1 de junho de 1996

A esquerda e a política de identidade

Eric J. Hobsbawm

Minha conferência trata de um tema surpreendentemente novo[1]. Estamos tão acostumados a termos como "identidade coletiva", "grupos de identidade", "política de identidade", ou, inclusive, "etnicidade", que custa recordar que só em data recente começaram a formar parte do vocabulário ou jargão atual do discurso político. Por exemplo, se consultássemos a Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences internacional, publicada em 1968 – ou seja, escrita em meados da década de 1960 –, não encontraríamos nenhuma entrada para o termo identidade, salvo uma que trata da identidade psicossocial, redigida por Erik Erikson, preocupado principalmente por temas tais como a chamada "crise de identidade" que sofrem os adolescentes quando tentam descobrir o que são, e um fragmento geral sobre a identificação dos eleitores. E quanto a etnia, no Oxford English Dictionary de princípios da década de 1970, ainda figura só como una palavra pouco comum que indica "o mundo e a superstição pagãs" e que aparece documentada com citações do século XVIII.

Em resumo, nos ocupamos de termos e conceitos que só começaram a ser utilizados realmente na década de 1960. O seu surgimento é mais facilmente seguido nos Estados Unidos, em parte porque sempre foi uma sociedade extraordinariamente interessada em monitorar a temperatura social e psicológica, pressão arterial e outros sintomas e principalmente porque a forma mais óbvia de identidade política, mas não a única, ou seja, a etnia, sempre foi central para a política estadunidense desde que este se converteu em um país de imigração massiva procedente de todos os pontos da Europa. Preliminarmente, pode-se dizer que que a nova etnia faz sua primeira aparição pública em 1963 com Beyond the Melting Pot, de Glazer e Moynihan, e que em 1972 se converte em um programa militante com The Rise of Unmeltable Ethnics, de Michael Novak. O primeiro, eu não preciso dizer, foi o trabalho de um professor judeu e um irlandês, atualmente senador democrata sênior por Nova York; o autor do segundo era um católico de origem eslovaca. No momento, você não precisa se preocupar muito sobre por que tudo isso aconteceu na década de 1960, mas deixe-me lembrá-lo que – pelo menos no cenário dos movimentos dos Estados Unidos, onde estes eventos ocorreram – esta década assistiu também ao surgimento de outras duas variantes da política de identidade: o movimento das mulheres contemporâneo (isto é, pós-sufragista) e o movimento gay.

Não pretendo dizer que antes da década de 1960 ninguém se fazia perguntas sobre sua identidade pública. Às vezes, em situações de incerteza, houve grupos que as fizeram; por exemplo, no cinturão industrial de Lorena, na França, cuja língua oficial e nacionalidade mudou cinco vezes em um século e cuja vida rural tornou-se industrial, semi-urbana, enquanto que suas fronteiras foram alteradas sete vezes no último século e meio. Não é de se estranhar que os habitantes dessa região dizem o seguinte: "Os berlinenses sabem que são berlinenses, os parisienses sabem que são parisienses, mas quem somos nós?". Ou, para citar outra entrevista: "Sou da Lorena, minha cultura é alemã, minha nacionalidade, francesa, e penso em nosso dialeto provincial"[2]. Na verdade, este tipo de situação só levou a problemas de identidade genuína quando as pessoas foram impedidas de manter identidades múltiplas, combinadas, que são naturais para a maioria de nós. Ou, mais ainda, quando estas se encontravam desligadas "das práticas culturais antigas e comuns a todos"[3]. No entanto, até os anos 1960, esses problemas de identidade incerta foram confinados a zonas de fronteira especiais da política. Eles ainda não eram centrais.

