Jude Blanchette
 |
| Presidente chinês Xi Jinping no Grande Salão do Povo, Pequim, março de 2025 Florence Lo / Reuters |
Em 2018, o líder chinês Xi Jinping argumentou que o mundo estava passando por "mudanças profundas nunca vistas em um século", um conceito que desde então se tornou central para a visão de mundo geopolítica de Pequim. A frase evocou paralelos com as mudanças globais dramáticas que se seguiram à Primeira Guerra Mundial, incluindo o colapso dos impérios europeus e a reorganização da política internacional. Hoje, Pequim percebe uma transformação sísmica semelhante, desta vez impulsionada por avanços tecnológicos acelerados — em inteligência artificial, biotecnologia e computação quântica — juntamente com a crescente volatilidade na política interna dos EUA e da Europa, e uma mudança econômica pronunciada em direção à região da Ásia-Pacífico, em grande parte impulsionada pelo rápido desenvolvimento da própria China.
Em 2018, a análise de Xi pode ter parecido prematura. Hoje, sua visão parece cada vez mais precisa. O governo Trump lançou guerras comerciais com seus principais parceiros econômicos. O maior conflito da Europa desde a Segunda Guerra Mundial continua na Ucrânia, com a perspectiva de uma paz duradoura frágil e incerta. A aliança transatlântica está se esforçando sob o peso do desdém explícito do presidente dos EUA, Donald Trump, pela União Europeia. Enquanto isso, os desenvolvimentos em IA e outras tecnologias emergentes ameaçam derrubar economias, sociedades e estruturas de poder geopolítico de maneiras sem precedentes e irreversíveis.
A questão agora é se Pequim pode explorar a incerteza global para promover seus interesses com os Estados Unidos e a Europa — ou se perderá terreno em meio à turbulência. O relacionamento EUA-China, em teoria, poderia se estabilizar por meio de uma "grande barganha" entre Xi e Trump, o que poderia reduzir as tensões em questões comerciais e militares. Mas a desconfiança arraigada entre os dois lados significa que tal acordo — se der certo — corre o risco de entrar em colapso em uma rivalidade entre grandes potências. Na Europa, Pequim vê novas oportunidades para reparar seus relacionamentos, pois a abordagem antagônica de Trump enfraquece a coesão transatlântica e as discussões de paz provisórias na Ucrânia aumentam a perspectiva de maior estabilidade regional. No entanto, os líderes europeus continuam relutantes em se voltar decisivamente para a China. E se as negociações de paz na Ucrânia fracassarem, um conflito renovado forçaria Pequim a uma escolha desconfortável entre suas ambições econômicas europeias e seu alinhamento com a Rússia sob o presidente Vladimir Putin.
Em 2018, a análise de Xi pode ter parecido prematura. Hoje, sua visão parece cada vez mais precisa. O governo Trump lançou guerras comerciais com seus principais parceiros econômicos. O maior conflito da Europa desde a Segunda Guerra Mundial continua na Ucrânia, com a perspectiva de uma paz duradoura frágil e incerta. A aliança transatlântica está se esforçando sob o peso do desdém explícito do presidente dos EUA, Donald Trump, pela União Europeia. Enquanto isso, os desenvolvimentos em IA e outras tecnologias emergentes ameaçam derrubar economias, sociedades e estruturas de poder geopolítico de maneiras sem precedentes e irreversíveis.
A questão agora é se Pequim pode explorar a incerteza global para promover seus interesses com os Estados Unidos e a Europa — ou se perderá terreno em meio à turbulência. O relacionamento EUA-China, em teoria, poderia se estabilizar por meio de uma "grande barganha" entre Xi e Trump, o que poderia reduzir as tensões em questões comerciais e militares. Mas a desconfiança arraigada entre os dois lados significa que tal acordo — se der certo — corre o risco de entrar em colapso em uma rivalidade entre grandes potências. Na Europa, Pequim vê novas oportunidades para reparar seus relacionamentos, pois a abordagem antagônica de Trump enfraquece a coesão transatlântica e as discussões de paz provisórias na Ucrânia aumentam a perspectiva de maior estabilidade regional. No entanto, os líderes europeus continuam relutantes em se voltar decisivamente para a China. E se as negociações de paz na Ucrânia fracassarem, um conflito renovado forçaria Pequim a uma escolha desconfortável entre suas ambições econômicas europeias e seu alinhamento com a Rússia sob o presidente Vladimir Putin.
