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| Tucker Carlson fala em sua turnê ao vivo na Desert Diamond Arena em 31 de outubro de 2024, em Phoenix, Arizona. (Chip Somodevilla / Getty Images) |
Nas eleições de meio de mandato de 1994, os republicanos varreram o Congresso, conquistando a Câmara e o Senado, bem como a maioria das legislaturas e governos estaduais. Conservadores e liberais deram crédito ao rádio falado por "virar a maré" e os republicanos homenagearam Rush Limbaugh — então o rei do formato — declarando-o membro honorário da 104ª classe do Congresso. Uma década depois, em 2004, George W. Bush derrotou John Kerry e ganhou o voto popular com a ajuda da Fox News de Rupert Murdoch, que passou a dominar a televisão a cabo. Naquele ano, o veterano ativista conservador Richard Viguerie chamou a Fox de "uma das maiores histórias de sucesso do movimento [conservador]".
Na eleição de 2024, Donald Trump exerceu mais um meio de comunicação de massa que os conservadores conseguiram conquistar: podcasting e vídeo online. A impetuosa "estratégia de mídia alternativa" de Trump sobrecarregou Kamala Harris e o jogo de campo dos democratas, impulsionando o criminoso condenado e duas vezes acusado de volta à Casa Branca. Muitos na esquerda há muito romantizam a política local, mas nenhuma quantidade de batidas de porta em porta pode igualar o alcance dos influenciadores conservadores que constroem laços parassociais com os vizinhos e fornecem a eles, a cada dia, histórias poderosas que dão sentido à vida política.
Murdoch e Trump sempre tiveram uma teoria de poder centrada na mídia e, na maior parte, sua teoria provou estar correta. Com o declínio dos sindicatos e de tantas outras formas de vida cívica, as organizações de mídia preencheram o vazio e até usurparam algumas das funções tradicionais que os partidos políticos desempenhavam.
Antes que a poeira baixasse na manhã de 6 de novembro, um debate já havia começado sobre se os progressistas precisam de seu "próprio Joe Rogan". Essas não são as condições com as quais esperávamos ver tal debate se desenrolar, nem uma fixação em Joe Rogan é útil para determinar os termos desse debate. Mas é hora de encarar a realidade da força da mídia conservadora e a necessidade de construir um contrapoder da mídia de esquerda.
Somos acadêmicos que passamos anos estudando a mídia de direita e entrevistando aqueles que a consomem e produzem. Temos pouca simpatia por seu conteúdo ideológico, mas não podemos deixar de invejar como a direita passou décadas construindo uma esfera de mídia alternativa — uma com muitos pontos fortes que a esquerda não tem. Embora a esquerda tenha uma esfera vibrante de publicações, Substacks e podcasts de nicho, estes atendem predominantemente a um público já altamente engajado e com ensino superior. A direita, enquanto isso, dedicou muito mais esforço para atingir comunidades e públicos da classe trabalhadora além das elites conservadoras.
O impulso para investir em mídia progressista não é novo. Mesmo antes deste ciclo eleitoral, houve apelos concentrados para que doadores liberais redirecionassem alguns dos bilhões gastos em publicidade política para investimentos de longo prazo em mídia. Podemos estar agora em um ponto de inflexão. Dada a necessidade mais ampla do Partido Democrata — e das instituições progressistas em geral — de repensar a estratégia em resposta ao desalinhamento de classes, a mídia deve ser central nesta discussão.
No entanto, há uma armadilha potencial. O entusiasmo por combater o domínio da mídia conservadora pode levar a um investimento excessivo em plataformas de vídeo online que apenas amplificam as vozes progressistas existentes — essencialmente, uma MSNBC de nicho mais digital. Esses projetos podem atrair ativistas e doadores progressistas porque refletem sensibilidades estéticas e morais familiares, mas pouco fariam para expandir o alcance da esquerda.
Embora uma série de esforços de organização e mídia de centro-esquerda sejam necessários, uma coisa é certa: seria uma oportunidade perdida trágica se a esquerda não conseguisse construir um ecossistema de mídia que realmente falasse aos gostos e experiências da classe trabalhadora.