Parecem haver adquirido uma importância fundamental a partir da década de 1960. Por quê? Sem dúvida, encontramos razões particulares na política e instituições deste ou aquele país: assim, nos procedimentos peculiares impostos pela Constituição dos Estados Unidos, que deram lugar, por exemplo, aos juízos de direitos civis da década de 1950, que em um primeiro momento tiveram como protagonistas aos negros e depois se estenderam às mulheres, proporcionando um modelo para outros grupos de identidade. Poderíamos dizer que, sobretudo em países onde os partidos competem pelos votos, constituir-se como um grupo de identidade deste tipo pode aportar vantagens políticas concretas: por exemplo, discriminação positiva a favor dos membros do grupo, cotas em postos de trabalho, etc. Os Estados Unidos são de novo um exemplo a respeito, mas não o único. Por exemplo, na Índia, onde o governo se comprometeu a garantir a igualdade social, pode resultar realmente proveitoso declarar-se membro de uma casta baixa ou de um grupo tribal indígena com o fim de desfrutar do acesso extraordinário ao emprego garantido para tais grupos.

A negação da identidade múltipla

Mas, em minha opinião, o surgimento da política de identidade é uma conseqüência dos movimentos e transformações extraordinariamente rápidos e profundos da sociedade humana no terceiro quarto deste século, que tentei descrever e compreender na segunda parte da minha história da "Era dos Extremos: O breve século XX. Esta não é uma visão apenas minha. O sociólogo americano Daniel Bell, por exemplo, argumentou em 1975 que "a separação das estruturas de autoridade tradicional e as unidades sociais afetivas anteriores - historicamente nação e classe... tornam o apego étnico mais saliente". [4]

In fact, we know that both the nation-state and the old class-based political parties and movements have been weakened as a result of these transformations. More than this, we have been living—we are living—through a gigantic ‘cultural revolution’, an ‘extraordinary dissolution of traditional social norms, textures and values, which left so many inhabitants of the developed world orphaned and bereft.’ If I may go on quoting myself, ‘Never was the word “community” used more indiscriminately and emptily than in the decades when communities in the sociological sense become hard to find in real life’. [5] Men and women look for groups to which they can belong, certainly and forever, in a world in which all else is moving and shifting, in which nothing else is certain. And they find it in an identity group. Hence the strange paradox, which the brilliant, and incidentally, Caribbean Harvard sociologist Orlando Patterson has identified: people choose to belong to an identity group, but ‘it is a choice predicated on the strongly held, intensely conceived belief that the individual has absolutely no choice but to belong to that specific group.’ [6] That it is a choice can sometimes be demonstrated. The number of Americans reporting themselves as ‘American Indian’ or ‘Native American’ almost quadrupled between 1960 and 1990, from about half a million to about two millions, which is far more than could be explained by normal demography; and incidentally, since 70 per cent of ‘Native Americans’ marry outside their race, exactly who is a ‘Native American’ ethnically, is far from clear. [7]

So what do we understand by this collective ‘identity’, this sentiment of belonging to a primary group, which is its basis? I draw your attention to four points.

First, collective identities are defined negatively; that is to say against others. ‘We’ recognize ourselves as ‘us’ because we are different from ‘Them’. If there were no ‘They’ from whom we are different, we wouldn’t have to ask ourselves who ‘We’ were. Without Outsiders there are no Insiders. In other words, collective identities are based not on what their members have in common—they may have very little in common except not being the ‘Others’. Unionists and Nationalists in Belfast, or Serb, Croat and Muslim Bosnians, who would otherwise be indistinguishable—they speak the same language, have the same life styles, look and behave the same—insist on the one thing that divides them, which happens to be religion. Conversely, what gives unity as Palestinians to a mixed population of Muslims of various kinds, Roman and Greek Catholics, Greek Orthodox and others who might well—like their neighbours in Lebanon—fight each other under different circumstances? Simply that they are not the Israelis, as Israeli policy continually reminds them.