Embora uma diplomacia cuidadosa possa deixar a China embolsar alguns sucessos táticos de curto prazo, não importa como Pequim jogue suas cartas, a dificuldade de conquistar os Estados Unidos e a Europa profundamente desconfiados torna improvável que Pequim alcance ganhos estratégicos duradouros em qualquer relacionamento. É no resto do mundo — na América Latina, África e Ásia — que a China tem mais probabilidade de colher os benefícios diplomáticos da retração dos EUA.
DEAL OR NO DEAL?
Forecasting the course of the second Trump administration’s relationship with Beijing is a tricky business, thanks to the mixed and often contradictory signals sent by Trump and his team. Trump’s cabinet features prominent figures, such as National Security Adviser Mike Waltz and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who, if given autonomy, would likely pursue intensified competition with China through measures such as tougher technology export controls and investment restrictions on Chinese firms, particularly in sensitive sectors such as AI and semiconductors. Before joining the administration, these officials supported increases in defense spending, a bolstered U.S. military presence in the Indo-Pacific, and cooperation with partners and allies to counter China’s growing influence. Several administration officials have also supported greater U.S. diplomatic and military backing for Taiwan, and some may be inclined to put political pressure on the Chinese Communist Party by highlighting human rights abuses in Xinjiang and Hong Kong and shortcomings in the party’s domestic governance. In effect, they advocate a continuation of the highly competitive approach that prevailed in the latter half of Trump’s first presidency.
Yet Trump himself has more idiosyncratic views on China. On the campaign trail last year, he called for a 60 percent tariff rate on Chinese imports, and since taking office, he has placed tariffs totaling 20 percent on Chinese goods, with the possibility of more on the way after a comprehensive trade review is concluded in early April. The Trump administration has unveiled its sweeping (if still aspirational) “America First Investment Policy,” which would scale back Chinese investment in the United States and U.S. investment in China. But Trump has also extolled his personal relationship with Xi, saying just after his second inauguration, “I like President Xi very much. I’ve always liked him.” One of Trump’s first acts after returning to office was to direct the Justice Department not to enforce a law banning the social media app TikTok in the United States until its Chinese parent company, ByteDance, sells it to a U.S. entity. He has also said that he would welcome more Chinese investment in the United States, making him one of the sole elected officials to take such a stance publicly.
Trump’s recent claim that he plans to meet with Xi in the “not too distant future” seemingly presents Beijing with an opportunity. A potential grand bargain with the Trump administration might entail a substantial reduction in, or even a cessation of, U.S. tariffs, an easing of U.S. export controls on advanced technology, and expanded Chinese investments in key U.S. sectors. Such an arrangement would offer Beijing significant economic relief, reduced geopolitical tensions, and greater bilateral stability. And given Trump’s previous criticisms of Taipei—such as his accusation that Taiwan “stole” the U.S. semiconductor industry—and his aversion to foreign entanglements, he might even be amenable to negotiating concessions on Taiwan. In Beijing’s eyes, Trump’s eagerness to improve relations with Putin, his antagonism toward traditional U.S. allies, and his apparent disregard for the domestic political repercussions of his trade war show that he is far less constrained by the traditional boundaries of U.S. foreign policy than previous leaders have been.
At the same time, many things could derail a grand bargain before it materializes. Although Trump’s transactional and erratic approach offers short-term tactical openings to Beijing, any deal that Trump signs will be inherently unstable. For one, China may not be able to hold up its end of any bargain. If Trump makes maximalist economic demands on rebalancing trade, dialing back China’s industrial subsidies, or revaluing the yuan, China will find it difficult to follow through on such commitments, if it agrees to them at all. On the U.S. side, Trump’s unpredictable policy shifts, erratic negotiating style, and uncertain domestic political standing mean that any agreement reached might unravel before it can be implemented. A similar story played out in Trump’s first term. Chinese officials initially underestimated Trump's willingness to escalate economic tensions, dismissing his threats as mere campaign rhetoric. Then, when Trump imposed tariffs on Chinese goods in late 2019, Beijing found itself scrambling to respond, eventually settling for limited concessions in the Phase One trade deal in early 2020. But even those modest gains quickly evaporated amid the COVID-19 pandemic, as Trump blamed China for the outbreak and allowed his subordinates wide latitude to pursue aggressive policies toward Beijing.