Persuasão da mídia como construção de laços culturais
Para construir um ecossistema de mídia que rivalize com a mídia de direita em alcance e impacto, os progressistas precisam de histórias comoventes e convincentes da vida pública que alcancem novos públicos. A política de esquerda deve ser apresentada de maneiras que tornem as experiências da classe trabalhadora centrais, usando uma narrativa dinâmica, acessível e envolvente. Essa mídia não pode ser chata ou excessivamente instável — ela deve falar em vernáculos populares com estilo e elegância. Mais do que apenas informar, ela deve criar caminhos para partidários fracos e caminhos não ideológicos para se sentirem conectados a uma comunidade de esquerda mais ampla. Esta é uma estratégia de movimento de mídia que é fundamentalmente orientada para a persuasão democrática.
There’s understandable disillusionment about persuasion today. People rarely change their minds — especially on big political questions — just because they are presented with “the better argument.” At the heart of media building, however, is a persuasion different in kind from the narrow notion of debaters’ talking points. As the Right’s best propagandists intuitively understand, much of the real persuasion happens before the policy debates even occur.
It is a game of creating long-term cultural and emotional bonds between media and audiences. This can happen through a political talk radio program, a Fox News morning show, or even ostensibly nonpolitical spaces. After all, some of those who appear to have been Trump’s most potent messengers this past election came from outside traditional news media — video game streamers, YouTube pranksters, anti-woke comedians, and mixed martial arts (MMA) fighters. When the moment for arguing Trump’s case arrived, vast portions of the online public were already pulling for the Right to win the exchange of ideas. The goal wasn’t just to win debates; it was to position Trump as the champion of pink- and blue-collar workers, farmers, multiracial small business owners, Christians, young men, and any other group the Right could claim to represent.
Na eleição de 2024, Donald Trump exerceu mais um meio de comunicação de massa que os conservadores conseguiram conquistar: podcasting e vídeo online. A impetuosa "estratégia de mídia alternativa" de Trump sobrecarregou Kamala Harris e o jogo de campo dos democratas, impulsionando o criminoso condenado e duas vezes acusado de volta à Casa Branca. Muitos na esquerda há muito romantizam a política local, mas nenhuma quantidade de batidas de porta em porta pode igualar o alcance dos influenciadores conservadores que constroem laços parassociais com os vizinhos e fornecem a eles, a cada dia, histórias poderosas que dão sentido à vida política.
Murdoch e Trump sempre tiveram uma teoria de poder centrada na mídia e, na maior parte, sua teoria provou estar correta. Com o declínio dos sindicatos e de tantas outras formas de vida cívica, as organizações de mídia preencheram o vazio e até usurparam algumas das funções tradicionais que os partidos políticos desempenhavam.
Antes que a poeira baixasse na manhã de 6 de novembro, um debate já havia começado sobre se os progressistas precisam de seu "próprio Joe Rogan". Essas não são as condições com as quais esperávamos ver tal debate se desenrolar, nem uma fixação em Joe Rogan é útil para determinar os termos desse debate. Mas é hora de encarar a realidade da força da mídia conservadora e a necessidade de construir um contrapoder da mídia de esquerda.
Somos acadêmicos que passamos anos estudando a mídia de direita e entrevistando aqueles que a consomem e produzem. Temos pouca simpatia por seu conteúdo ideológico, mas não podemos deixar de invejar como a direita passou décadas construindo uma esfera de mídia alternativa — uma com muitos pontos fortes que a esquerda não tem. Embora a esquerda tenha uma esfera vibrante de publicações, Substacks e podcasts de nicho, estes atendem predominantemente a um público já altamente engajado e com ensino superior. A direita, enquanto isso, dedicou muito mais esforço para atingir comunidades e públicos da classe trabalhadora além das elites conservadoras.
O impulso para investir em mídia progressista não é novo. Mesmo antes deste ciclo eleitoral, houve apelos concentrados para que doadores liberais redirecionassem alguns dos bilhões gastos em publicidade política para investimentos de longo prazo em mídia. Podemos estar agora em um ponto de inflexão. Dada a necessidade mais ampla do Partido Democrata — e das instituições progressistas em geral — de repensar a estratégia em resposta ao desalinhamento de classes, a mídia deve ser central nesta discussão.
