the organization’s headquarters must relocate to “the territory of the member holding the greatest number of shares.” Most likely, this would mean moving the bank to Japan, a step that could set the stage for building a coalition of members more closely involved in decision-making. Under Japan’s leadership, for example, the bank could establish a major branch of the IBRD in the territory of one of the bank’s largest fee-paying middle-income clients, such as Brazil or India; it could also place a major branch of the IDA in Europe, where many of the agency’s largest contributors are located, or in Africa, closer to its major borrowers. Likewise, China could host a major branch devoted, perhaps, to financing sustainable energy. It could sit alongside Beijing’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which already co-finances extensively with the World Bank.
In short, the inevitable shakeup of the World Bank that would result from a U.S. withdrawal could present an opportunity to strengthen the institution. By properly planning for this scenario, the World Bank’s members can ensure that the bank continues to function and that it sustains its multilateral character. Such a transformation could also become a template for how other international institutions can adapt to an order that is no longer led by the United States.
A FALTERING FUND?
Another major casualty of the Trump administration’s rejection of multilateralism could be the IMF, but the challenges it faces are different from those of the World Bank. For decades, U.S. policy has dominated the IMF, which has provided a place to pool reserves and to manage economic crises in a coordinated way. So dominant was this system in the late twentieth century that by the end of the Cold War, an international monetary and financial order without the United States seemed almost unthinkable. But the world looks very different today, and it is not just the United States that has changed.
For now, the Trump administration seems unlikely to withdraw from the IMF, which does much to protect U.S. interests using other countries’ charges and contributions. In 2023 alone, the United States reported unrealized gains from the IMF—the rise in value of U.S. shares in the fund—of $407 million. But the fund is not as important to other countries as it once was. If the Trump administration decided to reduce U.S. contributions to the IMF while exerting greater control, other members would not have to remain beholden to it. Instead, they could draw on and expand a number of emerging alternative structures that carry out many of the same functions as the IMF.
For one thing, many countries now have substantial foreign exchange reserves, which offer insurance against external shocks and can provide foreign currency to their own banks if they come under stress. By the end of 2018, total foreign currency reserves held globally had increased tenfold compared with 30 years earlier; two-thirds of those reserves were held by emerging and developing countries. Moreover, in building these reserves, many countries are relying less on the U.S. dollar. The proportion of foreign exchange reserves held in dollars has declined from around 71 percent in 1999 to 57 percent in 2024, as countries seek yields in easy-to-trade currencies such as the Australian dollar, the Canadian dollar, Chinese renminbi, South Korean won, the Singaporean dollar, and the Nordic currencies. The shift away from U.S. dollars could rapidly accelerate if the Trump administration acts on a trade policy document written by the economist Stephen Miran shortly before he became a senior adviser to the president, which appears to endorse the idea of forcing foreigners to convert their five- and ten-year U.S. Treasury bonds to 100-year securities bearing low interest rates; or on White House adviser Robert Lighthizer’s suggestion that the United States tax foreign purchases of U.S. treasuries. A world that depends less on the dollar and less on the IMF is a world in which a unilateralist United States will have less influence.
A second line of defense to a weakened IMF is the growing use of currency swap agreements. CSAs call directly on another country’s central bank for assistance in the event of a crisis. By 2024, China’s central bank had signed 40 bilateral swap agreements, 31 of which were in force with a total value of about $586 billion. Brazil signed swap agreements with Argentina, in 2008, worth $1.8 billion and with China, in 2013, worth $30 billion. India has concluded CSAs with more than 25 countries, in most cases prioritizing countries with which it runs a current account deficit. CSAs have often been precursors to broader agreements among countries. Since their introduction in 2009, China’s swap lines with Argentina have facilitated Chinese investment in Argentina’s strategic infrastructure.
Equally important is the emergence of regional institutions that replicate many of the IMF’s crisis-assistance roles. The Latin American Reserve Fund, or FLAR, evolved in the 1980s, offering financial support to countries in the region facing a balance-of-payments crisis. Similarly, in 2000, in the wake of the East Asian financial crisis, members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations came together with China, Japan, and South Korea to create a multilateral currency swap arrangement known as the Chiang Mai Initiative, which they have subsequently strengthened. A decade later, during the eurozone crisis, European countries established their own regional arrangement—what is now called the European Stability Mechanism. In 2014, BRICS created a Contingent Reserve Arrangement, which offers financial support in a crisis or anticipatory loans to avoid a crisis. And in 2025, the African Development Bank announced the creation of the African Financial Stability Mechanism to provide concessional refinancing—offering access to capital on favorable terms—to countries in crisis. Most of these arrangements have some link to the IMF, but each is also performing substantial forms of regional governance on its own.