Furthermore, if China fails to reach a deal with Trump on trade and tariffs, that will likely end the prospects for a quasi-détente, as Beijing will not have a chance to move on to other issues. Without a deal in the near term, China hawks in Trump’s administration will likely have an opening to push hard against Beijing, leading to tougher sanctions, broader technology export restrictions, intensified military posturing in the Indo-Pacific, and stronger diplomatic support for Taiwan.
Forecasting the course of the second Trump administration’s relationship with Beijing is a tricky business, thanks to the mixed and often contradictory signals sent by Trump and his team. Trump’s cabinet features prominent figures, such as National Security Adviser Mike Waltz and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who, if given autonomy, would likely pursue intensified competition with China through measures such as tougher technology export controls and investment restrictions on Chinese firms, particularly in sensitive sectors such as AI and semiconductors. Before joining the administration, these officials supported increases in defense spending, a bolstered U.S. military presence in the Indo-Pacific, and cooperation with partners and allies to counter China’s growing influence. Several administration officials have also supported greater U.S. diplomatic and military backing for Taiwan, and some may be inclined to put political pressure on the Chinese Communist Party by highlighting human rights abuses in Xinjiang and Hong Kong and shortcomings in the party’s domestic governance. In effect, they advocate a continuation of the highly competitive approach that prevailed in the latter half of Trump’s first presidency.
Yet Trump himself has more idiosyncratic views on China. On the campaign trail last year, he called for a 60 percent tariff rate on Chinese imports, and since taking office, he has placed tariffs totaling 20 percent on Chinese goods, with the possibility of more on the way after a comprehensive trade review is concluded in early April. The Trump administration has unveiled its sweeping (if still aspirational) “America First Investment Policy,” which would scale back Chinese investment in the United States and U.S. investment in China. But Trump has also extolled his personal relationship with Xi, saying just after his second inauguration, “I like President Xi very much. I’ve always liked him.” One of Trump’s first acts after returning to office was to direct the Justice Department not to enforce a law banning the social media app TikTok in the United States until its Chinese parent company, ByteDance, sells it to a U.S. entity. He has also said that he would welcome more Chinese investment in the United States, making him one of the sole elected officials to take such a stance publicly.
Trump’s recent claim that he plans to meet with Xi in the “not too distant future” seemingly presents Beijing with an opportunity. A potential grand bargain with the Trump administration might entail a substantial reduction in, or even a cessation of, U.S. tariffs, an easing of U.S. export controls on advanced technology, and expanded Chinese investments in key U.S. sectors. Such an arrangement would offer Beijing significant economic relief, reduced geopolitical tensions, and greater bilateral stability. And given Trump’s previous criticisms of Taipei—such as his accusation that Taiwan “stole” the U.S. semiconductor industry—and his aversion to foreign entanglements, he might even be amenable to negotiating concessions on Taiwan. In Beijing’s eyes, Trump’s eagerness to improve relations with Putin, his antagonism toward traditional U.S. allies, and his apparent disregard for the domestic political repercussions of his trade war show that he is far less constrained by the traditional boundaries of U.S. foreign policy than previous leaders have been.
At the same time, many things could derail a grand bargain before it materializes. Although Trump’s transactional and erratic approach offers short-term tactical openings to Beijing, any deal that Trump signs will be inherently unstable. For one, China may not be able to hold up its end of any bargain. If Trump makes maximalist economic demands on rebalancing trade, dialing back China’s industrial subsidies, or revaluing the yuan, China will find it difficult to follow through on such commitments, if it agrees to them at all. On the U.S. side, Trump’s unpredictable policy shifts, erratic negotiating style, and uncertain domestic political standing mean that any agreement reached might unravel before it can be implemented. A similar story played out in Trump’s first term. Chinese officials initially underestimated Trump's willingness to escalate economic tensions, dismissing his threats as mere campaign rhetoric. Then, when Trump imposed tariffs on Chinese goods in late 2019, Beijing found itself scrambling to respond, eventually settling for limited concessions in the Phase One trade deal in early 2020. But even those modest gains quickly evaporated amid the COVID-19 pandemic, as Trump blamed China for the outbreak and allowed his subordinates wide latitude to pursue aggressive policies toward Beijing.
Furthermore, if China fails to reach a deal with Trump on trade and tariffs, that will likely end the prospects for a quasi-détente, as Beijing will not have a chance to move on to other issues. Without a deal in the near term, China hawks in Trump’s administration will likely have an opening to push hard against Beijing, leading to tougher sanctions, broader technology export restrictions, intensified military posturing in the Indo-Pacific, and stronger diplomatic support for Taiwan.