No entanto, há uma armadilha potencial. O entusiasmo por combater o domínio da mídia conservadora pode levar a um investimento excessivo em plataformas de vídeo online que apenas amplificam as vozes progressistas existentes — essencialmente, uma MSNBC de nicho mais digital. Esses projetos podem atrair ativistas e doadores progressistas porque refletem sensibilidades estéticas e morais familiares, mas pouco fariam para expandir o alcance da esquerda.
Embora uma série de esforços de organização e mídia de centro-esquerda sejam necessários, uma coisa é certa: seria uma oportunidade perdida trágica se a esquerda não conseguisse construir um ecossistema de mídia que realmente falasse aos gostos e experiências da classe trabalhadora.
Persuasão da mídia como construção de laços culturais
Para construir um ecossistema de mídia que rivalize com a mídia de direita em alcance e impacto, os progressistas precisam de histórias comoventes e convincentes da vida pública que alcancem novos públicos. A política de esquerda deve ser apresentada de maneiras que tornem as experiências da classe trabalhadora centrais, usando uma narrativa dinâmica, acessível e envolvente. Essa mídia não pode ser chata ou excessivamente instável — ela deve falar em vernáculos populares com estilo e elegância. Mais do que apenas informar, ela deve criar caminhos para partidários fracos e caminhos não ideológicos para se sentirem conectados a uma comunidade de esquerda mais ampla. Esta é uma estratégia de movimento de mídia que é fundamentalmente orientada para a persuasão democrática.
There’s understandable disillusionment about persuasion today. People rarely change their minds — especially on big political questions — just because they are presented with “the better argument.” At the heart of media building, however, is a persuasion different in kind from the narrow notion of debaters’ talking points. As the Right’s best propagandists intuitively understand, much of the real persuasion happens before the policy debates even occur.
It is a game of creating long-term cultural and emotional bonds between media and audiences. This can happen through a political talk radio program, a Fox News morning show, or even ostensibly nonpolitical spaces. After all, some of those who appear to have been Trump’s most potent messengers this past election came from outside traditional news media — video game streamers, YouTube pranksters, anti-woke comedians, and mixed martial arts (MMA) fighters. When the moment for arguing Trump’s case arrived, vast portions of the online public were already pulling for the Right to win the exchange of ideas. The goal wasn’t just to win debates; it was to position Trump as the champion of pink- and blue-collar workers, farmers, multiracial small business owners, Christians, young men, and any other group the Right could claim to represent.
Aprendendo com a direita
The dominance of movement-conscious conservative media is not an accident — it is the result of decades of effort. Liberal and left millennials came of age politically in a world that Fox News created, making the prevalence of conservative media in their lives feels almost inevitable, as if it sprung organically from the reactionary bedrock of the country. But this perspective overlooks the deeper history of right-wing media — a history that is marked by more failures than successes in appealing to workers.
In the early 1990s, a wave of conservative TV ventures — now largely forgotten — attempted to establish a foothold. Newt Gingrich’s National Empowerment Television (NET) and other Fox prototypes assumed they would prosper simply by branding themselves as Republican and dishing out the good gospel of Reagan conservatism. Yet in hindsight, these efforts were hopelessly unentertaining — think right-wing PBS.
Why then did Fox succeed when past conservative media had failed? The standard explanation — that it simply catered to an underserved market of conservative ideologues — is wrong. The most successful right-wing media outlets —Limbaugh, Fox, Breitbart — did more than push ideology. They blended tabloid aesthetics, populist narratives, and “authentic” personalities to cultivate a loyal audience. More than just a news source, they presented themselves as champions of their viewers’ dignity, the only voices that truly respected their communities.
This was not a claim rooted in objective reality, but it was compelling because it largely went unchallenged. Beginning in the 1970s, mainstream media moved away from working-class audiences. Labor beats ended, newspapers curtailed delivery to less wealthy and less dense communities, and major news outlets shifted their focus to promotional efforts and lifestyle reporting designed for affluent readers. This trend was turbocharged by digital markets forcing news to rely on paying subscribers rather than advertisers. These pressures have intensified what scholar Victor Pickard describes as the tendency toward “informational redlining” endemic to market-based media systems.