Another major casualty of the Trump administration’s rejection of multilateralism could be the IMF, but the challenges it faces are different from those of the World Bank. For decades, U.S. policy has dominated the IMF, which has provided a place to pool reserves and to manage economic crises in a coordinated way. So dominant was this system in the late twentieth century that by the end of the Cold War, an international monetary and financial order without the United States seemed almost unthinkable. But the world looks very different today, and it is not just the United States that has changed.
For now, the Trump administration seems unlikely to withdraw from the IMF, which does much to protect U.S. interests using other countries’ charges and contributions. In 2023 alone, the United States reported unrealized gains from the IMF—the rise in value of U.S. shares in the fund—of $407 million. But the fund is not as important to other countries as it once was. If the Trump administration decided to reduce U.S. contributions to the IMF while exerting greater control, other members would not have to remain beholden to it. Instead, they could draw on and expand a number of emerging alternative structures that carry out many of the same functions as the IMF.
For one thing, many countries now have substantial foreign exchange reserves, which offer insurance against external shocks and can provide foreign currency to their own banks if they come under stress. By the end of 2018, total foreign currency reserves held globally had increased tenfold compared with 30 years earlier; two-thirds of those reserves were held by emerging and developing countries. Moreover, in building these reserves, many countries are relying less on the U.S. dollar. The proportion of foreign exchange reserves held in dollars has declined from around 71 percent in 1999 to 57 percent in 2024, as countries seek yields in easy-to-trade currencies such as the Australian dollar, the Canadian dollar, Chinese renminbi, South Korean won, the Singaporean dollar, and the Nordic currencies. The shift away from U.S. dollars could rapidly accelerate if the Trump administration acts on a trade policy document written by the economist Stephen Miran shortly before he became a senior adviser to the president, which appears to endorse the idea of forcing foreigners to convert their five- and ten-year U.S. Treasury bonds to 100-year securities bearing low interest rates; or on White House adviser Robert Lighthizer’s suggestion that the United States tax foreign purchases of U.S. treasuries. A world that depends less on the dollar and less on the IMF is a world in which a unilateralist United States will have less influence.
A second line of defense to a weakened IMF is the growing use of currency swap agreements. CSAs call directly on another country’s central bank for assistance in the event of a crisis. By 2024, China’s central bank had signed 40 bilateral swap agreements, 31 of which were in force with a total value of about $586 billion. Brazil signed swap agreements with Argentina, in 2008, worth $1.8 billion and with China, in 2013, worth $30 billion. India has concluded CSAs with more than 25 countries, in most cases prioritizing countries with which it runs a current account deficit. CSAs have often been precursors to broader agreements among countries. Since their introduction in 2009, China’s swap lines with Argentina have facilitated Chinese investment in Argentina’s strategic infrastructure.
Equally important is the emergence of regional institutions that replicate many of the IMF’s crisis-assistance roles. The Latin American Reserve Fund, or FLAR, evolved in the 1980s, offering financial support to countries in the region facing a balance-of-payments crisis. Similarly, in 2000, in the wake of the East Asian financial crisis, members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations came together with China, Japan, and South Korea to create a multilateral currency swap arrangement known as the Chiang Mai Initiative, which they have subsequently strengthened. A decade later, during the eurozone crisis, European countries established their own regional arrangement—what is now called the European Stability Mechanism. In 2014, BRICS created a Contingent Reserve Arrangement, which offers financial support in a crisis or anticipatory loans to avoid a crisis. And in 2025, the African Development Bank announced the creation of the African Financial Stability Mechanism to provide concessional refinancing—offering access to capital on favorable terms—to countries in crisis. Most of these arrangements have some link to the IMF, but each is also performing substantial forms of regional governance on its own.
SAFETY IN NUMBERS
In addition to upholding institutions that support economic order, countries can respond to a renegade hegemon by reshaping multilateral political forums. For decades, the United States has used a variety of groupings, including the G-7 and, in the twenty-first century, the G-20, to bring leaders together to shape collective responses to global problems. The G-7 emerged in the 1970s when the leaders of France, the United Kingdom, the United States, West Germany, and, subsequently, Canada, Japan, and representatives of EU institutions came together to manage new economic shocks. The broader G-20 emerged in 1999 and went on to play a key role in containing the 2008 financial crisis, orchestrating a global response and guiding the actions of various multilateral organizations to address the economic fallout. Overall, the G-7 and the G-20 have played key roles in forging mutual understanding and cooperative solutions.