ENTENTE OR ESCALATION?
Beijing’s prospects for reconciliation in Europe are similarly limited, although the downside risks are smaller. China’s consistent support for Russia’s war effort, combined with years of aggressive political, diplomatic, and economic pressure on European states, has eroded its position across much of the continent. The EU has criticized Beijing for enabling Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine by exporting technology and helping sustain the Russian economy, softening the bite of Western sanctions. China’s joint military exercises and defense consultations with Russia have heightened European concerns about the long-term security threat on Europe’s eastern flank. Even European businesses that once saw China as a critical market have started reassessing the scope and scale of their investments in the country.
Trump’s disputes with Europe, coupled with a potential settlement in Ukraine, certainly present Beijing with a short window to repair its relationships on the continent. Although Beijing has remained on the sidelines of the negotiations the Trump administration is conducting with Moscow and Kyiv, it is exploring opportunities to engage if a cease-fire is agreed upon. Despite its strong partnership with Russia, China has managed to preserve relations with Ukraine, which in turn has carefully managed diplomatic ties in the hope that China might eventually use its influence to restrain Russia from pursuing even more aggressive options.
Chinese support could be valuable to a postwar Ukraine. If a lasting cease-fire or peace arrangement can be established, reconstruction could cost more than $500 billion, according to a recent estimate by the European Commission, the Ukrainian government, the UN, and the World Bank. Few countries are as well positioned as China to support Ukraine’s post-conflict development. Beijing would be happy to play this role, given the relatively limited risks involved and the prospect of using financial support for Ukraine to advance China’s economic, technological, and strategic interests in Europe. China has a well-developed toolkit of state-owned enterprises, private firms, and state-bank lending that can bring financing, operational capability, personnel, and technology to developing countries, as shown by its Belt and Road Initiative. Indeed, Kyiv has already turned to Beijing for just that kind of help. Last year, a senior official led a delegation of Ukrainian companies to Beijing to ask “Chinese companies to take a more active part in helping Ukraine, in particular in developing trade and investment relations.” If a peace deal is reached, expect many more such visits.
Participation in Ukrainian reconstruction efforts would not, by itself, mend China’s relations with Europe, but peace in Ukraine would eliminate a significant source of tension. Already, Xi has worked to capitalize on the fracturing of the transatlantic alliance, dispatching Chinese diplomats across the European continent to promote China as a reliable alternative partner, emphasizing opportunities for stable economic cooperation and criticizing perceived U.S. unreliability and unilateralism. For now, this outreach remains largely rhetorical, but it is setting the groundwork for deeper economic and diplomatic initiatives down the line. An end to the war in Ukraine could allow China to move forward with long-stalled goals, such as by reopening talks on a major EU-Chinese investment deal, the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, which was put on ice in 2021.
A thoroughgoing European reorientation toward China, however, would require Beijing to change its behavior to a far greater extent. In particular, it would need to curb what Europe sees as China’s industrial overcapacity and distance itself from Moscow. The Chinese market no longer possesses the gravitational pull it once did, thanks to a slowdown in domestic growth, sluggish consumer spending, and a more interventionist and ideological party-state. Beijing now actively competes with European economies, especially Germany’s. And rather than expecting Trump’s overtures to Russia to peel Moscow and Beijing apart, Europe understands that China will remain Russia’s “decisive enabler,” as a NATO statement described it last year. Unless Beijing overhauls these unpopular policies—which it seems unwilling or unable to do—China cannot realistically expect major gains in Europe.
Even modest progress could stall and China’s relations with Europe could deteriorate if lasting peace in Ukraine proves elusive and violence escalates. An intensified conflict would force China into an unenviable choice between distancing itself from Russia, thereby alienating a crucial partner, and openly increasing its military and economic support for Moscow, removing any remaining European doubts about China’s complicity in the war in Ukraine. Beijing would then see its room for diplomatic maneuver sharply constrained across the continent.
Beijing’s prospects for reconciliation in Europe are similarly limited, although the downside risks are smaller. China’s consistent support for Russia’s war effort, combined with years of aggressive political, diplomatic, and economic pressure on European states, has eroded its position across much of the continent. The EU has criticized Beijing for enabling Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine by exporting technology and helping sustain the Russian economy, softening the bite of Western sanctions. China’s joint military exercises and defense consultations with Russia have heightened European concerns about the long-term security threat on Europe’s eastern flank. Even European businesses that once saw China as a critical market have started reassessing the scope and scale of their investments in the country.