Meanwhile, the Right invested in formats that appealed to working-class audiences: talk radio, tabloid-style cable news, and, later, online video. Once drawn in, viewers could be gradually pushed rightward. Recent research has shown that viewers are often initially attracted to conservative media not by ideology, but by style and tone — voice, aesthetics, relatability. Over time, they come to embrace its political narratives and ideological positions.
This isn’t a matter of “style over substance,” if by that we mean superficial flair overriding audiences’ critical faculties. Rather, style opens a path for substance. A conservative pundit or podcaster may first attract viewers or listeners with humor, a conversational tone, or an air of authenticity that contrasts with the scripted polish of corporate media. What develops is a bond. Once viewers or listeners identify with the voice behind the mic — once they believe he or she has goodwill toward people like them — they become more receptive to the influencer’s help in making sense of the confounding world of politics.
At the peak moment of the coconut tree memes, many liberals started to think of media power as a matter of blasting the internet with good vibes. Yes, vibes are important. But what makes the conservative media ecosystem influential in a sticky, durable way is not just virality or contagious affect. What really matters is when partisan media are able to influence common sense, speaking to inchoate frustrations and desires and offering overarching “deep stories” that frame the ongoing conflicts at the heart of political life.
Consider a conservative podcaster who draws in listeners with an approachable style. Emotionally gripping stories depict the people as under siege by them — elites who condescend and see the audience as trash. A curated set of claims and information (whether true or false) reinforces conservative positions as obvious, logical conclusions. Political loyalties and preferences take shape through these relationships.
As our in-depth interviews with conservative news consumers show, relationships with trusted media sources help guide how people make sense of the world. For instance, adopting nativist attitudes toward border restrictions doesn’t necessarily stem from animosity toward immigrants. Rather, it comes from reliance on conservative media voices to piece together the “truth” of the situation — border towns in chaos, cartels running ruthless trafficking operations, Democrats doing the bidding of corporations looking for cheap labor. Soon enough, some come to believe that “open border” policies are even inflicting suffering on aspiring immigrants themselves — duped by human traffickers and exploited by employers.
Building a Popular Media Front
So where are the left news voices telling different stories that are pitched to a variety of working- class communities? Voices that such communities can identify with and who speak in their familiar vernaculars? If you are college-educated and immersed in a progressive subculture, there are plenty of options. But where are the left media voices trying to make sense of politics for the Applebee’s manager in Trenton, the home health aide in Middle Tennessee, the sanitation worker in Staten Island, or the security guard in California’s Great Valley?
Left commentators have long chastised free-market conservatives for peddling a fictitious vision of America as a “classless” society (a criticism that is entirely warranted). Yet progressives often overlook class-based elements in our media analysis, as evidenced by the great underinvestment in media with different class-based market appeals. Progressives’ egalitarian rhetoric will ring hollow when the prevailing voice and aesthetic of its news channels cater overwhelmingly to college-educated professionals, the upper-middle class, and older voters.
Building a network of diverse and popular media voices in a left coalition will be key to enhancing the political capacity of progressives. It must challenge conservative media by competing directly for working-class audiences, telling stories about the world that speak to the tastes and experiences of working-class communities, both white and nonwhite, urban and rural.
This may sound like a Herculean task, but there are already promising efforts are already underway. A wide range of progressive influencers, radio hosts, and podcasters have made their mark with little support from established media or party figures. Consider progressive YouTube programs like Kyle Kulinski’s Secular Talk and Francesca Fiorentini’s The Bitchuation Room, to “bro” Twitch streamers like Hasan Piker, Twitter personality and self-described Appalachian bartender John Russell, or pro-union, trans-partisan, antiestablishment shows like Breaking Points.
Expanding and connecting this emerging media network will require collaboration and cooperation. Grassroots organizers can help discover and elevate talent — launching YouTube channels, building TikTok creator networks, and linking up with new outlets. Donors and investors can provide a key role too, providing the resources needed for both small- and large-scale media projects. Undoubtedly, both philanthropic and commercial markets present real disadvantages for left movement media. But that’s the terrain on which we must work for now, even if ultimately a much stronger public media is necessary for an informed democracy.