Of course, there are collectivities which are based on objective characteristics which their members have in common, including biological gender or such politically sensitive physical characteristics as skin-colour and so forth. However most collective identities are like shirts rather than skin, namely they are, in theory at least, optional, not inescapable. In spite of the current fashion for manipulating our bodies, it is still easier to put on another shirt than another arm. Most identity groups are not based on objective physical similarities or differences, although all of them would like to claim that they are ‘natural’ rather than socially constructed. Certainly all ethnic groups do.

Second, it follows that in real life identities, like garments, are interchangeable or wearable in combination rather than unique and, as it were, stuck to the body. For, of course, as every opinion pollster knows, no one has one and only one identity. Human beings cannot be described, even for bureaucratic purposes, except by a combination of many characteristics. But identity politics assumes that one among the many identities we all have is the one that determines, or at least dominates our politics: being a woman, if you are a feminist, being a Protestant if you are an Antrim Unionist, being a Catalan, if you are a Catalan nationalist, being homosexual if you are in the gay movement. And, of course, that you have to get rid of the others, because they are incompatible with the ‘real’ you. So David Selbourne, an all-purpose ideologue and general denouncer, firmly calls on ‘The Jew in England’ to ‘cease to pretend to be English’ and to recognize that his ‘real’ identity is as a Jew. This is both dangerous and absurd. There is no practical incompatibility unless an outside authority tells you that you cannot be both, or unless it is physically impossible to be both. If I wanted to be simultaneously and ecumenically a devout Catholic, a devout Jew, and a devout Buddhist why shouldn’t I? The only reason which stops me physically is that the respective religious authorities might tell me I cannot combine them, or that it might be impossible to carry out all their rituals because some got in the way of others.

Usually people have no problem about combining identities, and this, of course, is the basis of general politics as distinct from sectional identity politics. Often people don’t even bother to make the choice between identities, either because nobody asks them, or because it’s too complicated. When inhabitants of the usa are asked to declare their ethnic origins, 54 per cent refuse or are unable to give an answer. In short, exclusive identity politics do not come naturally to people. It is more likely to be forced upon them from outside—in the way in which Serb, Croat and Muslim inhabitants of Bosnia who lived together, socialized and intermarried, have been forced to separate, or in less brutal ways.

The third thing to say is that identities, or their expression, are not fixed, even supposing you have opted for one of your many potential selves, the way Michael Portillo has opted for being British instead of Spanish. They shift around and can change, if need be more than once. For instance non-ethnic groups, all or most of whose members happen to be black or Jewish, may turn into consciously ethnic groups. This happened to the Southern Christian Baptist Church under Martin Luther King. The opposite is also possible, as when the Official ira turned itself from a Fenian nationalist into a class organization, which is now the Workers’ Party and part of the Irish Republic’s government coalition.

The fourth and last thing to say about identity is that it depends on the context, which may change. We can all think of paid-up, card-carrying members of the gay community in the Oxbridge of the 1920s who, after the slump of 1929 and the rise of Hitler, shifted, as they liked to say, from Homintern to Comintern. Burgess and Blunt, as it were, transferred their gayness from the public to the private sphere. Or, consider the case of the Protestant German classical scholar, Pater, a professor of Classics in London, who suddenly discovered, after Hitler, that he had to emigrate, because, by Nazi standards, he was actually Jewish—a fact of which until that moment, he was unaware. However he had defined himself previously, he now had to find a different identity.

O universalismo da esquerda

What has all this to do with the Left? Identity groups were certainly not central to the Left. Basically, the mass social and political movements of the Left, that is, those inspired by the American and French revolutions and socialism, were indeed coalitions or group alliances, but held together not by aims that were specific to the group, but by great, universal causes through which each group believed its particular aims could be realized: democracy, the Republic, socialism, communism or whatever. Our own Labour Party in its great days was both the party of a class and, among other things, of the minority nations and immigrant communities of mainland Britainians. It was all this, because it was a party of equality and social justice.

