Dan Smith
Jacobin
 |
| O secretário do Tesouro dos EUA, Henry Morgenthau Jr., fala na Conferência de Bretton Woods de 1944, que estabeleceu o Fundo Monetário Internacional. |
Resenha de The Meddlers: Sovereignty, Empire, and the Birth of Global Economic Governance por Jamie Martin (Harvard University Press, 2022)
Como as instituições econômicas internacionais justificam a intromissão em estados soberanos? Como Jamie Martin argumenta em seu novo livro, The Meddlers: Sovereignty, Empire, and the Birth of Global Economic Governance, não é com a linguagem de “coerção”, mas de “cooperação”.
The Meddlers traça a história da violação ocidental nas economias de estados soberanos não ocidentais e as origens das instituições que governam a economia global hoje. Embora mais frequentemente associado a órgãos como o Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) e o Banco Mundial, como argumenta Martin, o Ocidente começou a criar uma economia global estruturada de acordo com seus interesses bem antes da Segunda Guerra Mundial.
Vale a pena levar a sério o relato de Martin, e não apenas porque nos permite expor a retórica de cooperação e desenvolvimento que justifica uma ordem internacional exploradora e desigual. De fato, para desafiar o capitalismo em nível local e nacional, precisamos entender como a classe capitalista organiza e projeta seu poder internacionalmente.
Weaponized Finance
The book’s discussion of the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) is of particular interest. Created in spring of 1930, the BIS went on to become a template for later institutions. Louis McFadden, a Republican representative from Pennsylvania, called it a “financial League of Nations.” Indeed, according to its most committed supporters, thanks to the BIS, there “would be no need of soldiers nor ships of war. The world bank, and the world’s banking system alone, could keep the peace.”
The BIS did not exactly achieve this goal. Nor did it intervene to help distressed countries stabilize their economies or lend money to assist with economic development. It was instead a central bank of central banks, with the ability to impinge upon sovereign nations’ monetary policy. Following World War II, the same great powers set up the IMF and World Bank to carry out the functions that were outside of the BIS’s remit, including lending.
Martin’s point is that these programs were always designed as extensions of Western economic power. The BIS ensured that central banks around the world aligned their monetary policies with those preferred by the West, while the IMF and World Bank issued loans with conditions that would guarantee unequal global development. Meanwhile, the cartels dominating commodity markets set prices regardless of the interests of workers or poorer nations.
Although the IMF and World Bank have perfected the art of lending money with onerous conditions, this practice also predated World War II. What has changed, however, is that over time, the conditions attached to these loans have become more burdensome. “Structural adjustment” conditions attached to loans — which only apply to borrower countries — have forced developing nations to liberalize markets, raise interest rates, impose austerity, and privatize state-owned enterprises.
Developing nations, in turn, have very little say over this. The IMF and World Bank boards are designed to ensure such nations remain marginal to the decision-making process. These practices are, as Martin argues, “an extension of financial statecraft with over a century of history.”
Indeed, in recent history, the IMF and World Bank have tightened their grip over the world economy. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, as well as the Asian financial crisis in the 1990s, the IMF issued a new slew of structural adjustment loans, extending neoliberalism into nations like Russia and Mexico. And during the pandemic, the IMF continued to attach conditions to loans, a practice that Martin argues it is unlikely to ever drop.
The point is that the world market was never free. Rather, it has been maintained by economic institutions that both rely on and uphold the geopolitical and economic dominance of the West.
Como as instituições econômicas internacionais justificam a intromissão em estados soberanos? Como Jamie Martin argumenta em seu novo livro, The Meddlers: Sovereignty, Empire, and the Birth of Global Economic Governance, não é com a linguagem de “coerção”, mas de “cooperação”.
The Meddlers traça a história da violação ocidental nas economias de estados soberanos não ocidentais e as origens das instituições que governam a economia global hoje. Embora mais frequentemente associado a órgãos como o Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) e o Banco Mundial, como argumenta Martin, o Ocidente começou a criar uma economia global estruturada de acordo com seus interesses bem antes da Segunda Guerra Mundial.
Vale a pena levar a sério o relato de Martin, e não apenas porque nos permite expor a retórica de cooperação e desenvolvimento que justifica uma ordem internacional exploradora e desigual. De fato, para desafiar o capitalismo em nível local e nacional, precisamos entender como a classe capitalista organiza e projeta seu poder internacionalmente.
Os primórdios da governança econômica global
1944 viu o nascimento de instituições de Bretton Woods, incluindo o FMI e o Banco Mundial. No entanto, apesar da fanfarra, eles, assim como outras estruturas econômicas do pós-guerra, representavam uma nova versão de uma antiga ambição de controle econômico global. De fato, como escreve Martin, mesmo antes da Primeira Guerra Mundial, os impérios europeus haviam “aperfeiçoado a arte de se intrometer nos assuntos dos outros sem precisar colonizá-los formalmente”.