Additionally, political parties shouldn’t be afraid to engage with the diverse voices in their ranks. Democratic officials and candidates, in particular, need to put themselves out there and accept invites to do interviews with emerging progressive outlets — even when it may conflict with their own politics or pose some risks. Political parties play a critical role in promoting upstart media ventures. Republican leaders nourish and embrace even the most marginal sectors of the conservative media environment, whereas even the progressive wing of the Democratic Party has been hesitant to embrace independent left media.
To some extent, Democrats’ caution is understandable. Right-wing media figures pride themselves on proclaiming they are not lapdogs of the Republican Party. But despite this performance of autonomy, they reliably fall in line behind GOP nominees. Rush Limbaugh, for instance, was famously wooed into supporting George H. W. Bush over Pat Buchanan in 1992. Tucker Carlson has privately admitted that he “passionately” hates Donald Trump, but that’s not the tone he had taken on air. Democrats fear that independent left media, unlike its right-wing counterpart, won’t offer the same deference — and try to skewer them in ways conservative media never does to Republicans.
At the peak moment of the coconut tree memes, many liberals started to think of media power as a matter of blasting the internet with good vibes. Yes, vibes are important. But what makes the conservative media ecosystem influential in a sticky, durable way is not just virality or contagious affect. What really matters is when partisan media are able to influence common sense, speaking to inchoate frustrations and desires and offering overarching “deep stories” that frame the ongoing conflicts at the heart of political life.
Consider a conservative podcaster who draws in listeners with an approachable style. Emotionally gripping stories depict the people as under siege by them — elites who condescend and see the audience as trash. A curated set of claims and information (whether true or false) reinforces conservative positions as obvious, logical conclusions. Political loyalties and preferences take shape through these relationships.
As our in-depth interviews with conservative news consumers show, relationships with trusted media sources help guide how people make sense of the world. For instance, adopting nativist attitudes toward border restrictions doesn’t necessarily stem from animosity toward immigrants. Rather, it comes from reliance on conservative media voices to piece together the “truth” of the situation — border towns in chaos, cartels running ruthless trafficking operations, Democrats doing the bidding of corporations looking for cheap labor. Soon enough, some come to believe that “open border” policies are even inflicting suffering on aspiring immigrants themselves — duped by human traffickers and exploited by employers.
Building a Popular Media Front
So where are the left news voices telling different stories that are pitched to a variety of working- class communities? Voices that such communities can identify with and who speak in their familiar vernaculars? If you are college-educated and immersed in a progressive subculture, there are plenty of options. But where are the left media voices trying to make sense of politics for the Applebee’s manager in Trenton, the home health aide in Middle Tennessee, the sanitation worker in Staten Island, or the security guard in California’s Great Valley?
Left commentators have long chastised free-market conservatives for peddling a fictitious vision of America as a “classless” society (a criticism that is entirely warranted). Yet progressives often overlook class-based elements in our media analysis, as evidenced by the great underinvestment in media with different class-based market appeals. Progressives’ egalitarian rhetoric will ring hollow when the prevailing voice and aesthetic of its news channels cater overwhelmingly to college-educated professionals, the upper-middle class, and older voters.
Building a network of diverse and popular media voices in a left coalition will be key to enhancing the political capacity of progressives. It must challenge conservative media by competing directly for working-class audiences, telling stories about the world that speak to the tastes and experiences of working-class communities, both white and nonwhite, urban and rural.
This may sound like a Herculean task, but there are already promising efforts are already underway. A wide range of progressive influencers, radio hosts, and podcasters have made their mark with little support from established media or party figures. Consider progressive YouTube programs like Kyle Kulinski’s Secular Talk and Francesca Fiorentini’s The Bitchuation Room, to “bro” Twitch streamers like Hasan Piker, Twitter personality and self-described Appalachian bartender John Russell, or pro-union, trans-partisan, antiestablishment shows like Breaking Points.