Let us not misunderstand its claim to be essentially class-based. The political labour and socialist movements were not, ever, anywhere, movements essentially confined to the proletariat in the strict Marxist sense. Except perhaps in Britain, they could not have become such vast movements as they did, because in the 1880s and 1890s, when mass labour and socialist parties suddenly appeared on the scene, like fields of bluebells in spring, the industrial working class in most countries was a fairly small minority, and in any case a lot of it remained outside socialist labour organization. Remember that by the time of World War i the social-democrats polled between 30 and 47 per cent of the electorate in countries like Denmark, Sweden and Finland, which were hardly industrialized, as well as in Germany. (The highest percentage of votes ever achieved by the Labour Party in this country, in 1951, was 48 per cent.) Furthermore, the socialist case for the centrality of the workers in their movement was not a sectional case. Trade unions pursued the sectional interests of wage-earners, but one of the reasons why the relations between labour and socialist parties and the unions associated with them, were never without problems, was precisely that the aims of the movement were wider than those of the unions. The socialist argument was not just that most people were ‘workers by hand or brain’ but that the workers were the necessary historic agency for changing society. So, whoever you were, if you wanted the future, you would have to go with the workers’ movement.

Conversely, when the labour movement became narrowed down to nothing but a pressure-group or a sectional movement of industrial workers, as in 1970s Britain, it lost both the capacity to be the potential centre of a general people’s mobilization and the general hope of the future. Militant ‘economist’ trade unionism antagonized the people not directly involved in it to such an extent that it gave Thatcherite Toryism its most convincing argument—and the justification for turning the traditional ‘one-nation’ Tory Party into a force for waging militant class-war. What is more, this proletarian identity politics not only isolated the working class, but also split it by setting groups of workers against each other.

O que tem, então, a política de identidade a ver com a esquerda? Permitam que o diga com firmeza o que nem deveria ser necessário dizer: o projeto político da esquerda é universalista, é para todos os seres humanos. Independentemente da forma como interpretamos estas palavras, não se trata de liberdade para acionistas ou para negros, mas para todos. Não se trata de igualdade para todos os membros do Garrick Club ou para as pessoas com deficiência, mas para todos. Não se trata de fraternidade apenas para os velhos etonianos ou para os gays, mas para todos. E a política de identidade serve, no essencial, apenas para os membros de um grupo específico, e não para todos. Isto é perfeitamente evidente no caso dos movimentos étnicos ou nacionalistas. O nacionalismo sionista judaico, simpatizemos ou não com ele, se centra exclusivamente nos judeus, e não reage, ou melhor bombardeia, o resto. Todos os nacionalismos são exclusivistas. A afirmação nacionalista que sustenta que o que se defende é o direito à autodeterminação para todos é enganosa.

That is why the Left cannot base itself on identity politics. It has a wider agenda. For the Left, Ireland was, historically, one, but only one, out of the many exploited, oppressed and victimized sets of human beings for which it fought. For the ira kind of nationalism, the Left was, and is, only one possible ally in the fight for its objectives in certain situations. In others it was ready to bid for the support of Hitler as some of its leaders did during World War ii. And this applies to every group which makes identity politics its foundation, ethnic or otherwise.

Now the wider agenda of the Left does, of course, mean it supports many identity groups, at least some of the time, and they, in turn look to the Left. Indeed, some of these alliances are so old and so close that the Left is surprised when they come to an end, as people are surprised when marriages break up after a lifetime. In the usa it almost seems against nature that the ‘ethnics’—that is, the groups of poor mass immigrants and their descendants—no longer vote almost automatically for the Democratic Party. It seems almost incredible that a black American could even consider standing for the Presidency of the usa as a Republican (I am thinking of Colin Powell). And yet, the common interest of Irish, Italian, Jewish and black Americans in the Democratic Party did not derive from their particular ethnicities, even though realistic politicians paid their respects to these. What united them was the hunger for equality and social justice, and a programme believed capable of advancing both.