But the Trump administration has expressed deep skepticism of both groups. In his previous term in office, Trump took the unprecedented step of refusing to join fellow G-7 leaders in the traditional joint communiqué issued at the end of a summit. Since returning to the White House, he has also directly contradicted other G-7 members by announcing a desire to bring Russia, a country that is under extensive Western sanctions for its aggression in Ukraine, back into the group. (Russia took part in G-7 meetings from 1998 until 2014, when G-7 members disinvited it because of its annexation of Crimea.) Trump has been equally critical of the G-20, refusing to send U.S. representatives to the G-20 meetings of foreign and finance ministers in Johannesburg in February 2025. In explanation, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio cited both the Trump administration’s hostility to South Africa and a desire not to “coddle anti-Americanism.”
With the United States increasingly absent, other countries must now step up to reshape these groups, including planning meetings potentially without the United States. In fact, the G-7 has often had a somewhat elastic membership, sometimes meeting in smaller groupings, as when five core members met in 1985 to sign the Plaza Accord to depreciate the U.S. dollar against other leading currencies, or inviting select guest countries to take part. Similarly, the G-20 has regularly invited additional attendees. This flexibility suggests a way forward if the United States withdraws or seeks to hobble these forums.
To be effective, a new group would need to include countries with substantial economic and/or military power, such as Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Members must also have a strong commitment to existing multilateral organizations, which would exclude Russia and the current U.S. administration. Of course, the exact membership would require careful consideration. The inclusion of China in particular would present a dilemma for countries that regard China as an adversary.
As many countries see it, the growing contest between China and the United States is not only for control over markets and technology but also over who controls the rules of the game. The United States has enjoyed enormous influence over international rules and norms through its position in multilateral institutions. After all, it created these agencies after World War II with loyal junior partners in Japan, the United Kingdom, and Europe. China, by contrast, has had to build up its influence elsewhere through bilateral diplomacy and by setting up multilateral institutions of its own, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
But the Trump administration is now relinquishing its influence over the multilateral system, preferring instead to handle countries one by one, transaction by transaction. In so doing, it is thrusting China to the fore, and Beijing seems well prepared. It has quietly increased its role in multilateral agencies, becoming the third-largest shareholder in the IMF and the World Bank. And it has seized opportunities to publicly advocate for the World Health Organization and the World Trade Organization at a time when the United States has shown antagonism toward both. Like all powerful states, China relentlessly pursues its own national interests and participates in multilateral institutions as the best way to secure those interests in the long term. For other countries, this coincidence of self-interest and multilateralism—previously a defining characteristic of U.S. hegemony—is vital for sustaining international cooperation. Of course, it also raises the question of whether China in turn will become hegemonic. The answer to that will depend on how actively other countries press for and act on their own demands for cooperation.
Regardless of its exact membership, a new group would need to convene at speed. The United States is due to take over the leadership of the G-20 in December 2025, and other members cannot assume that the group will continue to function as it has in the past. Perhaps the longest-serving members of the original group—the governments of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—could consider convening a selection of members of the EU, the United Kingdom, and some members of BRICS+ in the intervening months, as a way of laying the groundwork for possible further shifts ahead.
In addition to upholding institutions that support economic order, countries can respond to a renegade hegemon by reshaping multilateral political forums. For decades, the United States has used a variety of groupings, including the G-7 and, in the twenty-first century, the G-20, to bring leaders together to shape collective responses to global problems. The G-7 emerged in the 1970s when the leaders of France, the United Kingdom, the United States, West Germany, and, subsequently, Canada, Japan, and representatives of EU institutions came together to manage new economic shocks. The broader G-20 emerged in 1999 and went on to play a key role in containing the 2008 financial crisis, orchestrating a global response and guiding the actions of various multilateral organizations to address the economic fallout. Overall, the G-7 and the G-20 have played key roles in forging mutual understanding and cooperative solutions.
But the Trump administration has expressed deep skepticism of both groups. In his previous term in office, Trump took the unprecedented step of refusing to join fellow G-7 leaders in the traditional joint communiqué issued at the end of a summit. Since returning to the White House, he has also directly contradicted other G-7 members by announcing a desire to bring Russia, a country that is under extensive Western sanctions for its aggression in Ukraine, back into the group. (Russia took part in G-7 meetings from 1998 until 2014, when G-7 members disinvited it because of its annexation of Crimea.) Trump has been equally critical of the G-20, refusing to send U.S. representatives to the G-20 meetings of foreign and finance ministers in Johannesburg in February 2025. In explanation, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio cited both the Trump administration’s hostility to South Africa and a desire not to “coddle anti-Americanism.”