Expanding and connecting this emerging media network will require collaboration and cooperation. Grassroots organizers can help discover and elevate talent — launching YouTube channels, building TikTok creator networks, and linking up with new outlets. Donors and investors can provide a key role too, providing the resources needed for both small- and large-scale media projects. Undoubtedly, both philanthropic and commercial markets present real disadvantages for left movement media. But that’s the terrain on which we must work for now, even if ultimately a much stronger public media is necessary for an informed democracy.
Additionally, political parties shouldn’t be afraid to engage with the diverse voices in their ranks. Democratic officials and candidates, in particular, need to put themselves out there and accept invites to do interviews with emerging progressive outlets — even when it may conflict with their own politics or pose some risks. Political parties play a critical role in promoting upstart media ventures. Republican leaders nourish and embrace even the most marginal sectors of the conservative media environment, whereas even the progressive wing of the Democratic Party has been hesitant to embrace independent left media.
To some extent, Democrats’ caution is understandable. Right-wing media figures pride themselves on proclaiming they are not lapdogs of the Republican Party. But despite this performance of autonomy, they reliably fall in line behind GOP nominees. Rush Limbaugh, for instance, was famously wooed into supporting George H. W. Bush over Pat Buchanan in 1992. Tucker Carlson has privately admitted that he “passionately” hates Donald Trump, but that’s not the tone he had taken on air. Democrats fear that independent left media, unlike its right-wing counterpart, won’t offer the same deference — and try to skewer them in ways conservative media never does to Republicans.
Saindo do Silo
An independent left media will not create the same controlled environment many Democrats and their patrons have come to rely on: paid advertisements, social media posts, and highly selective engagements with professional news. Hopefully, the 2024 election compels Democrats to move beyond these safe spaces. A vibrant left media sphere — with different strains of Democrats and leftists engaging in meaningful debate — would likely cool some of the animosity that festers when some views and communities are kept isolated. It might also counter factionalism and splintering across the left-of-center coalition.
The reluctance to engage new voices extends far beyond elected Democrats. Many progressives instinctively resist calls for outreach beyond the base. Some radicals cling to the fantasy that simply exposing more people to radical views will inspire a groundswell of support. Some wealthy backers may fear the unpredictable demands that new voices might introduce. Some activists fear that calls for “outreach” are just a coded push for moderation and tacking to the center. Given how often moderation is framed as the only path to grow a coalition, this skepticism is warranted. But building a left media sphere isn’t about compromising — it’s about forging new pathways to the Left.
The reluctance to engage new voices extends far beyond elected Democrats. Many progressives instinctively resist calls for outreach beyond the base. Some radicals cling to the fantasy that simply exposing more people to radical views will inspire a groundswell of support. Some wealthy backers may fear the unpredictable demands that new voices might introduce. Some activists fear that calls for “outreach” are just a coded push for moderation and tacking to the center. Given how often moderation is framed as the only path to grow a coalition, this skepticism is warranted. But building a left media sphere isn’t about compromising — it’s about forging new pathways to the Left.
Lançar valores de esquerda como o ponto final natural do pensamento racional e da empatia humana pode ser lisonjeiro para nossa autoimagem, mas sabemos que não é assim que funciona. Todos nós exercemos agência moral, é claro, mas não em condições que criamos. Todos nós precisamos de ajuda. Todos nós dependemos de redes sociais e fontes de mídia para ajudar a dar sentido ao mundo ao nosso redor. No momento, a maioria dos americanos não encontrará as histórias e argumentos que podem inspirar o comprometimento com projetos de esquerda. Precisamos lutar para mudar isso. Esse tipo de persuasão democrática exigirá esforço concentrado, implacável e criativo. A única coisa que temos a perder são nossos silos.
Colaboradores
Anthony Nadler é professor de estudos de mídia no Ursinus College e membro do Tow Center for Digital Journalism da Universidade de Columbia. Ele coeditou o News on the Right e publicou amplamente em veículos como o LA Review of Books, Columbia Journalism Review e n+1.
Reece Peck é professor associado no CUNY Graduate Center e autor de Fox Populism: Branding Conservatism as Working Class. Ele forneceu comentários para veículos como o New York Times, o Washington Post e a Vice TV.
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