O interesse comum

Mas isto é precisamente o que tanta gente da esquerda esquece, à medida em que se submerge nas águas profundas da política de identidade. Tem havido, desde a década de 1970, uma tendência - uma tendência crescente - para ver a esquerda essencialmente como uma coligação de grupos e interesses minoritários: de raça, gênero, preferências e estilos de vida sexuais e culturais e até mesmo de minorias econômicas, como veio a ser a antiga classe trabalhadora industrial que antes se ocupava das tarefas sujas. Isto é compreensível mas perigoso, tanto mais que ganhar maiorias não é a mesma coisa que somar minorias.

Em primeiro lugar, deixe-me repetir: os grupos identitários vivem centrados em si próprios, para si próprios, e para mais ninguém. Uma coligação desses grupos que não se mantenha através de um conjunto comum de objetivos ou valores não terá mais do que uma unidade ad hoc, um pouco como os estados aliados temporariamente em guerra contra um inimigo comum. Se separam quando já não têm necessidade de estar juntos. Em qualquer caso, como grupos de identidade, não têm um compromisso com a esquerda como tal, mas se limitam a obter apoios para seus próprios objetivos sempre que podem. Pensamos na emancipação das mulheres como una causa intimamente associada à esquerda, como tem sido sem dúvida desde a origem do socialismo, mesmo antes de Marx e Engels. No entanto, historicamente, o movimento sufragista britânico anterior a 1914 era um movimento dos três partidos, e a primeira mulher que chegou a ser membro do parlamento pertencia, como sabemos, ao Partido Conservador. [9]

Secondly, whatever their rhetoric, the actual movements and organizations of identity politics mobilize only minorities, at any rate before they acquire the power of coercion and law. National feeling may be universal, but, to the best of my knowledge, no secessionist nationalist party in democratic states has so far ever got the votes of the majority of its constituency (though the Québecois last autumn came close—but then their nationalists were careful not actually to demand complete secession in so many words). I do not say it cannot or will not happen—only that the safest way to get national independence by secession so far has been not to ask populations to vote for it until you already have it first by other means.

That, by the way, makes two pragmatic reasons to be against identity politics. Without such outside compulsion or pressure, under normal circumstances it hardly ever mobilizes more than a minority—even of the target group. Hence, attempts to form separate political women’s parties have not been very effective ways of mobilizing the women’s vote. The other reason is that forcing people to take on one, and only one, identity divides them from each other. It therefore isolates these minorities.

Consequently to commit a general movement to the specific demands of minority pressure groups, which are not necessarily even those of their constituencies, is to ask for trouble. This is much more obvious in the usa, where the backlash against positive discrimination in favour of particular minorities, and the excesses of multiculturalism, is now very powerful; but the problem exists here also.

Hoje, quer a Direita quer a Esquerda estão sobrecarregadas de políticas da identidade. Infelizmente, o perigo de desintegração numa pura aliança de minorias é enorme à Esquerda, visto que o declínio dos grandes lemas universalistas do Iluminismo, que foram essencialmente lemas da esquerda, deixa-a sem qualquer forma óbvia de formular um interesse comum entre os limites seccionais. O único entre os denominados "novos movimentos sociais" que traspassa todas estas fronteiras é o ecologista. Mas, infelizmente, seu atrativo político é limitado e provavelmente continuará a sê-lo.

However, there is one form of identity politics which is actually comprehensive, inasmuch as it is based on a common appeal, at least within the confines of a single state: citizen nationalism. Seen in the global perspective this may be the opposite of a universal appeal, but seen in the perspective of the national state, which is where most of us still live, and are likely to go on living, it provides a common identity, or in Benedict Anderson’s phrase, ‘an imagined community’ not the less real for being imagined. The Right, especially the Right in government, has always claimed to monopolize this and can usually still manipulate it. Even Thatcherism, the grave-digger of ‘one-nation Toryism’, did it. Even its ghostly and dying successor, Major’s government, hopes to avoid electoral defeat by damning its opponents as unpatriotic.