Após a guerra, a Liga das Nações teve um papel ativo na abertura das economias dos antigos impérios Habsburgo e Otomano à exploração internacional. Outras crises econômicas, como a Grande Depressão, fizeram com que outros estados-nação pedissem ajuda à Liga, trocando soberania por empréstimos e outras assistências. Por exemplo, no início da década de 1930, a Liga removeu o controle da China sobre seus próprios níveis de tarifas, desenvolvimento industrial e produção agrícola. Tudo isso foi feito, como argumentavam os defensores da nova ordem, em prol da estabilização financeira. O que eles eram menos propensos a admitir era que os impérios centrais privilegiavam a estabilidade econômica global sobre a estabilidade interna de suas colônias.
Como explica Martin, outras instituições econômicas do pós-guerra foram estabelecidas na década de 1930 ou foram inspiradas por outras que já existiam. Por exemplo, a Comissão Internacional do Estanho (ITC) foi criada na esteira da Grande Depressão e, segundo Martin, foi uma das primeiras experiências de governança econômica global. Anteriormente, os cartéis britânicos dominavam o comércio global de estanho, resultado do controle do império britânico sobre as indústrias malaias de estanho e borracha. Para o Reino Unido, essa foi uma vantagem significativa, dada a importância dessas commodities para os industriais automotivos como Harvey Firestone e Henry Ford. No entanto, a Grã-Bretanha concordou em ceder parte de sua soberania imperial ao ITC para estabilizar os preços do estanho após um colapso na demanda durante a Grande Depressão.
O ITC foi bem-sucedido e inspirou outros grupos internacionais, como a Organização dos Países Exportadores de Petróleo (OPEP), bem como cartéis que organizam os mercados globais de trigo, chá e café. Martin explica que, à medida que essas organizações passaram a governar o comércio de commodities-chave, substituindo a concorrência de mercado por conluio, cortaram a oferta para aumentar os preços das commodities. É assim que esses cartéis garantem estabilidade econômica e lucratividade para as nações ocidentais mais ricas e suas corporações, às custas das nações mais pobres onde as commodities geralmente são produzidas.
Weaponized Finance
The book’s discussion of the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) is of particular interest. Created in spring of 1930, the BIS went on to become a template for later institutions. Louis McFadden, a Republican representative from Pennsylvania, called it a “financial League of Nations.” Indeed, according to its most committed supporters, thanks to the BIS, there “would be no need of soldiers nor ships of war. The world bank, and the world’s banking system alone, could keep the peace.”
The BIS did not exactly achieve this goal. Nor did it intervene to help distressed countries stabilize their economies or lend money to assist with economic development. It was instead a central bank of central banks, with the ability to impinge upon sovereign nations’ monetary policy. Following World War II, the same great powers set up the IMF and World Bank to carry out the functions that were outside of the BIS’s remit, including lending.
Martin’s point is that these programs were always designed as extensions of Western economic power. The BIS ensured that central banks around the world aligned their monetary policies with those preferred by the West, while the IMF and World Bank issued loans with conditions that would guarantee unequal global development. Meanwhile, the cartels dominating commodity markets set prices regardless of the interests of workers or poorer nations.
Although the IMF and World Bank have perfected the art of lending money with onerous conditions, this practice also predated World War II. What has changed, however, is that over time, the conditions attached to these loans have become more burdensome. “Structural adjustment” conditions attached to loans — which only apply to borrower countries — have forced developing nations to liberalize markets, raise interest rates, impose austerity, and privatize state-owned enterprises.
Developing nations, in turn, have very little say over this. The IMF and World Bank boards are designed to ensure such nations remain marginal to the decision-making process. These practices are, as Martin argues, “an extension of financial statecraft with over a century of history.”
Indeed, in recent history, the IMF and World Bank have tightened their grip over the world economy. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, as well as the Asian financial crisis in the 1990s, the IMF issued a new slew of structural adjustment loans, extending neoliberalism into nations like Russia and Mexico. And during the pandemic, the IMF continued to attach conditions to loans, a practice that Martin argues it is unlikely to ever drop.
The point is that the world market was never free. Rather, it has been maintained by economic institutions that both rely on and uphold the geopolitical and economic dominance of the West.
Implications for Today
For Martin, the solution is neither a return to economic nationalism nor a root and branch transformation of the global economic system. As he concludes,
A retreat to nationalist policies is dangerously unsuitable for the global problems of the twenty-first century. But it is also clear that governing the world economy needs to be dramatically rethought if it is to be made fully compatible, for the first time, with real economic self-determination and democratic self-governance — and for all states, regardless of their histories of sovereignty and imagined standings in a hierarchical global order.
Martin argues for a worldwide safety net and an expansion of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which would give borrowing countries liquidity and security, but without conditions. He also argues that the institutions governing the world economy must include more non-US representatives or face systemic collapse. Nevertheless, while some of these proposals are supportable, they also indicate the biggest political limit of Meddlers. Despite the criticisms he raises, Martin accepts the existence of the institutions whose history he uncovers.
Yet, as Martin’s historical narrative makes clear, the capitalist classes of dominant Western economies built the World Trade Organization, IMF, World Bank, and BIS to extend their control over the globe. This is why, to fight back against neoliberalism effectively at the local level, it will be necessary to fight for a new, genuinely democratic international system.
Colaborador
Dan Smith é um estudante de pós-graduação que estuda história do trabalho e economia política internacional na Wayne State University.
Nenhum comentário:
Postar um comentário