Trump’s disputes with Europe, coupled with a potential settlement in Ukraine, certainly present Beijing with a short window to repair its relationships on the continent. Although Beijing has remained on the sidelines of the negotiations the Trump administration is conducting with Moscow and Kyiv, it is exploring opportunities to engage if a cease-fire is agreed upon. Despite its strong partnership with Russia, China has managed to preserve relations with Ukraine, which in turn has carefully managed diplomatic ties in the hope that China might eventually use its influence to restrain Russia from pursuing even more aggressive options.
Chinese support could be valuable to a postwar Ukraine. If a lasting cease-fire or peace arrangement can be established, reconstruction could cost more than $500 billion, according to a recent estimate by the European Commission, the Ukrainian government, the UN, and the World Bank. Few countries are as well positioned as China to support Ukraine’s post-conflict development. Beijing would be happy to play this role, given the relatively limited risks involved and the prospect of using financial support for Ukraine to advance China’s economic, technological, and strategic interests in Europe. China has a well-developed toolkit of state-owned enterprises, private firms, and state-bank lending that can bring financing, operational capability, personnel, and technology to developing countries, as shown by its Belt and Road Initiative. Indeed, Kyiv has already turned to Beijing for just that kind of help. Last year, a senior official led a delegation of Ukrainian companies to Beijing to ask “Chinese companies to take a more active part in helping Ukraine, in particular in developing trade and investment relations.” If a peace deal is reached, expect many more such visits.
Participation in Ukrainian reconstruction efforts would not, by itself, mend China’s relations with Europe, but peace in Ukraine would eliminate a significant source of tension. Already, Xi has worked to capitalize on the fracturing of the transatlantic alliance, dispatching Chinese diplomats across the European continent to promote China as a reliable alternative partner, emphasizing opportunities for stable economic cooperation and criticizing perceived U.S. unreliability and unilateralism. For now, this outreach remains largely rhetorical, but it is setting the groundwork for deeper economic and diplomatic initiatives down the line. An end to the war in Ukraine could allow China to move forward with long-stalled goals, such as by reopening talks on a major EU-Chinese investment deal, the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, which was put on ice in 2021.
A thoroughgoing European reorientation toward China, however, would require Beijing to change its behavior to a far greater extent. In particular, it would need to curb what Europe sees as China’s industrial overcapacity and distance itself from Moscow. The Chinese market no longer possesses the gravitational pull it once did, thanks to a slowdown in domestic growth, sluggish consumer spending, and a more interventionist and ideological party-state. Beijing now actively competes with European economies, especially Germany’s. And rather than expecting Trump’s overtures to Russia to peel Moscow and Beijing apart, Europe understands that China will remain Russia’s “decisive enabler,” as a NATO statement described it last year. Unless Beijing overhauls these unpopular policies—which it seems unwilling or unable to do—China cannot realistically expect major gains in Europe.
Even modest progress could stall and China’s relations with Europe could deteriorate if lasting peace in Ukraine proves elusive and violence escalates. An intensified conflict would force China into an unenviable choice between distancing itself from Russia, thereby alienating a crucial partner, and openly increasing its military and economic support for Moscow, removing any remaining European doubts about China’s complicity in the war in Ukraine. Beijing would then see its room for diplomatic maneuver sharply constrained across the continent.
Ultimately, the best Beijing may hope to achieve in its relationships with the United States and Europe could be to limit the substantial downside risks of the present disorder. But Beijing is better positioned to make gains elsewhere. The Trump administration’s unconventional and unpredictable foreign policy is creating openings in Africa, Latin America, and among China’s Asian neighbors. Long-standing U.S. allies and partners in these regions may not pivot decisively toward China, but Trump’s actions, including abrupt withdrawals from international agreements, wavering security commitments, and erratic economic policies, are compelling many to reconsider their dependence on Washington. As countries hedge against potential U.S. retrenchment, Beijing stands ready to present itself as a dependable partner. The “profound changes” that Xi sees in Europe and the United States may not yet have provided Beijing with the chance to reimagine its relationships with the West, but the story across the rest of the globe may prove quite different.
Nenhum comentário:
Postar um comentário