Por que, então, tem sido tão difícil para a esquerda, e sem dúvida para a esquerda dos países de língua inglesa, ver-se como representante de toda a nação? (Aqui evidentemente me refiro à nação como comunidade de indivíduos de um país, não como entidade étnica.) Por que tem sido tão difícil até mesmo tentar? Afinal, as origens da esquerda europeia remontam ao momento em que uma classe, ou uma aliança de classes, o Terceiro Estado dos Estados Gerais franceses de 1789, decidiu declarar-se "a nação", contra a minoria da classe governante, criando assim o próprio conceito de "nação" política. Afinal, inclusive Marx previa uma transformação desse tipo no Manifesto Comunista [10]. Na verdade podemos ir mais além. Todd Gitlin, um dos melhores observadores da esquerda norte-americana, colocou de forma dramática em seu novo livro, The Twilight of Common Dreams: ‘O que é uma Esquerda se não for, pelo menos de um modo plausível, a voz de todo o povo?... Se não houver povo mas apenas povos, não há Esquerda.’ [11]

A voz abafada do Novo Trabalhismo

Houve épocas em que a esquerda não só queria ser a nação, mas que foi aceita como representante do interesse nacional, inclusive por aqueles que não tinham especial simpatia por suas aspirações: nos Estados Unidos, quando o Partido Democrata rooseveltiano desfrutava de hegemonia política, na Escandinávia desde princípios da década de 1930. De modo mais geral, quando terminou a Segunda Guerra Mundial, a esquerda representava a nação no sentido mais literal quase em toda a Europa, porque representava a resistência e a vitória contra Hitler e seus aliados. Daí a singular união entre o patriotismo e a transformação social, que dominou a política europeia imediatamente depois de 1945. O mesmo aconteceu na Grã Bretanha, onde 1945 foi um plebiscito em favor do Partido Trabalhista como partido que melhor representava a nação, frente ao conservadorismo de toda uma nação, capitaneado pelo dirigente do período de guerra mais carismático e vitorioso da cena política. O qual marcou o rumo dos próximos trinta e cinco anos da história do país. Muito mais recentemente, François Mitterrand, um político sem um compromisso natural com a esquerda, optou por presidir o Partido Socialista como a melhor plataforma para exercer a liderança sobre toda a população francesa.

One would have thought that today was another moment when the British Left could claim to speak for Britain—that is to say all the people—against a discredited, decrepit and demoralized regime. And yet, how rarely are the words ‘the country’, ‘Great Britain’, ‘the nation’, ‘patriotism’, even ‘the people’ heard in the pre-election rhetoric of those who hope to become the next government of the United Kingdom!

It has been suggested that this is because, unlike 1945 and 1964, ‘neither the politician nor his public has anything but a modest belief in the capacity of government to do very much’. [10] If that is why Labour speaks to and about the nation in so muffled a voice, it is trebly absurd. First, because if citizens really think that government can’t do very much, why should they bother to vote for one lot rather than the other, or for that matter for any lot? Second, because government, that is to say the management of the state in the public interest, is indispensable and will remain so. Even the ideologues of the mad Right, who dream of replacing it by the universal sovereign market, need it to establish their utopia, or rather dystopia. And insofar as they succeed, as in much of the ex-socialist world, the backlash against the market brings back into politics those who want the state to return to social responsibility. In 1995, five years after abandoning their old state with joy and enthusiasm, two thirds of East Germans think that life and conditions in the old gdr were better than the ‘negative descriptions and reports’ in today’s German media, and 70 per cent think ‘the idea of socialism was good, but we had incompetent politicians’. And, most unanswerably, because in the past seventeen years we have lived under governments which believed that government has enormous power, which have used that power actually to change our country decisively for the worse, and which, in their dying days are still trying to do so, and to con us into the belief that what one government has done is irreversible by another. The state will not go away. It is the business of government to use it.