With the United States increasingly absent, other countries must now step up to reshape these groups, including planning meetings potentially without the United States. In fact, the G-7 has often had a somewhat elastic membership, sometimes meeting in smaller groupings, as when five core members met in 1985 to sign the Plaza Accord to depreciate the U.S. dollar against other leading currencies, or inviting select guest countries to take part. Similarly, the G-20 has regularly invited additional attendees. This flexibility suggests a way forward if the United States withdraws or seeks to hobble these forums.
To be effective, a new group would need to include countries with substantial economic and/or military power, such as Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Members must also have a strong commitment to existing multilateral organizations, which would exclude Russia and the current U.S. administration. Of course, the exact membership would require careful consideration. The inclusion of China in particular would present a dilemma for countries that regard China as an adversary.
As many countries see it, the growing contest between China and the United States is not only for control over markets and technology but also over who controls the rules of the game. The United States has enjoyed enormous influence over international rules and norms through its position in multilateral institutions. After all, it created these agencies after World War II with loyal junior partners in Japan, the United Kingdom, and Europe. China, by contrast, has had to build up its influence elsewhere through bilateral diplomacy and by setting up multilateral institutions of its own, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
But the Trump administration is now relinquishing its influence over the multilateral system, preferring instead to handle countries one by one, transaction by transaction. In so doing, it is thrusting China to the fore, and Beijing seems well prepared. It has quietly increased its role in multilateral agencies, becoming the third-largest shareholder in the IMF and the World Bank. And it has seized opportunities to publicly advocate for the World Health Organization and the World Trade Organization at a time when the United States has shown antagonism toward both. Like all powerful states, China relentlessly pursues its own national interests and participates in multilateral institutions as the best way to secure those interests in the long term. For other countries, this coincidence of self-interest and multilateralism—previously a defining characteristic of U.S. hegemony—is vital for sustaining international cooperation. Of course, it also raises the question of whether China in turn will become hegemonic. The answer to that will depend on how actively other countries press for and act on their own demands for cooperation.
Regardless of its exact membership, a new group would need to convene at speed. The United States is due to take over the leadership of the G-20 in December 2025, and other members cannot assume that the group will continue to function as it has in the past. Perhaps the longest-serving members of the original group—the governments of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—could consider convening a selection of members of the EU, the United Kingdom, and some members of BRICS+ in the intervening months, as a way of laying the groundwork for possible further shifts ahead.
ADMIRÁVEL NOVA ORDEM
Com a rejeição veemente do governo Trump às regras, normas e instituições multilaterais, a ordem do pós-guerra moldada pela liderança americana está desaparecendo. Mas outros países não precisam ser espectadores passivos. Países europeus, Japão e outros grandes aliados dos Estados Unidos, juntamente com potenciais novos parceiros de coalizão, têm várias opções. Eles podem intensificar e substituir o papel dos EUA em instituições existentes, como no caso da AID e do Banco Mundial. Podem encontrar maneiras alternativas de desempenhar algumas das mesmas funções quando as instituições se tornarem fundamentalmente enfraquecidas. E podem construir novas coalizões dispostas a sustentar a cooperação e apoiar a gestão coletiva de crises, criando o que agora pode ser um G-9 ou G-12.
A ordem institucional que emergirá dessa turbulência será diferente daquela liderada pelos EUA, que vigora há mais de oito décadas. Haverá novos riscos sérios, e a presença de uma hegemonia que se retirou em grande parte dos acordos internacionais representará desafios de longo alcance. Mas, em conjunto, o amplo grupo de países que continua a apoiar instituições globais e o multilateralismo — um grupo que pode abranger da Europa a grande parte da Ásia, América Latina e Oriente Médio — representará uma grande fatia do PIB global e será apoiado por um poder militar significativo. E, ao reconstruir ou reformular as instituições mais importantes, eles podem fazer muito para manter a estabilidade, enfrentar problemas globais e proteger seus membros contra crises. Se não o fizerem, muitos países poderão se ver mais expostos do que nunca, lutando para proteger interesses mesquinhos e de curto prazo, sem alavancagem ou influência em um mundo mais perigoso.
NGAIRE WOODS é professor de Governança Econômica Global e reitor da Escola de Governo Blavatnik na Universidade de Oxford.
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