Government is not just about getting elected and then re-elected. This is a process which, in democratic politics, implies enormous quantities of lying in all its forms. Elections become contests in fiscal perjury. Unfortunately, politicians, who have as short a time-horizon as journalists, find it hard to see politics as other than a permanent campaigning season. Yet there is something beyond. There lies what government does and must do.There is the future of the country. There are the hopes and fears of the people as a whole—not just ‘the community’, which is an ideological cop-out, or the sum-total of earners and spenders (the ‘taxpayers’ of political jargon), but the British people, the sort of collective which would be ready to cheer the victory of any British team in the World Cup, if it hadn’t lost the hope that there might still be such a thing. For not the least symptom of the decline of Britain, with the decline of science, is the decline of British team sports.

It was Mrs Thatcher’s strength, that she recognized this dimension of politics. She saw herself leading a people ‘who thought we could no longer do the great things we once did’—I quote her words—‘those who believed our decline was irreversible, that we could never again be what we were’. [11] She was not like other politicians, inasmuch as she recognized the need to offer hope and action to a puzzled and demoralized people. A false hope, perhaps, and certainly the wrong kind of action, but enough to let her sweep aside opposition within her party as well as outside, and change the country and destroy so much of it. The failure of her project is now manifest. Our decline as a nation has not been halted. As a people we are more troubled, more demoralized than in 1979, and we know it. Only those who alone can form the post-Tory government are themselves too demoralized and frightened by failure and defeat, to offer anything except the promise not to raise taxes. We may win the next general election that way and I hope we will, though the Tories will not fight the election campaign primarily on taxes, but on British Unionism, English nationalism, xenophobia and the Union Jack, and in doing so will catch us off balance. Will those who have elected us really believe we shall make much difference? And what will we do if they merely elect us, shrugging their shoulders as they do so? We will have created the New Labour Party. Will we make the same effort to restore and transform Britain? There is still time to answer these questions.

Notas:

[1] Este é o texto da Barry Amiel and Norman Melburn Trust Lecture, pronunciada no Institut of Education de Londres, em 02 de maio de 1996.

[2] M.L. Pradelles de Latou, "Identity as a Complex Network", in C. Fried, ed., Minorities, Community and Identity, Berlin 1983, p. 79.

[3] Ibid. p. 91.

[4] Daniel Bell, "Ethnicity and Social Change", in Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds., Ethnicity: Theory and Experience, Cambridge, Mass. 1975, P. 171

[5] E.J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991, London 1994, p. 428.

[6] O. Patterson, "Implications of Ethnic Identification" in Fried, ed., Minorities: Community and Identity, pp. 28-29. O. Patterson, "Implications of Ethnic Identification" in Fried, ed., Minorities: Community and Identity, pp. 28-29.

[7] O. Patterson, "Implications of Ethnic Identification" in Fried, ed., Minorities: Community and Identity, pp. 28-29.

[8] Jihang Park, "The British Suffrage Activists of 1913", Past & Present, no. 120, August 1988, pp. 156-7.

[9] "Mas, porque o proletariado deve em primeiro lugar conquistar o poder político, elevar-se à condição de classe nacional, constituir-se em nação, ainda é nacional, embora de modo algum no sentido burguês"; Karl Marx e Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto, 1848, II parte. Na edição original (alemã) aparece o termo "classe nacional"; na tradução inglesa de 1888 figura como "a classe que lidera a nação".

[10] Gitlin, The Twilight of Common Dreams, New York 1995, p. 165.

[11] Hugo Young, "No Waves in the Clear Blue Water", The Guardian, 23 April 1996, p. 13.

[12] Citado em Eric Hobsbawm, Politics for a Rational Left, Verso, London 1989, p. 54.

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